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 This dissertation empirically measures how the laws governing taxation and finance 
affect behavior and addresses how those laws should adapt to changing circumstances.  The first 
chapter examines the effect of joint-taxation and “marriage bonuses” on marriage formation in 
the United States in the late 1940s and early 1950s.  It uses a natural experiment to identify the 
effect and finds that tax incentives caused an increase in the marriage rate of up to 9%.  The 
second chapter shows that idiosyncratic risk has spiked in every economic downturn since the 
1920s and develops new models to explain this phenomenon.  It then explores the implications of 
spikes in idiosyncratic risk for corporate and securities law.  The third chapter compares the 
existing corporate tax to a hypothetical “cash flow tax” to determine how much of the corporate 
tax base is composed of the normal return to capital.  It finds that the normal return to capital 
made up a relatively small percentage of the corporate tax base over the last 20 years.  Because 
taxes on the normal return to capital are the most likely to be passed on to labor, this suggests 





Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
This dissertation contains three additional chapters applying empirical methods to issues 
in the law of tax and corporations and finance. The second chapter of this dissertation deals with 
the vexing question of how to tax married couples, which has remained controversial since the 
adoption of the federal income tax over a century ago.  The appropriate answer to this question 
depends in part on how sensitive couples are to taxes when deciding to marry. Yet we know 
surprisingly little about how taxes shape couples’ marriage choices.  The chapter begins to fill 
that gap using a natural experiment generated by the halting shift in how the income tax treated 
married couples in the mid-Twentieth Century.  The system moved from taxing married couples 
as two individuals—in which case marriage largely did not affect taxes—to taxing married 
couples on their joint income.  At the time of this shift, joint taxation lowered couples’ taxes 
upon marriage.  The change to joint taxation, however, came later to some states, creating a 
natural experiment to study its impact on marriage rates.   
The chapter shows that annual marriage rates increased by 9% in the relevant states after 
the introduction of joint taxation made marriage tax-advantaged, with affected men marrying 3 to 
5 months sooner on average.  This suggests that at any given time during this period there were 
tens or hundreds of thousands of married couples in the United States who would not have been 
married if not for the tax incentives.  Couples appear to have been unexpectedly responsive to 
the tax changes given that unmarried cohabitation was not acceptable under the social mores of 
the day.  If anything, Americans today are likely more sensitive to taxes when deciding whether 
and when to marry, suggesting that joint taxation continues to affect marriage decisions today. 
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This in turn strengthens the case for returning to individual taxation of marriage if the goal is to 
avoid inefficiently distorting people’s marriage decisions.  By contrast, if the government wishes 
to encourage marriage, the results imply that using the tax code may be effective under some 
circumstances, but further analysis suggests that joint taxation remains a poor choice for doing 
so.  
The third chapter, coauthored with Merritt Fox and Ronald Gilson and published in the 
Columbia Law Review, addresses a puzzle which we first identified during the 2008 recession 
and important for understanding how the capital market prices common stocks and in turn, for 
the intersection between law and finance. During the crisis, there was a dramatic five-fold spike, 
across all industries, in “idiosyncratic risk”—the volatility of individual-firm share prices after 
adjustment for movements in the market as a whole. 
This phenomenon is not limited to the most recent financial crisis. The third chapter uses 
an empirical review to show that a dramatic spike in idiosyncratic risk has occurred with every 
major downturn from the 1920s through the recent financial crisis. It canvasses three possible 
explanations for this phenomenon. Thereafter, the chapter explores the implications of these 
crisis-induced volatility spikes for certain legal issues that depend analytically on valuation 
methodology and hence are affected by volatility: using event studies to determine materiality 
and loss causation in fraud-on-the-market securities litigation, determining materiality in cases 
involving claims of both insider trading and misstatements or omissions in registered public 
offerings, and determining the extent of deference given to a corporate board that rejects an 
acquisition offer at a premium above the pre-offer market price. 
This analysis shows that the conventional use of event studies during periods of 
economic-crisis-induced volatility spikes results in understating the number of occasions when a 
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corporate misstatement can be shown to have had a meaningful impact on a firm’s stock price. 
Relatedly, the analysis suggests that during crisis times, insiders have substantially more 
opportunities to profit from trading on the nonpublic information that they possess and issuers 
conducting offerings have more opportunities to sell securities at an inflated price. Analysis 
shows that trying to cure this problem by lowering the standard of what is considered statistically 
significant is as likely to be socially harmful as socially beneficial. These conclusions counsel 
that the best response to the reduced effectiveness of private litigation as a deterrent to securities 
law violations during crisis times is to provide additional resources to SEC enforcement. Lastly, 
with respect to Delaware courts’ recognition of “substantive coercion” as a justification for 
target-corporation deployment of takeover defenses—arguably a dubious justification in normal 
times—crisis-induced idiosyncratic-risk spikes provide an unusually plausible claim that target 
shareholders may indeed make a mistake in tendering into a hostile offer. Analysis of the timing 
of the spikes in recent cases, however, shows that the claim is tenuous even in these 
circumstances. 
 The fourth chapter presents new evidence from U.S. corporate tax returns comparing the 
existing tax to a hypothetical cash flow tax, which exempts the normal return to capital.  Under 
reasonable assumptions, the corporate tax raised only 4% of its revenue from the normal return 
from 1995 to 2013.  The similarity of the revenue raised by the hypothetical cash flow tax and 
the actual corporate tax has two important implications.  First, under the Treasury’s model for 
distributing the corporate tax, 50% of the burden of taxes on the normal return to capital 
ultimately are borne by labor, while 100% of the burden of taxes on “supernormal returns” like 
economic rents falls on capital owners. Under this model, these results show that the corporate 
tax burden falls only on capital owners because the current tax raises essentially no revenue from 
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the normal return to capital.  This result differs from Treasury’s current estimate that roughly 
40% of the tax is raised from the normal return and thus that 20% of the tax is ultimately borne 
by labor.  Second, the results show that the United States could switch to a cash flow tax without 
sacrificing much revenue, but the efficiency gains would be smaller than if the current tax raised 
more revenue from the normal return.  Finally, the chapter explores why the tax raised from the 
normal return appears to have fallen over time, finding both theoretically and empirically that 
two factors are associated with this decline: (1) decreases in the riskless return to capital as 
measured by rates on Treasury notes, and (2) increased investment in intangible capital by 
businesses which has largely been given cash flow treatment under the corporate tax. 
  
 5 
Chapter 2 Do Taxes Affect Marriage? Lessons from History 
INTRODUCTION  
And to get to the point, if we were to file a joint return, it would seem to me that with the 
two exemptions, a joint return would not only be feasible, but economically sound. 
Indeed.  Taxwise.   
 
Jack Lemmon in Phffft (1954) (asking his girlfriend to marry him) 
  
Policymakers face a fundamental choice in implementing a progressive income tax: treat 
married couples as two individuals, or as a unit.  There is an inherent tension in this decision.  
Treating married couples like any two individuals ensures that their income taxes will not change 
at marriage or divorce.  This means that both marriage decisions and other important choices, 
like whether to work outside the home, will not be distorted by marriage taxation.
1
  Under 
individual taxation, however, married couples with the same total income may pay different 
taxes depending on how income is divided among the spouses.  In addition, the government must 
prevent spouses from shifting income so as to reduce their taxes.  Taxing couples on their joint 
income solves these problems, but necessitates having couples’ taxes change at marriage.  Thus 
under joint taxation, policymakers must then decide whether couples’ taxes will rise or fall at 
marriage, leading to either “marriage bonuses” or “marriage penalties.”  These bonuses and 
particularly penalties are perceived by many as inequitable and the tax changes at marriage may 
also distort marriage and employment choices.  
                                                 
1
 This study is concerned with income taxes, so when I refer to a “tax” I mean income tax, unless otherwise 
noted.  
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There will always be a tension in deciding between individual and joint taxation because 
the advantages associated with each cannot be fully combined.  It is impossible for an income tax 
to be (1) progressive, (2) marriage neutral, and (3) tax all couples with the equal income the 
same way (“couples neutrality”).2  To see this, consider two couples: W and X, who each earn 
$50,000 per year, and Y and Z, who earn $100,000 and $0 per year, respectively.  Prior to 
marriage, progressivity implies that Y’s taxes exceed W and X’s combined taxes.  Marriage 
neutrality requires the total taxes of each couple not change at marriage, so Y and Z must pay 
more tax than W and X after each couple marries.  This of course violates couples neutrality.  
Upholding couples neutrality instead requires either the taxes of W and X or Y and Z change at 
marriage, or both, violating marriage neutrality.  Tax scholars frequently refer to the 
impossibility of meeting all three goals as the trilemma.
3
   
In theory and practice, progressivity has been seen as too important to give way before 
the other two principles.  From the start of the modern income tax in 1913 to 1948, the United 
States (largely) chose marriage neutrality by employing individual taxation.  Since 1948, it has 
prioritized couple’s neutrality by using joint taxation, which has often led to large tax changes at 
marriage.   Single-earner couples have consistently received marriage bonuses, with couples’ 
total taxes falling at marriage.  For example, a single-earner couple with income each year 
                                                 
2
 See, e.g., Tax Treatment of Single Persons and Married Persons Where Both Spouses Are Working: Hearings 
Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 92d Cong. 78-79 (1972) (statement of Edwin S. Cohen, Ass't Sec'y for 
Tax Pol'y).   
3
 For a sample of the discussion of the appropriate tax treatment of marriage discussing the trilemma, see, e.g., 
Lily Kahng, One Is the Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint Return World, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 651 
(2010); Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. Cal. L. Rev. 339 (1994); Edward McCaffery, 
TAXING WOMEN (1997); Michael J. McIntyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a Comprehensive and 
Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1572 (1977); Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 
27 STAN. L. REV. 1389 (1975). See also Anne Alstott, Updating the Welfare State: Marriage, the Income Tax, and 
Social Security in the Age of Individualism, 66 TAX L. REV 695 (2014) (arguing that the trilemma should no longer 
be viewed as central to the taxation of the family given the “deinstitutionalization” of marriage). Yair Listokin in, 
Taxation and Marriage: A Reappraisal, 67 TAX L. REV. 185, 191 (2013), also quite rightly points out that although 
the trilemma is frequently framed as requiring picking either couples or marriage neutrality, violating both 
principles slightly might be better than upholding one neutrality completely while badly violating the other.   
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equivalent to $100,000 in today’s dollars would have seen their taxes fall on average by $4,423 
per year after marriage over the period 1948 to 2016.
4
  By contrast, dual-earner couples have 
faced marriage penalties on average since a change in law in 1969, when marriage penalties were 
first made common.
5
  Moreover, although Congress moved to reduce or eliminate marriage 
penalties as part of the Bush tax cuts,
6
  recent estimates suggest that about 40% of married 
couples still face marriage penalties, averaging about $1,500 per year (or $28 billion total), while 
55% enjoyed marriage bonuses averaging about $2,300 per year (or $60 billion total).
7
  The 
remaining roughly 5% of couples saw no change in taxes as a result of their marriage.  Even 
these sizable figures probably understate the size of income tax changes resulting from marriage.  
The same authors estimate that returning fully to a system of individual taxation would have 
raised revenue by $140 billion in 2009, or about 15% of total personal income tax revenue for 
that year.
8
   
Although these tax changes at marriage are longstanding, we know relatively little about 
how, if at all, they shape marriage decisions.  This chapter helps to fill that gap by using a natural 
                                                 
4
 See infra, Appendix, Figure A-1 (assuming the standard deduction is taken by the single-earner prior to 
marriage and by the couple during marriage and the non-working spouse’s personal exemption was used prior to 
marriage).   
5
 James Alm & J. Sebastian Leguizamon, Whither The Marriage Tax?, 68 NAT’L. TAX J. 251, 263 (2015).  
Marriage penalties were first technically imposed by the creation of head of household status in 1951. See Lawrence 
Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the Perplexed, 54 Tax L. Rev. 1, 70 (2000).   
6
 Pub. L. No. 107-16, §§ 101, 301-302, 115 Stat. 38, 41, 53-54 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 1(f), 1(i), 
63(c) (2012)); Lawrence Zelenak, For Better and Worse: The Differing Income Tax Treatments of Marriage at 
Difference Income Levels, 93 N. CAROLINA L. REV. 783, 807 (2014). 
7
 See Alm & Leguizamon, supra note 5, at 261.  The number of taxpayers facing marriage penalties is arguably 
inflated (and the number receiving bonuses is therefore likewise arguably too low) because the authors’ baseline is 
the couple’s most advantageous tax position if unmarried, including having the higher earner file as head of 
household if the couple has children.  Some people would think of the marriage penalty calculation as being most 
naturally done relative to a system with only individual filing.  This is particularly true because head of household 
status itself exists (at least originally) only to provide some of the tax benefits of marriage to single parents. See 
Jacob Goldin & Zachary D. Liscow, Beyond Head of Household: Rethinking the Taxation of Single Parents, TAX L. 
REV (forthcoming 2017).   
8
 See Alm & Leguizamon, supra note 5, at 273 (reform includes eliminating head of household status); OMB, 
BUDGET OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2011 at 152 (listing 2009 personal income tax receipts), available 
at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2011-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2011-BUD.pdf   
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experiment generated by what Judge Henry Friendly called marriage taxation’s “long and stormy 
history.”9  Specifically, under the federal income tax, the shift to joint taxation in the mid-20th 
century occurred at different times in different states.  In that period, joint taxation created only 
marriage bonuses—whereas marriage had been largely tax neutral before—because it permitted 
“full income splitting.” Under full income splitting, spouses were taxed like two individuals, 
except that each was attributed 50% of the couple’s joint income, regardless of the actual 
division of income between them.  This lowered the taxes of couples with enough income to be 
taxed progressively.  
As a formal matter, the 1948 Revenue Act was to work a nationwide change by adopting 
joint taxation with full income splitting.  In practice, however, the Act’s adoption of joint 
taxation only affected “common law” states, where each spouse owns her wages and income 
from assets in her name.  Joint taxation with full income splitting had already come years before 
in the other states, which had laws providing that most income received during marriage 
becomes the “community property” of both spouses.  This was because in 1930, the Supreme 
Court, in Poe v. Seaborn,
10
 interpreted the tax code to allow each spouse in community property 
states to report half of the community income on her individual tax return, using the rationale 
that each had an equal ownership interest in the income.  Also important for this study, the 1948 
Act had no effect on couples in either type of state whose income was low enough that they did 
not pay income taxes or else were in the lowest bracket.  This is an important additional feature 
of the natural experiment examined in the chapter because it can help control for confounding 
                                                 
9
 See Druker v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1982) (upholding the constitutionality of marriage 
penalties). 
10
 282 U.S. 101, 101 (1930). 
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factors which might affect common law and community property states differently and otherwise 
be confused for the effect of the Act.    
The 1948 Revenue Act sets up a natural “difference-in-difference” design to measure the 
effect on marriage decisions of the marriage bonus that comes from joint taxation with full 
income splitting.
11
  The tax incentives to marry of residents of the community property states and 
lower income persons in both types of states did not change in 1948 and their behavior can be 
used as controls for what would have happened among affected individuals in the common law 
states without the Act.  In particular, using the publicly available sample of the 1960 census, I 
construct a history of first marriages for Americans in the six years before, and six years after, 
passage of the Act (1942-1947 and 1948-1953).
12
  This allows me to calculate the likelihood a 
person who has never married weds in a given year (hereinafter simply “the marriage rate”).  I 
then examine whether the marriage rate for higher income people in common law states (the 
“treated group”) 13 increased in the years following the Act, compared to changes in the control 
groups.   
The evidence shows that after the 1948 Revenue Act was enacted, marriage rates of 
higher income people in common law states increased, both absolutely and, more importantly, 
                                                 
11
 Seaborn could also be used as a similar natural experiment, but, as discussed below, only the rich paid 
income taxes at the time.  Only about 3% of American adults filed an income tax return in 1930, compared with 
about 60% in 1947.  See infra, note 66.  The small population affected by Seaborn, as well as data limitations in the 
1940 census, limit our ability to study the effect of the case with sufficient precision.   
12
 The 1948 Revenue Act was enacted April 2, 1948 after Congress overrode President Truman’s veto and 
became effective for the entire 1948 tax year.  Pub. L. No. 471, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.  Truman twice vetoed similar 
legislation in 1947.  See Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family: The Revenue Act of 1948, 61 HARV. L. 
REV. 1097 (1948).  To the extent some couples in common law states married in 1947 in anticipation of joint 
taxation with income splitting, this will cut against my finding an effect from the 1948 Act because these marriages 
increase the baseline marriage rate in the period before the Act.  
13
 I will sometimes refer to higher income people in common law states as the “treated or treatment group” to 
remind the reader as simply as possible whose marriage incentives were changed by the 1948 Act.  This language is 
common in economics and derives from randomized controlled trials in medicine in which there is a treatment and 
control (placebo) group.   
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relative to the control groups.
14
  For example, at the aggregate level, the marriage rate among 
treated men increased from an average of 8.9% in the six years before the Act to 10.1% in the six 
years after (or 1.2%), while the marriage rates of their higher income counterparts in the 
community property (control) states increased only from 9.7% to 10.2% (or 0.5%).  By contrast, 
marriage rates among low income men showed the opposite pattern.  Among those men, 
marriage rates rose faster in community property states (rising 1.4% compared to 1.0%).  This 
rough cut of the data intuitively suggests that confounding factors were not driving the faster 
increase in the marriage rate among treated men in common law states because that pattern does 
not hold among the untreated, lower income men.  
In the analysis below, I adjust for the behavior of the control groups and a variety of other 
individual factors in a difference in difference regression model.  I estimate that the marriage rate 
of treated men in common law states increased by about 9% after the 1948 Act (a 0.8% increase 
in the rate under the Act compared to a 9.3% baseline marriage rate).  The increase in the 
marriage rate is primarily caused by men marrying 3 to 5 months sooner on average than would 
have been predicted absent the Act, rather than the Act inducing men who would not otherwise 
have married to wed.  Given that unmarried cohabitation was socially unacceptable at the time—
presumably adding to the underlying significance of a couple’s decision to marry—couples 
appear to have been surprisingly sensitive to tax considerations in making this decision.
15
   
The Act also appears to have indirectly caused other important changes in couples’ lives, 
with treated couples having more children.  On average 8 in 100 affected couples is estimated to 
have had an extra child as a result of the Act.  This makes sense both because the Act seems to 
                                                 
14
 “Higher” and “lower” income are defined in the Data section, infra.  
15
 See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, For Better and Worse: The Differing Income Tax Treatments of Marriage at 
Difference Income Levels, 93 N. CAROLINA L. REV. 783, 792 (2014) (arguing that when cohabitation was socially 
unacceptable, we would not expect marriage bonuses to have large effects on marriage decisions).    
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have caused couples to marry younger and reduced married women’s financial incentives to 
participate in the labor force by effectively increasing their marginal tax rate.
16
  Both factors 
pushed couples toward having more children.  Moreover, the 1948 Act increased the take-home 
income of couples at the beginning of the Baby Boom, which also likely allowed them to have 
more kids. 
Understanding how couples reacted to marriage bonuses in the Post-War period reveals a 
previously unrecognized role for federal tax policy in increases in marriage and fertility during 
the Baby Boom.  Moreover, it can also shed new light on the long running debate about the 
appropriate tax treatment of marriage. By maintaining joint taxation since 1948, the United 
States has broken with a global trend over the latter part of the 20
th
 century of countries moving 
from joint to individual taxation of marriage.  In 1970, just six of twenty-two developed 
countries used individual taxation, while the rest, like the United States, used joint taxation.
17
  
From 1970 to 1990, however, ten of those countries, including the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand, switched to some form of individual taxation.
18
 No developed country switched from 
individual to joint taxation. 
                                                 
16
 During this period, the vast majority of married women earned less than their husbands if they worked 
outside the home.  Under individual taxation, married women would therefore tend to be taxed in lower brackets, but 
under joint taxation women’s marginal income would be taxed at a higher rate because their husband’s income 
would drive up the couple’s bracket.  See infra note 31 and accompanying text. 
17
 See Congressional Budget Office, For Better or Worse: Marriage and the Federal Income Tax, 59 (1997) 
(discussing joint taxation among members of the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation 
(OECD)) 
18
 Most of these countries adopted individual taxation for wages and salary only, while pooling unearned 
income among the spouses, and then taxing it either to the higher earner or apportioning it to the spouses by 
formula.  Thus these systems are to some extent a hybrid: individual taxation for wage and salary income and joint 
taxation for capital income.  See id; see also Oliver Oldman & Ralph Temple, Comparative Analysis of the Taxation 
of Married Persons, 12 STANFORD L. REV. 585, 585-86 (1960) (discussing the tax systems of various countries 
before the trend towards individual taxation began).  One motive, albeit not the main one, for the U.K.’s switch to 
individual taxation was to avoid discouraging marriage.  See Stephanie Hunter McMahon, London Calling: Does the 
UK's Experience with Individual Taxation Clash with the US's Expectations, 55 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 159, 187 (2010).  
 12 
Scholars have strenuously debated whether the United States should join those other 
countries.
19
  The arguments for choosing either couples neutrality (and joint taxation) or 
marriage neutrality (and individual taxation) invoke more basic concepts of tax fairness and 
economic efficiency.
20
  The results of this chapter strengthen the efficiency case for marriage 
neutrality, i.e., the libertarian case stemming from the view that the choice to marry should not 
be distorted by its tax effects.  The more sensitive Americans are to taxes in making these 
decisions, the greater the efficiency cost from joint taxation.
21
 American’s unexpected 
responsiveness to taxes in the Post-War period suggests joint taxation continues to effect 
marriage decisions today.  Indeed, the two most readily identifiable changes in the decades since 
the study period would push most single-earner couples toward paying more attention to taxes in 
making marriage decisions. Those changes are (1) the dramatic rise in cohabitation, which has 
given couples a largely socially acceptable way to live together without marriage, and (2) 
increases in marriage bonuses today for single-earner couples with income equivalent to the 
“high income” couples around 1948 ($50,000 to $110,000 per year in today’s dollars).  Thus, 
although we cannot know with certainty, there are good reasons to believe taxes may exert a 
larger influence on the marriage decisions of single-earner couples making $50,000 to $110,000 
today.  If true, this would make the estimates in this chapter a floor on the effect of taxes today 
for those couples.
22
   To the extent one puts any weight on the desirability of not having taxes 
                                                 
19
 See, supra note 3. 
20
 See Listokin, supra note 3, at 191; see also Alm & Leguizamon, supra note 5 (noting the efficiency costs of 
distorting marriage decisions).   
21
 In economic models, it is often assumed that taxes have no impact on the decision to get married.  For 
example, the most prominent theory article on joint taxation makes this assumption.  See Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, 
Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Emmanuel Saez, The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples, 77 ECONOMETRICA 537 
(2009).  All modeling requires simplification, but my results suggest that this model omits a reasonably significant 
feature of the optimal tax problem. I thank Zach Liscow for pointing this out.  
22
 Note that single-earner couples today constitute a much smaller proportion of married couples than during the 
study period.  On the other hand, today a significantly larger percentage of single-earner couples earn enough 
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directly shape whether a couple marries or not, the results of the chapter therefore augment the 
case for returning to individual taxation of married couples.  
To the extent the government instead wishes to promote marriage, the results imply that 
using the tax code can be effective in doing so.  Nevertheless, joint taxation with full income 
splitting for all married taxpayers remains a poor tool for encouraging marriage relative to 
providing a credit of fixed size to all married taxpayers. The vast majority of the benefits from 
joint taxation with full income splitting accrue to the richest taxpayers, whom the evidence 
indicates are less sensitive, per dollar, to tax incentives to marry.  Moreover, dual income 
couples, who now make up a substantial majority of all couples, receive little or no benefits.  
And joint taxation with income splitting causes a host of other problems.  For example, it 
reinforces gender roles by discouraging married women, where they are the lower earning 
partner in a heterosexual relationship, from working outside the home and this distortion is also 
quite inefficient economically.
23
   
The remainder of this chapter is divided into six parts.  The first reviews the literature on 
how the income tax affects marriage decisions.  The second provides background on community 
property and gives the history of how community property income was taxed by the federal 
government, leading to Seaborn in 1930 and eventually the 1948 Act. The third discusses the 
census data used in this study.  The fourth offers the primary results and analyzes the robustness 
of the result.  The fifth discusses the main results and their implications for policy.  The sixth 
briefly concludes.  
                                                                                                                                                             
income to obtain sizable marriage bonuses.  This means that the proportion of all married couples receiving large 
marriage bonuses is roughly similar today as during the study period.  See, infra note 113 and accompanying text.   
23
 See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 3, at 365.   
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LITERATURE  
This chapter contributes generally to a rich literature empirically estimating how 
economic factors affect marriage decisions, and more directly to a smaller literature on the role 
of U.S. taxes.  The earliest attempt to empirically identify the impact of U.S. income taxes used 
aggregate data on the U.S. marriage rate and the size of the marriage penalties and bonuses 
through time.
24
 It found a relationship between taxes and marriage, but the reliability of such 
aggregate analysis is low because it cannot control for unobserved underlying variables that over 
time correlate with changes in tax penalties/bonuses and also affect marriage rates. For example, 
the loosening of social attitudes toward marriage starting in the 1960s correlates with increases in 
marriage penalties through time, making it difficult to ascertain how important these penalties 
were in explaining the drop in marriage rates. Later papers are more convincing as they tried to 
estimate this relationship using data at the individual level.  The papers which most convincingly 
identify a causal relationship between marriage and taxes showed that “notches” in the tax code 
(or transfer system) have an impact on the timing of marriage.
25
 These notches are places where, 
by slightly adjusting timing of marriage, taxpayers can significantly change their taxes (or 
benefits).  These studies are useful in showing that couples are paying attention to taxes when 
deciding when to marry within a short time frame, but the importance of these timing games is 
usually limited.    
                                                 
24
 See, e.g., James Alm & Leslie A. Whittington, Income Taxes and the Marriage Decision, 27 APPLIED ECON. 
25 (1995).  For summaries of the literature, see James Alm, Stacy Dickert-Conlin & Leslie A. Whittington, Policy 
Watch: The Marriage Penalty, 13 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 251 (1999); Nancy Burstein, Economic Influences On 
Marriage And Divorce, 26 J. POLICY ANALYSIS AND MGM’T 387 (2007). 
25
 See James Alm & Leslie A. Whittington, Income taxes and the Timing of Marital Decisions, 64 J. PUBLIC 
ECON. 219 (1997) (finding that marriage penalties often cause couples to delay marriage until the next year (e.g., 
from November to January) to avoid being taxed as though they were married for the entire year); Michael J. Brien, 
Stacy Dickert-Conlin &  David A. Weaver, Widows Waiting to Wed?(Re) Marriage and Economic Incentives in 
Social Security Widow Benefits, 39 J. Human Resources 585 (2004) (Widows lose claims on their deceased 
husbands’ social security spousal benefits if they remarry before 60 and the authors find this has a significant effect 
on the timing of remarriage around women’s 60th birthday.). 
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  Scholars have also used data on individual marriage decisions to study the 
broader effect of marriage penalties and bonuses.
26
  This work finds that income tax incentives 
affect marriage rates, although the effects are of moderate size.  For example, James Alm and 
Leslie Whittington estimated that increasing marriage penalties by 10% led to a 13% fall in the 
likelihood of first marriage in a year for women near the mean of their sample from 1968 to 
1992.  These studies are still hampered, however, by the lack of a natural experiment which 
makes it difficult to disentangle whether the estimates actually reflect the causal effect of income 
tax incentives or other factors.    
Similarly, a number of studies have examined the effect of transfer programs embedded 
in the tax code (e.g., the Earned Income Tax Credit) and those outside it (e.g., welfare programs 
like AFDC and later TANF).  Lower income people may face proportionally quite large marriage 
penalties (and sometimes bonuses) from the ways these programs treat the marriage of potential 
participants.  Most of these studies find the programs affect marriage decisions, but do so in 
relatively modest ways.
27
   
Non-tax economic factors have been shown to substantially affect marriage rates and so 
care must be taken to be sure any apparent relation between tax changes and marriage rates is not 
really the result of these other economic causes. Mathew Hill, using data similar to mine, has 
shown that marriage rates fell in areas hit harder by the Depression, as measured by retail sales 
                                                 
26
 See James Alm & Leslie A. Whittington, For Love or Money? The Impact of Income Taxes on Marriage, 66 
ECONOMICA 297 (1999); see also Hector Chade & Gustavo Ventura, Income Taxation And Marital Decisions, 8 
REV. ECON. DYNAMICS 251 (2005) (creating an analytical model of how marriage decisions are made and 
calibrating that model using data).   
27
 See Burstein, supra note 24, at 411-418 (summarizing the literature on the effect of AFDC/TANF, the EITC, 
food stamps, etc).  The behavioral effects of these programs on marriage may be blunted in part by how difficult it is 
for participants (and researchers) to understand “byzantine interactions of the[m]” and what the ultimate effect of 
getting married will be on take home income.  See id. 
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activity.  Hill attributes this to male unemployment and lack of disposable income.
28
 A number 
of other studies also document the effect of wages and employment on marriage in the United 
States and elsewhere.
29
   Therefore, I control for economic conditions at the state level in the 
analysis below.   In addition, I estimate a “fixed effects model” that will control for the effect of 




Prior literature also empirically confirms that the coming of joint taxation also altered 
work incentives.  From 1930 to 1948, a working woman in a community property state would 
usually see her marginal tax rate increase if she married a high earning man, because her tax rate 
was driven up by her husband’s income.  Theory suggests this would reduce her incentives to 
continue working outside the home.  In common law states during this period, where each 
member of a couple was taxed individually, this was not true; there taxation of a wife’s income 
would start at the lowest bracket, no matter her husband’s income.  As noted, the 1948 Revenue 
Act extended joint taxation with income splitting to the common law states. Thus, in these states, 
                                                 
28
 See Matthew Hill, Love in the Time of Depression: The Effect of Economic Downturns on the Probability of 
Marriage, 75 J. Econ. History 163 (2015).  See also Namkee Ahn & Pedro Mira, Job Bust, Baby Bust?: Evidence 
from Spain, 14 J. POPULATION ECON. 505 (2001) (finding male unemployment decreases the probability of 
marriage); Humphrey Southall & David Gilbert, A Good Time to Wed?: Marriage and Economic Distress in 
England and Wales, 1839-1914, 49 ECON. HIST. REV. 35 (1996).     
29
 The literature is substantial. A few papers on the U.S. include: Michael C. Keely, The Economics of Family 
Formation, 15 ECON. INQUIRY 238 (1977) (finding all else equal in the 1960s men with higher wages married 
slightly sooner, while the opposite is true for women); Ted Bergstrom & Robert F. Schoeni, Income Prospects and 
Age-at-Marriage, 9 J. POPULATION ECON. 115 (1996) (evidence that the effect Keely finds is confined to men 
marrying under age 30, and the opposite effect for those who have not married by 30); Megan M. Sweeney & Maria 
Cancian, The Changing Importance of White Women's Economic Prospects for Assortative Mating, 66 J. MARRIAGE 
& FAMILY 1015 (2004) (showing an increasing correlation between a wife’s pre-marriage income and her husband’s 
income for U.S. marriages).  
30
 Intuitively, fixed effects allow one to compare only similar individuals in the model.  For example, I use state, 
age, and income group fixed effects, which means that my estimates implicitly only compare persons from the same 
state, of the same age group, and income group.  Mechanically this is implemented by (in essence) including a 
separate “indicator” variable for each possible combination of state, age, and income group in the regressions below. 
Many factors which affect the marriage rate, say of high income men in Michigan aged 20-24, will presumably not 
change significantly over the twelve year period under study.  Using fixed effects, those factors will be controlled 
for, even if they cannot be directly observed and will be represented in the indicator variable associated with that 
state, age, and income group combination.     
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suddenly, a wife earning less than her husband saw her marginal tax rate driven up by her 
husband’s income. Using a study design similar to this one, Sara LaLumia examined the impact 
of the 1948 changes on labor force participation by women in higher income households in 
common law states, with similar women in community property states as a control.
31
  She found 
that the 1948 changes reduced women’s participation in the workforce in common law states.32 
This study contributes to the literature along a couple of dimensions.  First, the chapter 
examines a clean natural experiment with multiple control groups.  This provides an unusually 
good opportunity to understand the effect of joint taxation with full income splitting on marriage 
during the Post War period and to be more confident that the estimates are not driven by 
confounding factors.  The results suggest the role of federal tax policy in increases in marriage 
during this period (and in the Baby Boom) is greater than has been previously understood.  This 
is a matter of intrinsic historic interest.   
Second, the results may be informative about the effect of federal tax policy today on 
marriage decisions.  Qualitatively, the finding that couples were surprisingly sensitive to tax 
considerations during the Post War period, suggests that joint taxation continues to influence 
marriage decisions today.  This is particularly true because the rise of cohabitation has very 
likely made couples more sensitive to tax considerations in marrying by permitting them a 
socially acceptable option to live together without marriage.  Moreover, for single-earner couples 
                                                 
31
See Sara LaLumia, The Effects of Joint Taxation of Married Couples on Labor Supply and Non-Wage 
Income, 92 J. PUB. ECON.  1698 (2008).   
32
 It is worth noting that LaLumia’s work shows that income splitting affects marriage incentives for at least two 
reasons.  The first is the “bonus” that a married couple will reap if they do not change their work choices after the 
new tax system comes into place.  One can (roughly) imagine this as the effect of keeping the unit of taxation on the 
individual, but having the government providing a credit equal to the amount the couple’s taxes would decline under 
joint taxation if they do not change their labor decisions.  Second, joint taxation will affect the menu of after tax 
wages a married couple may choose from usually by decreasing the husband’s marginal rate and increasing the 
wife’s.  Some couples may find this new menu of after tax wages more appealing than the old menu and that could 
influence marriage incentives as well (although others, of course, could find the new menu less attractive).  In 
addition, even the effect of the “bonus” itself can be decomposed into an income and substitution effect.   
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today making $50,000 to $110,000—an amount equivalent to the earnings of the high income 
couples examined in this study around 1948—marriage bonuses are larger now than in 1948.   
Quantitatively, inferring lessons for today from the results of this chapter is more 
complicated and involves a tradeoff: the natural experiment provides clarity arguably unavailable 
using modern data, but requires one to make strong assumptions about how couples today 
compare to those many decades ago.  While there have been a myriad of changes since the study 
period which are potentially relevant, the importance of the rise of cohabitation and the large 
increases in marriage bonuses for single-earner couples making $50,000 to $110,000 suggests 
that the effects estimated here might reasonably be seen as a floor on the effect of taxes today for 
those couples.  
LEGAL BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
A. Community Property 
Two marital property regimes prevail in the United States: community property and 
separate property, the latter being followed in common law states.
33
 These regimes are quite 
different.  In common law states, income earned by each spouse remains her own separate 
property.  The same holds for income derived from property legally owned by one spouse, even 
if the property was bought with funds from a joint bank account.
34
  In contrast, in community 
                                                 
33
 For basic background see JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 512-514 
(9th ed. 2013). To avoid confusion I will use “common law states” rather than separate property to refer to this 
regime because separate property has its own meaning in the community property system.   
34
 Spouses can enter into various forms of joint ownership, e.g. joint tenancy, if they so choose. Since the 1960s 
even in common law states legal ownership plays a smaller role in the division of property after a divorce under 
“equitable distribution” statutes. Such statutes tend to give the judge wide latitude to divide the assets regardless of 
the nominal owner. During the period in question, though, community property states differed significantly from 
common law states in how property was divided at divorce.  For example, Newsweek reported that “[i]n [common 
law] states, if a husband left his wife or if a wife went home to mother, the best she could hope for was a nominal 
support allowance. In any community property state, the woman automatically came out with half the family 
bankroll.”  Community Dilemma, Oct. 13, 1947, at 64-65. 
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property states “spouses retain separate ownership of property brought to the marriage, but they 
own all earnings and acquisitions from earnings during the marriage in equal, undivided 
shares.”35   
States have different marital property systems because of their differing legal origins.  
Community property exists in states with marriage law based in French and Spanish settlement, 
while common law states derive their marital rules from England. In 1930 at the time of Seaborn, 
Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington a 
community property system. These states are highlighted in orange in the map below, while the 
common law states are in blue.
36
  
Figure 1: Map of Community Property States 
                                                 
35
 DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 33, at 512. It should be noted that within the community property states, 
laws vary some about narrower questions like how to characterize income received during marriage from separate 
property. 
36
 In the 1980s Wisconsin adopted community property, but for all periods relevant to this paper it was a 
common law state. See Palma Maria Forte, Wisconsin Marital Property Act: Sections in Need of Reform, 79 MARQ. 
L. REV. 859 (1995).  As discussed below, five states and Hawaii, which was then a territory, passed community 
property laws shortly before 1948 to try to obtain the tax advantages under Seaborn.  
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B. History of the Taxation of Marriage and the 1948 Revenue Act 
The modern
37
 federal income tax began its life “dominated by an individualistic 
approach” to family taxation.38  Each spouse was taxed on the income she or he earned. This 
largely ensured marriage neutrality.
39
  However, marriage neutrality also meant that in a 
progressive tax system, two married couples with the same total income could pay very different 
taxes.  Two-earner couples would pay less tax than single-earner couples with the same income.  
In 1913, Congress passed the first modern income tax under the newly approved 16
th
 
Amendment. The statute purported to tax “net income arising or accruing from all sources…to 
every citizen of the United States.”40  The 1916 Revenue Act changed the language to tax “the 
net income of every individual.”41 This language “of every individual” persisted in each revenue 
act enacted until Seaborn in 1930.
42
  
The question of how for tax purposes to assign income to spouses in community property 
states proved thorny from the start.  Until 1919 the Treasury held that the husband was taxable 
on all community income.
43
 In 1919 the Treasury adopted a compromise position. Income from 
                                                 
37
 The United States also had an income tax during the Civil War (though it collected little revenue) and 1895, 
but the latter tax had to be abandoned after the Supreme Court ruled large parts of it unconstitutional in Pollock v. 
Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429 (1895). 
38
 Bittker, supra note 3, at 1400. 
39
 There were in fact modest marriage bonuses built into the structure of personal exemptions for much of the 
period before WWII, with personal exemptions for married couples usually more than twice as large as those for 
single individuals.  See Larry Zelenak, A Troubled Relationship from the Start: Marriage and the Income Tax (on 
file with author).  This should not affect the empirical analysis below, however, as the exemptions applied equally 
across both types of states.  
40
 Act of Oct.3, 1913, ch. 16, §II(A)(I), 38 Stat. 166. 
41
 Act of Sept.8, 1916, ch. 463, §I(A), 39 Stat. 463. 
42
Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 101 n. 1 (1930).  See also Dennis J. Ventry Jr., Saving Seaborn: Ownership Not 
Marriage as the Basis of Family Taxation. 86 IND. L.J. 1459 (2011) for a quite complete history of the lead up to 
Seaborn.   
43
 See Douglas Blount Maggs, Community Property and the Federal Income Tax, 14 CAL. L. REV. 351, 354 
(1926).  Maggs reports that “[u]ntil the latter part of 1919 none of the Treasury rulings were made public; for that 
reason references to specific rulings made before that time cannot be given.” Id. 
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what the Treasury thought of as genuinely belonging to the couple as a whole—e.g., bonds 
purchased after marriage—would be split 50:50 on each return. A higher earning husband’s 
salary, however, would be taxed to him in community property states despite the fact that the 
wife had an identical property interest in the salary as in the income from bonds and other 
capital.
44
  This treatment of a husband’s salary essentially mirrored what was allowed in 
common law states.  In those states, salaries and wages could not be split between the spouses 
via intra-family gift or agreement,
45
 but income from capital could be reapportioned using intra-
spousal gifts.
46
 This equivalence with the tax treatment of couples in common law states was 
short-lived, however. In 1920 and 1921 the Attorney General concluded that community 
property states, except California, gave the wife a vested interest in one half of all community 
income and thus required splitting all community income, including wages and salaries.
47
   
In 1926 the Supreme Court upheld California’s exclusion in Robbins v. United States.48  
The Court, via Justice Holmes, agreed with the government that California’s law gave the wife a 
“mere expectancy,” thus validating California’s exclusion from true community property 
treatment.  But the Court went further and concluded that—even if the wife’s interest were 
instead vested under California law—Congress could tax all community income to the husband 
                                                 
44
 Id. at 355; Bittker, supra note 3, at 1406. Along with salaries and wages, income from separate property 
purchased before the marriage was to be taxed to the spouse that owned it.  This interpretation was tenuous in Idaho, 
Louisiana and Texas because in those states the income from separate property is (usually) community property.  
Maggs, supra note 43, at 353; see also IRS, PUBLICATION 555 at 4 n.1 (2014).    
45
 See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930), although the law on splitting income through intra-family agreements 
was relatively unclear at the time Treasury made its 1919 ruling.     
46
 For example, a husband could use his after-tax salary to buy a bond in his wife’s name. Such a gift would 
make the interest on the bond taxable to the wife rather than the husband. See Bittker, supra note 3, at 1401 and 
1403. La Lumia finds a decline in women in common law states reporting non-wage income following the 1948 Act. 
This is consistent with couples previously shifting income to avoid taxes.  However, even in relatively high income 
households, 90% of women reported (to the census) that they had less than $50 of non-wage income, which suggests 
that the majority of high income couples did not make use of income shifting.   La Lumia, supra note 31, at 1711. 
47
 See 32 Ops. Att'y Gen. 298; see also Maggs, supra note 43, at 355; Bittker, supra note 3, at 1406.  In 
California, the Attorney General found that during her husband’s life “the wife has no vested interest in the 
community property, her interest therein being a mere expectancy.” 32 Ops. Att’y Gen. 435, 456. 
48
 269 U.S. 315 (1926).   
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“if it so minded.” After reviewing the power of the husband to manage the property,49 the Court 
concluded that in fact “it was intended [by Congress] to tax him for the whole.”50 Contemporary 
commentators viewed the opinion as “in effect an invitation (or a command) to the Treasury to 




Following Robbins, the Attorney General withdrew his 1920 and 1921 opinions and the 
Treasury moved to tax all community income to the husband.  This led to Seaborn, in which a 
Washington couple challenged the Treasury’s ruling that the husband had to include all 
community income.  There the Supreme Court reversed course and held that all community 
income should be split by the spouses.  The Court found that the “of” in “net income of every 
individual” must connote ownership52 and that under the laws of Washington “the entire property 
and income of the community can no more be said to be that of the husband, than it could rightly 
be termed that of the wife.”53 Taking a more formal approach, the Court found that the husband’s 
broad managerial powers under the family law of the day were not relevant; the wife’s rights in 
the property were equal to his. The opinion all but ignores Robbins, dismissing it as specific to 
California law and ignoring its conclusion that Congress intended to tax all California 
community income to the husband even if the wife had a vested interest in it.
54
 It is difficult to 
explain the Court’s seemingly abrupt reversal.  It is true that Holmes’ conclusion about 
                                                 
49
 In Holmes’ usual high rhetoric, the Court found that “he who has all the power [should] bear the burden and 
[thus]. . . the husband [is] the most obvious target for the shaft.” Id. at 328. Moreover, the Court observed that if the 
wife was unable or unwilling to pay, the government would apparently be unable to seize community property. Id. 
(“[B]ut the [community] fund taxed, while liable to be taken for his debts, is not liable to be taken for the wife's . . . 
so that the remedy for her failure to pay might be hard to find.”).      
50
 Id. at 327. 
51
 Maggs, supra note 43, at 362. 
52
 282 U.S. at 109.   
53
 Id. at 113 
54
 Id. at 116.  
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Congress’ intent was dicta, but it is still puzzling that five Justices, including Justice Holmes, 
joined both Robbins and Seaborn taking seemingly opposite interpretations of the same statutory 
language just four years later.
55
 
In sister cases released the same day as Seaborn, the Court held that community income 
should also be split in Arizona, Texas, and Louisiana.
56
 The Treasury quickly allowed the same 
treatment to Idaho, Nevada, and New Mexico.  Following legislative changes to California’s 
community property law, the Court allowed Californians to begin splitting community income 
starting in 1931.
57
  Thus beginning in 1931 there was a sharp disparity in the tax treatment of 
married couples’ incomes between the eight community property states and common law states.  
This led to a married couple in community property states usually having lower taxes than the 




The disparity between community property and common law states persisted until 
Congress enacted joint filing in 1948.
59
 As enacted, joint filing extended community property-
style income splitting to all of the common law states.  There was considerable activity preceding 
the 1948 Act, however. Some in Congress had tried to reinstitute uniform income tax treatment 
                                                 
55
 In Robbins, Justice Sutherland dissented (without opinion) and Justice Stone recused himself.  Between the 
cases, Chief Justice Taft resigned, and Justice Roberts, who wrote the unanimous opinion in Seaborn, was 
appointed.  In Seaborn, Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Stone (again) recused themselves. 
56
 See Bittker, supra note 3, at 1408. 
57
See United States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792 (1931). 
58
 As discussed in note 46, La Lumia’s work suggests that the vast majority of higher income couples in 
common law states did not shift significant capital income to wives. However, many of the very wealthiest couples 
did so, and the Treasury at the time believed inter-spousal income shifting accounted for a quite substantial loss of 
tax revenue.  See Ventry, supra note 33, at 1511 (citing for example Tax Evasion and Avoidance: Hearings Before 
the Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance, 75th Cong. 310 (1937)).  
59
 For a history of the 1948 Revenue Act and its impact on the taxation of the family see Stanley S. Surrey, 
Federal Taxation of the Family: The Revenue Act of 1948, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1097 (1948).  Surrey called the 
enactment of joint filing the “one bright spot” in the Act.   Id. at 1106.  Technically we should say that the 1948 Act 
allowed for the first practical joint filing.  Joint filing had been allowed since the early days of the income tax, but 
because the tax-rates for joint filers were the same as for individuals this made joint filing very unappealing since 
progressive rates ensured that a couple’s taxes would almost always be higher with a joint return.    
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for community property and common law states on a number of occasions, as early as 1920 and 
most notably during 1941,
60
 but all attempts failed.
61
 In 1939, Oklahoma enacted an optional 
community property system, attempting to get the same tax treatment as its neighbor Texas, to 
which Oklahoma claimed it was losing wealthy taxpayers.
62
  The Treasury refused to recognize 
Oklahoma’s law and was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1944 because Oklahoma’s regime was 
optional.
63
 Not to be deterred, Oklahoma enacted another community property regime in 1945, 
this one mandatory.  The Treasury thus allowed married Oklahomans to begin splitting their 
income in 1946.  It likewise recognized a similar law in Oregon in 1947. When Congress enacted 
the 1948 Revenue Act, Michigan, Nebraska and Hawaii had very recently passed community 
property statutes that were as yet unrecognized by the Treasury.
64
  Indeed, joint taxation was 
passed in 1948 in large part to prevent the remainder of the states from simply opting into 
community property “impetuous[ly]” to get the tax benefits.65  
It is important to note that the income tax changed substantially between the Seaborn 
decision in 1930 and the 1948 Revenue Act.  In 1930 the income tax was paid only by the rich, 
                                                 
60
 See Bittker, supra note 3, at 1409.  The proposed bill in 1941 would have enacted mandatory joint filing, but 
with rates for joint income the same as for single taxpayers.  This form of mandatory joint filing would have created 
uniform taxation across community property and common law states, but at the same time imposed a very 
substantial marriage penalty for two earner couples. 
61
 Congress found it very difficult to pass any legislation removing the favorable treatment from the community 
property states. In hearings on the 1948 bill Senator Edwin Johnson stated in hearings on the Act that “[y]ou cannot 
take it away from the [community property states]; we have tried that.” (quoted in Surrey, supra note 59, at 1105). 
Likewise, Senator Eugene Milliken of Colorado stated to an expert testifying before the Senate who proposed 
overturning Seaborn legislatively: “The difficulty is that it is not a novel thought. It has been tossed in the hopper 
around here a number of times. But legislatively it has not been possible to do.” See id. 
62
 Stephanie Hunter McMahon, To Save State Residents: States' Use of Community Property for Federal Tax 
Reduction, 27 L. & HIST. REV. 585, 593 (2009). 
63
 Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44 (1944).  
64
 Pennsylvania also passed a community property statute in 1947, but the state supreme court ruled that the 
statute violated the state constitution.  See Note, Epilogue to the Community Property Scramble: Problems of 
Repeal, 50 COLUM. L. R. 332, 334 (1950).  The five states and Hawaii that had switched to community property 
quickly reverted after the 1948 Revenue Act.  Carolyn Jones argues that concerns that community property gave 
women too many rights—undermining traditional gender roles—spurred the return to separate property. Carolyn C. 
Jones, Split Income and Separate Spheres: Tax Law and Gender Roles in the 1940s, 6 L. & HIST. REV. 259 (1988).      
65
 S. Rep. No. 1013, 80
th
 Cong. 2d Sess. 25 (1948). 
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as it had been since the tax’s inception in 1913.  About 2.4 million relatively wealthy Americans 
filed returns in 1930.
66
 The nation’s insatiable need for revenue to fight World War II, however, 
turned the income tax into a mass tax.  In 1939 the government collected about $1 billion 
through the individual income tax, in 1945 it raised more than $19 billion, an increase of more 
than 14 fold after adjusting for inflation.
67
 The government achieved this increase in revenue by 
both increasing the number of people paying the tax (through lower exemptions) and by 
substantially increasing rates.  By 1947, nearly 55 million Americans were filing returns. In 1930 
the Code imposed a 1.5% tax on the first $4,000 of ordinary taxable income after exemptions, 
and 3% on the next $4,000. The comparable rates in 1948 were 23% and 33% respectively.
68
   
C. Size of Income-Splitting Tax Advantage 
The Treasury rulings (1920-1926) and Seaborn (1930) made marriage tax-advantaged for 
higher income couples in community property states, but this advantage was small for all but the 
richest citizens until the run up to World War II.  For example, even for a reasonably well off 
single-earner couple with today’s equivalent of $100,000 in income, the marriage bonus was 
moderate or close to zero (depending on the assumptions used concerning the couple’s pre-
marriage taxes) during the period from Seaborn until 1940.
69
   This bonus increased 
                                                 
66
 See Annual Report of the Commissioner for Internal Revenue for 1930, 1931, 1932 (Tables displaying 
number of returns processed from each tax year).  
67
 Annual Report for the Commissioner for Internal Revenue 1946, 1 (“individual income tax and withholding), 
both figures are nominal.  The cumulative inflation rate between 1939 and 1946 was about 29%. 
68
 Based on 1948 rates and using the CPI to update for inflation http://data.bls.gov/ 
69
 Assuming the husband could claim his future wife as a dependent before marriage, there would be basically 
no marriage bonus at all because with two personal exemptions, the husband would be taxed in the first bracket 
only.  If the spouse’s personal exemption was previously unused, the bonus from Seaborn until 1940 averaged 
$1,100.   
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substantially, however, starting in 1941, and averaged $3,000 per year from 1948-1953 (or as 
high as $5,000 on other assumptions).
70
  This is shown in Figure 2: 
Figure 2: Taxes Owed by a Single-Earner Couple with $100,000 in Income 
 
In 1947, the Treasury estimated that extending income splitting to common law states 
would cost $743.5 million (or $8.2 billion in 2016 dollars).
71
  This represented a 5% decline in 
the total individual income taxes collected from common law states.
72
 Treasury’s prediction 
appears to have been roughly accurate: after the 1948 Act, revenues from common law states 
                                                 
70
 Figure 2 assumes the future wife used her full personal exemption prior to marriage.  If not, then the average 
bonus from 1948-1953 was just over $5,000.  For simplicity, I do not adjust Figure 2 for small marriage bonuses 
built into the structure of the personal exemptions in the years 1942-1944, discussed supra in note 39, and I also 
ignore the question of whether the value of the wife’s personal exemption—which could be used by the husband 
after marriage—would have been greater after the couple wedded.   
71
 John D. Morris, Inequities in Tax Cited by Treasury, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1947 at 4. 
72
 See Annual Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for Internal Revenue for Fiscal Year Ended June 
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declined 4 percentage points more than in community property states.
73
  Full income splitting for 
married couples remained in place until 1969, when Congress moved toward the current system.  
The 1969 changes reduced marriage bonuses for single-earner couples, and introduced the first 
marriage penalties for dual-earner couples with similar incomes.
74
  
The differences for married couples between individual taxation and joint taxation with 
income splitting were not just economically important; they also had salience in the popular 
press.  The Wall Street Journal featured an article on the results of Seaborn.
75
 The Los Angeles 
Times featured a breathless front page story about United States v. Malcolm, which allowed 
married California couples to split incomes in 1931.
76
 Similarly, Oklahoma and other states’ 
attempts to obtain income splitting for their residents by switching to community property 
focused attention on the issue, garnering articles in articles in Business Week, Colliers, Harper’s, 
Newsweek, and Time among others.
77
 Not surprisingly, the 1948 extension of income splitting to 
all common law states garnered even more coverage because it affected a much greater portion 
of the population and the Act created much larger savings for those couples than did Seaborn. 
                                                 
73
 See Annual Report of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for Internal Revenue for Fiscal Year Ended June 
1949.  This figure is derived from comparing revenues collected from June 1948 to June 1949 relative to June 1947 
to June 1948—the January to June portion of 1948 should have been largely unaffected the Revenue Act of 1948 
since 1948 taxes would not be collected until 1949.  Even withholding would not have been affected much since the 
Revenue Act was not passed until April 2, 1948.   
74
See Druker v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1982) (detailing a history of the legal challenges to the 
“singles penalty/marriage bonuses). 
75
 Taxes on Community Income, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 1930 at 2; see also Income Tax Facts, WASH. POST, Feb. 
4, 1931 at 11.    
76
 Community Tax Ruling Studied: Married Man’s Salary Held Property of Both, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1931 at 
A1 (reporting the holding in Malcolm even before the full text of the decision had arrived on the West Coast). 
77
 See articles in Business Week, Colliers, Harper’s, Newsweek, and Time among others cited in Carolyn C. 
Jones, Split Income and Separate Spheres: Tax Law and Gender Roles in the 1940s, 6 L. & HIST. REV. 259, 268 n.67 
(1988).  Stanley Surrey, writing in 1948, also noted that “[t]he preceding [history concerning income-splitting is] 
familiar even to non-tax experts, for this phase of federal taxation has been widely discussed.” See Surrey, supra 
note 59, at 1104.   
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During the first tax season when residents of common law states could split incomes, numerous 




The data used in this study are drawn from the 1960 decennial census, available as part of 
the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS).  The 1960 census asked 25% of the 
population about when they married for the first time.  The publicly available sample is built 
solely from this portion of the population, which allows me to create a year-by-year record of 
first marriages from 1942 to 1953 for about 1 million people.
79,80
  Obtaining yearly data is 
important because it allows me to look at changes in marriage rates over this relatively short 
window around the 1948 Revenue Act, making my estimate of the impact of the tax change more 
reliable than looking at changes between one decennial census and another.
81
   
Below, I run my analysis using each of three measures to proxy for those with enough 
income to be affected by the 1948 Act: education, 1960 income projected back to income around 
1948 by adjusting for inflation and economic growth, and a prediction of income in the period 
around 1948 based on a person’s occupation, education, age, and state of residence.  All the 
                                                 
78
 See, e.g., Permit Marital Tax Split In All States In Filing: Results in Lower Levy in Most Cases, CHICAGO 
TRIBUNE, Feb. 3, 1949 at C7; Tax Angles: Joint Returns Save Money for Many, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 4, 1949 at 18; 
Suggestions On Income Tax Returns: Joint Report Works Out Nearly Always Cheapest Procedure, Hartford 
Courant, Feb. 22, 1949 at 3; Joint Return Eases Family Income Taxes: Offers Privilege $3,600 Starting Point One 
Return for Two, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec 7, 1948 at 2. Interestingly, the instructions to the individual tax 
form from 1930 to 1947 do not appear to have discussed community property income splitting.  Perhaps this was 
Treasury’s small way of thumbing its nose at Seaborn. 
79
The 1950 census only requested marriage dates from the 5% of citizens who received the long-form.  Since 
the publicly available portion is only 1% of this 5%, there is not enough data to construct year-by-year measures for 
a large enough population.  Moreover, the effect of the 1948 Revenue Act is likely to have extended beyond 1950.   
80
 Some individuals died between 1948 and 1960.  However, this will primarily be a problem if there is 
differential mortality between common law and community property states and this differential mortality is 
correlated with changes in the marriage rate across income groups.  I see no reason to think this is likely, especially 
because those most likely to be affected by the policy were in their 20s or early 30s around 1948 and therefore were 
quite likely to survive until 1960.    
81
 I can only observe year-by-year changes when people entered their first marriage, rather than all marriages. 
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measures produce fairly comparable results, but in my main specification I use education levels.  
This is in keeping with LaLumia’s related work, which uses college education as an indicator for 
those affected by income splitting.
82
  Married men with at least two years of college education on 
average earned about $5,000 in 1950, enough to generate important tax savings from income 
splitting with a spouse who did not work or who was paid significantly less.
83
  By contrast, the 
median education for married men in 1950 was having completed 9
th
 grade.  Men who 
completed 9
th
 grade or less, earned $2,500 per year on average with a substantial majority not 
making enough to benefit from income splitting.  I use these education levels as the primary 
definition of high and low income.
84
  
I focus on the marriage rate of men because I can use various measures of income to 
confirm my primary results. That is not possible for women because the majority of women in 
higher income households were not in the labor force.  The marriage behavior of women, 
however, closely tracks that of men.  I examine marriage rates among women in the robustness 
section, using high-school graduates as a proxy for those women who are most likely to enter 
into a marriage where income splitting is valuable.
85
   
                                                 
82
 See LaLumia, supra note 31. 
83
 1950 Public Use Census Data (author’s calculations).   
84
 This means that in the primary specification “middle” education men who completed 10th grade but less than 
two years of college are excluded as too likely to contain both a significant fraction of men who are affected by 
income splitting, and a large proportion who are not.  Regardless, the results are not sensitive to other ways of 
defining high and low income to include those men in the analysis.  As shown in the robustness section, the results 
are similar if high school graduates are considered higher income, and all those who did not complete high school 
are deemed lower income.   
My measures of who was affected by the Act are imperfect, and will include some individuals who did not have 
enough income to be affected.  This will “attenuate” my results toward 0.  Put differently, this means that my results 
should be a lower bound on the actual effect of the Act.  
85
 In 1950 more than half of married female high-school graduates lived in a household which would benefit 
from income splitting, while far fewer of those who did not graduate from high school lived in such a household. 
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A. Summary Statistics and Graphs of Differences 
Table 1 presents summary data on men in common law and community property states 
immediately before the 1948 Revenue Act.  Overall residents of the two kinds of states look 
quite similar.  It is true that men in community property states were somewhat better educated, 
having completed a bit less than half-a year of additional schooling on average.  One should not 
be overly concerned that the education figures are not identical, however.  To start with, the high 
income group looks very similar across the two types of states.  Moreover, differences between 
the residents of the two types of states will not bias the estimates of the model run below if one 
fully controls for them in the regression.  Indeed, even assuming that fully controlling for the 
differences between the residents of the two types of states in the regression is not possible, the 
model will still produce unbiased results so long as those differences are largely consistent 
through the twelve-year period of the study.  Economists refer to this as a “common trend” 
requirement.  There is good reason to believe in a common trend here: in the six years prior to 
the Act there was a 90% correlation between the marriage rates among high income men across 
the two types of states, and a 92% correlation
86
  after adjusting for the marriage behavior of low 
income men.  
  
                                                 
86= 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 ((𝑀𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛,ℎ𝑖 𝑖𝑛𝑐 − 𝑀𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛,𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑖𝑛𝑐), ( 𝑀𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦,ℎ𝑖 𝑖𝑛𝑐 − 𝑀𝑅𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦,𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑖𝑛𝑐)) from 1942 to 
1947 where MRi,j represents the marriage rate in state type i (common or community) of men of income type j (high 




Adult Men in 1947 





All Adult Men      
 % White  90.6%  90.7%  
 % Aged 16-19  5.7%  5.2%  
 % Aged 20-24  14.3%  13.5%  
 % Aged 25-29  14.6%  13.7%  
 % Aged 30-34  13.2%  13.0%  
 % Aged 35-39  12.1%  12.0%  
 % Aged 40-49  19.6%  20.0%  
 % Aged 50-59  12.5%  14.1%  
 % Aged 60+  8.0%  8.6%  
 % Ever Married  73.7%  73.2%  
 Avg Years Education
1 
 9.94  9.56  
 % 2 years of College +  18%  14%  
 % 10th Grade - 1 Yr College  38%  35%  
 % 9th Grade or less  44%  51%  
 Number of Men  79,452  342,435  
High Income Men
2
      
 % White  95.8%  96.3%  
 % Aged 16-19  8.4%  8.1%  
 % Aged 20-24  20.9%  20.0%  
 % Aged 25-29  18.7%  17.9%  
 % Aged 30-34  14.2%  13.4%  
 % Aged 35-39  11.3%  11.3%  
 % Aged 40-49  14.8%  16.9%  
 % Aged 50-59  7.7%  8.4%  
 % Aged 60+  4.0%  4.0%  
 % Ever Married  62.5%  61.5%  
 Number of Men  14,013  47,079  
  
Source: 1960 census iPUMs sample.  Adults defined as persons 16 or older.  
   
1 
Counting 1st grade as the first year of education.      
2 
Defined as men who completed at least 2 years of college.       
       
It is easier to verify or reject a common trend visually.  Figure 3 plots the marriage rate 
among high income men aged 18-50.
87
  The dashed orange line is the marriage rate in the 
                                                 
87
 I take a running three year average to smooth the rates and make patterns easier to see by reducing noise.   
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untreated, community property states.  The solid blue line (with circular markers) is the marriage 
rate in the treated, common law states. 
 
 
Figure 3: Marriage Rate among High Income Men  
 
The rates evolve in roughly parallel fashion in the years before 1948, but the common 
law line sits about 0.6% below the community property line.  The small blue dotted 
“hypothetical common law line” represents roughly what one would expect in the common law 
states absent the 1948 Act: to continue to be about 0.6% below the community property line.  
Instead, following the Act, the common law line quickly rises to about even with the dashed line 
in the period after the Act (1948-1953).  The shaded blue area between the actual common law 
line and the hypothetical represents an approximate estimate of the effect of the Act, about 0.6%.   
Figure 3 is a graphical depiction of a “difference in difference” model because it allows 
us to visually take the difference (subtract) the difference in marriage rates of high income men 
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where MRcommon, Post48 stands for the marriage rate among high income men in common law 
states after the enactment of the 1948 Act, etc. 
Although the common trend appears to roughly hold in Figure 3, one can use the data on 
marriage rates among lower income men to help control for any remaining confounding factors.  
Figure 4 therefore plots the marriage rate across the two types of states of high income men 
relative to low income men.  Thus, the orange dotted line represents the community property 
states and is equal to 
( 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦,   ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑐 𝑚𝑒𝑛 − 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦,   𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑖𝑛𝑐 𝑚𝑒𝑛). 
The solid blue line (with the circular markers) represents the comparable figure for 
common law states. 
Difference #1 Before ≈ -0.6% 
Difference #2 ≈ 0.0% - (-0.6%) = 0.6% ≈ Effect of the Act 
Difference #1 After ≈ 0.0% 
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Figure 4: Marriage Rate of  
High Income Men - Low Income Men 
 
In Figure 4, the common law and community property lines track each other very closely 
in the pre-1948 period, with the common law line on average 0.1% below the community 
property line.  They separate, however, starting in 1948 with the common law line rising faster 
from 1948-1953.   Again, the small dotted blue line after 1948 represents approximately what 
one might have expected in common law states absent the Act: to continue to track the 
community property line almost exactly.  Instead, the actual common law line rises after the Act, 
sitting on average 0.7% above the community property line.  The shaded blue area again 
represents an estimate of the effect of the Act—about a 0.8% increase in the marriage rate among 
treated men (after controlling for the untreated states and behavior of lower income men). 
Figure 4 represents a visual “difference in difference in difference” (or triple difference) 
model.  In Figure 3 there were two “differences” in the marriage rate of high income men: (1) 
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third difference in marriage rates: (3) of high and low income men.  Intuitively this can still be 
thought of as a difference in difference model as in Figure 3, except that instead of using the raw 
marriage rate among high income men, the triple difference model uses an adjusted measure of 
the marriage rate, which controls for confounding factors using the behavior of low income men.   
Both Figures 3 and 4, while useful, use aggregated data.  The formal model below 
implements the triple difference model implicit in Figure 4, but uses individual level data to 
control for a variety of other factors which might affect marriage rate.
88
 
FORMAL MODEL AND RESULTS 
I estimate a model which measures how quickly an unmarried man will marry for the first 
time after he turns 18.
89





 in year t (1942-1953), the probability of marrying is: 
Pr(Marri,j,k,l,t) = γj,k,l+ κt*I[t=year] + η *I[Post’48*Hi Inc=1]  + λ*I [Post-‘48*Common=1]  + 
β*I[Post’48*HiInc*Common=1]  + π*XΔ State-j Per Capita Inc + ρ*XΔ State-j Emp’t + μi 
I use state-age-income group fixed effects (γ). In practice, this restricts my analysis to 
changes in marriage rates following the 1948 Act within small groups that should be highly 
comparable (e.g., 20-24 year-old high income men in Michigan).  Using these fixed effects 
reduces the likelihood of the results being driven by factors unrelated to the 1948 Act.  To see 
this, assume, for example, that high income men in Michigan, marry especially early throughout 
the period of study, compared to those in other states.  Let us also assume that for some 
                                                 
88
 Formally running the difference in difference model implicit in Figure 3 using individual level data yields 
comparable results to the ones presented below.  
89
 This model is closely related to what economists call a “proportional hazard” model, which is used to 
estimate the probability an event will occur during a given time period, where that event can occur at most one time 
for a given individual (e.g., death of an individual, or dissolution of a firm etc.).    
90
The age-groups are 16-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60+ 
91
 Divided into higher income (=1) (at least two years of college) and lower income (=0) (9
th
 grade or less) as 
described in Table 1.  
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demographic reason—i.e., a reason totally unrelated to the passage of the Act—there was a spike 
starting in 1948 in the number of high income young men in Michigan.  Without the fixed 
effects, this demographic spike could bias the results: the spike in young high income 
Michiganders (who tend to marry especially early) would lead to an increase in the marriage rate 
after the Act among high income men in common law states as a whole and thus to the estimated 
treatment effect.  Using fixed effects, however, the model looks only at changes in marriage rates 
within state-age-income groups, so the spike in young high income Michiganders would have no 
effect on my results.  This is because there has been no change in the marriage behavior within 
any state-age-income group, (just a change in the number of young high income Michiganders, 
who married especially early both before and after the Act).   
In addition, πΔ State-j Per Capita Inc and ρΔ State-j Emp’t  control for yearly changes in state per-




I also control for the national trend for each year (κt).  This soaks up the effect of any 
factor that uniformly affects the marriage rate of all men across the nation.
93
  I likewise control 
for any national changes that uniformly influence high income men relative to low income men 
following the 1948 Revenue Act (η).  Similarly, I control for factors that affect uniformly all 
                                                 
92
 In fact, the inclusion or exclusion of this set of controls ends up making relatively little difference, 
presumably because these factors largely affect high and low income men similarly and hence are controlled for by 
inclusion of low income men as well in the model.       
93
 Note that the national trend in marriage rates in a given year (κt) is defined as having a “uniform” effect on all 
men somewhat tautologically.  A factor—say a change in the average age at which men enter the work force—need 
not actually affect all men identically to contribute to the national trend κt.  Instead (roughly) the average nationwide 
effect of the change in age of workforce entry on marriage rates will be reflected in the national trend. The 
remaining effect of this change in age of workforce entry on different men will appear elsewhere in the model.  The 
same is true of the “uniform” effect of factors controlled for in η (factors uniformly affecting high income men 
relative to low income men after the Act) and λ (factors uniformly affecting common law men relative to 
community property men after the Act).   
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men in common law states differently than those in community property states following the Act 
(λ).   
Those three factors (κt, η, λ)  are implicitly already controlled for in Figure 4.  Recall that 
in Figure 4 the lines for common law and community property states represent the relative 
marriage rates among higher and lower income individuals.  Because the national trend κt is 
defined as affecting all men uniformly (including both high and lower income men), changes in 
the national trend will leave relative marriage rates unchanged in both types of states.  Similarly, 
consider changes in factors which uniformly affect common law men after the 1948 Act (λ).  
Because these factors, by definition, affect high and low income men in common law states the 
same way, the relative marriage rate will be unaffected.  Last, consider factors that affect high 
income men identically across both types of states after the Act’s passage (η).  These factors will 
change the relative marriage rates in both types of states because they affect high income men 
differently than low income men.  These factors, however, will change relative marriage rates in 
exactly the same way in both types of states.  Thus the difference between the two lines will stay 
the same.   
Finally, we come to the coefficient of interest βPost’48*High Inc*Common, which estimates the 
effect of the 1948 Revenue Act on marriage rates.  βPost’48*High Inc*Common formally measures the 





Estimated Impact of 1948 Revenue Act on Marriage Rate: Men 18-50 
  
Post 1948*High Income -0.74% 
 (0.27)*** 
Post 1948*Common Law State -0.12% 
 (0.37) 






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Estimated year, state-age-income fixed effects, and state level economic controls not reported, standard errors 
clustered at the state level 
This .82 percentage point increase in the likelihood a high income, never-married man in 
a common law state marries for the first time in a year corresponds to those individuals marrying 
on average about 5 months sooner.  In all the robustness checks this figure is at least 3 months 
and every specification implies that tens or hundreds of thousands of Americans who were 
married at any given time during this period, who would not have been married if not for joint 




A. Robustness of the Main Results 
Table 3: 
































Post’48*High Income -0.70% -0.74% -0.35% 1.52% 1.99% -0.42% -0.45% 
 (0.26)** (0.27)** (0.19)* (0.18)*** (0.20)*** (0.22)* (0.32) 
Post’48*Common Law -0.17% -0.27% 0.04% -0.03% 0.21% 0.09% -0.13% 
 (0.33) (0.39) (0.39) (0.24) (0.43) (0.33) (0.29) 
Post’48*Common 
Law*High Income 
0.79% 1.05% 0.51% 0.69% 0.79% 0.52% 0.74% 
 (0.31)** (0.43)** (0.22)** (0.27)** (0.48)* (0.29)* (0.36)** 
High Mobilization*Post’48 -0.21%       
 (0.18)       
R2 (excluding fixed effects) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 
N 695,348 338,696 1,252,964 927,873 886,726 552,414 966,312 
Estimated year, state-age-income fixed effects, and state economic controls not reported, standard errors clustered at the 
state level.    
1 1960 income is converted to income during the study period by deflating it and accounting for per-capita economic 
growth.  High income is defined as making at least $4,200 per year and low income less than $3000 in 1948 dollars. 
2 A person’s predicted income is based on a regression of 1960 income on a variety of fixed effects: one for each level of 
education, each state, each census defined occupation, and each age (in years), for unmarried individuals.  This gives a 
predicted income for each person in each year under study.  High and low income are defined as described in note 1.    
3 The adjusted location is based on the following hierarchical rule: (1) if a man lives in the state in which he was 
born, then that state is used; (2) if a man marries and he and his spouse reside in his spouse’s birth state, that state is 
used; (3) if a man marries and both he and his spouse are from the same birth state, then the birth state is used; (4) if 
the man migrated across state lines in the last 5 years, his birth state is used. Men whose location is placed abroad 
are not included in the analysis.   
  40 
Table 3 shows the results of various robustness checks.  The first column deals with some 
of the potential problems raised by the fact that some states sent a higher percentage of men off 
to World War II than others.
94
  We would expect marriage rates to rise faster in states with 
higher mobilization once the war was over.
95
  Nevertheless, including this control does not 
significantly change the estimate of the impact of the 1948 Revenue Act.  This makes sense 
because state specific factors, like mobilization, are already controlled for in the main estimate as 
long as the factors affect high and low income individuals similarly.  The closeness of the 
estimates with and without the World War II control also suggests that the GI Bill is unlikely to 
be driving the primary result.  The second column shows that although the community property 
states are grouped in the South and West, the results are not driven by forces which are 
geographically focused and unrelated to the 1948 Act.  Instead, when we look only at the 
difference between the community property and common law states located in the South and 
West regions of the country, the coefficients are actually slightly larger.
96
  The third, fourth and 
fifth columns show alternative ways of defining high and low income which all produce roughly 
comparable results.   
The sixth column shows the results of adjusting the location of men in the sample to 
account for the fact that some may have moved to their 1960 location during or after the study 
period.  Again, this produces fairly similar estimates, as do two alternative ways to adjust for 
possible migration shown Table A-1 in the Appendix.  Finally, the seventh column shows an 
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 See LaLumia, supra, note 31. 
95
 High Mobilization states are defined as having had more than 50% of their men aged 18-44 register for the 
draft. See id. 
96
 In fact, I have also examined just the states of Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, 
and Tennessee which should be highly comparable and find similar, actually slightly larger results, albeit less 
precisely estimated due to the smaller sample size. See Table A-1 in the appendix.   
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estimate of the treatment effect for women in common law states, where the probability of 
benefitting from income splitting is based on whether a woman graduated from high school.  The 
effect is similar to that on men in the primary results.   
B. Couples Married Younger, Had More Children 
Table 4 shows the estimated effect of the 1948 tax change on the age at first marriage 
among men who marry at some point in the sample period.   
Table 4: 
Impact of 1948 Tax Change on Age at First Marriage 
 Age at first marriage 
Post 1948*High Income 0.7047 
 (0.2017)*** 
Post 1948*Common Law State 0.3393 
 (0.1463)** 






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Estimated year, state-income fixed effects, and control for economic changes and average age state population not 
reported, Standard Errors clustered at the state level. 
As in the primary specification, the coefficient of -.43 years indicates that “treated” men 
married about 5 months sooner than we would have predicted without the tax change.  This 
effect is large enough to explain almost the entire increase in the probability an unmarried man 
marries in a given year.  Put differently, Table 4 suggests that the tax change induced men who 
would have married at some point to marry sooner, rather than inducing men who otherwise 
would not have ever married to marry.  This result makes sense because in this era nearly all 
high income men married eventually: 95% had married by age 40 in 1948. Thus, most of the 
reaction to the 1948 Act would have to take the form of changes in when high income men 
married, because the pool of high income men who would never have married was quite small.   
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In addition, higher income men in common law states appear to have had more children 
following the 1948 Act.  The Act could cause couples to have more kids in at least three ways: 
(1) affected couples married younger thereby increasing the period of marriage during couples’ 
childbearing years, (2) the tax change drove some married women out of the labor force by 
substantially raising their marginal tax rate, as La Lumia shows, and (3) it increased take-home 
pay for married couples during the Baby Boom.
97
  The estimated effect of the tax change is that 
men had .08 more children at home.
98
  On average men affected by the tax change had 2.34 
children at home in 1960, so an increase of .08 is about 3.5% increase, a small but important 
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 Although the effect of higher income on fertility is theoretically ambiguous, during the Baby Boom it seems 
likely that increasing income for a given higher income couple would increase the number of children born to that 
couple.  
98
 Note that I am using number of children in the house in 1960 as a proxy for children ever born.  While a 
substantial fraction of children from marriages early in the period may have left the house by 1960, this should not 
bias the results unless the difference in the proportion of children who leave the house between higher and lower 
income households is different between common law and community property states.   
99
 The 1948 Act has theoretically ambiguous implications for divorce among high income couples.  On the one 
hand, the Act provided a new financial incentive not to divorce for treated couples once they married.  On the other 
hand, the Act seems to have caused treated couples to marry younger, which might lead to higher divorce rates 
because couples had less time prior to marriage to gauge whether they will be good life partners.  For contemporary 
sociological studies finding marriage at a young age was associated with marital instability, see e.g., T. P. Monahan, 
Does Age at Marriage Matter in Divorce?, 32 SOCIAL FORCES 81 (1953); Lee G. Burchinal, Trends and Prospects 
for Young Marriages in the United States, J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 243 (1965).  Note, however, that these studies 
are not directly applicable because only couples marrying younger than about age 20 were found to be more likely to 
divorce during this period.  The 1948 Act would not have induced many couples this young to marry because few 
would have had a high enough income to receive a marriage bonus under the Act, and indeed I estimate that the 
effect of the Act on men younger than 22 is close to 0 and is not statistically significant.   
Unfortunately, studying the effect of the Act on divorce empirically is difficult using the existing data.  The 
1960 census contains some information about whether the respondent had divorced at some point, but no data about 
when this occurred.  This makes it hard to identify the effect of the Act, although it seems very likely the effect was 
small because this was a period when divorce was still relatively uncommon. (1.3% of men were divorced and not 
remarried in 1960, along with another 6.9% whose first marriage had ended and who had remarried, but many of 
these first marriages would have ended because of the death of the spouse rather than divorce).  To get a rough 
estimate of the effect of the Act on divorce, I combine data from the 1940, 1950, and 1960 censuses and compare 
how the proportion of high income men who were divorced (and not remarried as of the census date) changed over 
time.  In unreported regressions, I find a small, marginally statistically significant uptick following the 1948 Act in 
the probability a high income man in a treated state was divorced. The data are thus consistent with the Act very 
modestly increasing the divorce rate, but I emphasize that we cannot make inferences with confidence without more 
data, as well as a careful look at changes in divorce laws in the various states up to 1960.   
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Table 5: 
Impact of 1948 Tax Change on Fertility 
 Number of own children in the 
household 
Post 1948*High Income -0.0482 
 (0.0284)* 
Post 1948*Common Law State -0.1128 
 (0.0590)* 




 (excluding fixed effects) 0.02 
N 67,737 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Estimated year, state income fixed effects, and control for state average age of men not reported, Standard Errors 
clustered at the state level 
 
DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The main estimate that the 1948 Act caused eligible men to marry three to five months 
sooner on average is surprisingly large given the social context.  Nevertheless, the estimate is 
plausible in light of the size of the bonuses.  A single-earner couple with $100,000 in income in 
today’s dollars would have received each year a marriage bonus about large enough to cover the 
entire down payment on a house in the new Levittown suburbs around in 1948 (after federal 
housing guarantees).
100
  Or, looked at differently, if that couple’s saving rate matched the 
national average in 1950, the tax benefit of being married would represent about 40% of their 
annual savings if they did not change their consumption.
101
 Marriage bonuses of this size 
allowed couples who were waiting to marry until they could afford a home or to raise kids to 
                                                 
100
 See EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY: HOW OUR GREATEST INVENTION MAKES US RICHER, 
SMARTER, GREENER, HEALTHIER, AND HAPPIER Ch. 7 (2011) (noting that a down payment, after FHA guarantees, in 
Levittown was $400, although the suburb drew mostly residents with incomes lower than the hypothetical couple). 
101
 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 100 YEARS OF CONSUMER SPENDING 22 (showing an average savings 
rate of 10% in 1950), available at https://www.bls.gov/opub/uscs/1950.pdf. 
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marry significantly sooner.
102
  Moreover, contemporary observers believed that the tax code was 
pushing couples to wed as well.  Even before the 1948 Act was passed, the Chicago Tribune 
reported that sociologists predicted joint filing with income splitting would “work for earlier 
marriages and against long engagements.”103 After enactment, newspapers ran articles like 
“Wedlock Remains Best Tax Relief” and “Bachelors: Don't Forget Dowry Uncle Sam Gives 
Bride at Altar,” observing that joint taxation induced marriage.104 Indeed, income splitting crept 
into popular culture, with a young Jack Lemon proposing to his girlfriend in the 1954 comedy 
Phffft by extoling the virtues of joint filing.
105
   
As noted above, the main estimates relating to marriage and those regarding children 
suggest that the role of federal tax policy in increases in marriage and fertility in the Post War 
period is greater than previously appreciated.  The marriage rate among treated men is estimated 
to have risen 9% (an increase of 0.82% on a base marriage rate of 9.3%) as a result of the Act.  
Using the main specification, I estimate that at any given time after 1948 there were roughly 
200,000 Americans who were married, who would not have been married absent joint taxation 
with income splitting.
106,107
  These are important effects.  
                                                 
102
 One academic noted at the beginning of the study period: “‘How much money does it take to get married?’ is 
one of the questions which is most frequently asked by young men and women who are seriously contemplating 
marriage. What they really want to know is . . . on how small an income and with how little money in the bank they 
can safely establish a new family. . . . Most intelligent young couples, no matter how anxious they are to start their 
new families, are seriously concerned, lest they embark on this their most important life venture with economic 
resources which may prove to be inadequate.”  Howard Bigelow, Money and Marriage in MARRIAGE AND THE 
FAMILY (Howard Becker and Rueben Hill eds. 1942).  
103
 Believe Cupid Will Benefit by Tax Slash Bill, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan 4. 1948 at 16.  
104
 See e.g., Malvina Lindsay, Wedlock Remains Best Tax Relief, WASHINGTON POST, July 19, 1954 (“the 
national trend to wedlock is being given continued reinforcement by the new tax bill [which reserved full income 
splitting for married couples]”); J. A. Livingston, Bachelors: Don't Forget Dowry Uncle Sam Gives Bride at Altar, 
WASHINGTON POST, Nov 14, 1952; Investor’s Guide: Marriage in December, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 11, 1948 at 
A6. 
105
 Edward Barry, Movie Romeo Sings of Split in Income Tax: "PHFFFT", CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec 2, 1954 at 
C10. 
106
 Looked at differently, from 1960 to the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, a variety of cultural and 
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The main estimate can also inform our understanding of the effect of marriage bonuses 
today on middle income single-earner couples.  The two changes since the study period which 
would appear to have the greatest relevance for single-earner couples making $50,000 to 
$110,000 both suggest taxes have a larger effect on marriage decisions of those couples today.  
Thus, although we cannot know with certainty, it might be reasonable to think of the estimates of 
the chapter as a floor for the effect of taxes on those couples today.  As noted above, the 
increasing substitutability of marriage and unmarried cohabitation will likely make today’s 
couples more sensitive to tax incentives when deciding whether or when to marry.  Around 1948, 
unmarried cohabitation was quite uncommon among middle and upper income couples. As late 
as 1965-1974, less than 10% of all women cohabited prior to marriage.
108
  Now that figure is 
over 60%.
109
  Moreover, cohabitation has moved slowly from being primarily “a short-term 
arrangement among childless young adults who . . . quickly break up or marry” to being 
“accepted [by many] as an alternative to marriage.”110 As cohabitation has become a genuine 
alternative to marriage for many couples, they will have become more sensitive things like the 
tax consequences of marriage, which might have been secondary for many of them in the past.  
                                                                                                                                                             
economic factors (including increasing educational attainment and labor force participation by women, loosening 
attitudes toward pre-marital sex and changing opinions of marriage itself) drove up the median age at first marriage 
for men, from 22.8 years to 24.7 years, or 1.9 years. See CENSUS DEPARTMENT, TABLE MS-2, ESTIMATED MEDIAN 
AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE: 1890 TO PRESENT (2017).  The estimated effect of joint taxation with income splitting on 
treated men (driving down marriage age by 5 months) is therefore about 20% the size of the effect of all the various 
forces active during the 1960s and 1970s driving up median age at first marriage for men. 
107
 The natural experiment studied here is also promising as what economists term an “instrument” which can 
help untangle the causal effect of marrying earlier or having more children on health or economic outcomes. I plan 
to explore this possibility in a follow up paper. 
108
 Pamela Smock, Cohabitation in The United States: An Appraisal of Research Themes, Findings, and 
Implications, 26 ANN. REV. SOCIOLOGY 1, 3 (2000)  
109
 Wendy D. Manning, Trends in Cohabitation: Over Twenty Years of Change, 1987-2010, (presenting data 
from the National Survey of Family Growth conducted by the CDC).   
110
 Andrew Cherlin, The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 848, 849 (2004). 
For example, the number of cohabitations which end in marriage within three years dropped from 60% in the 1970s 
to 33% by the 1990s. Id. 
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Indeed, many other authors have observed that the increase in cohabitation likely amplifies the 
effect of tax considerations on marriage.
111
  
Second, marriage bonuses for single-earner couples making the equivalent today of what 
the high income couples studied here earned in 1948 ($50,000 to $110,000 per year in today’s 
dollars) are bigger now than around 1948.  Indeed, the bonuses are at least twice as large now for 
couples in the $50,000-$80,000 range than in the period under study.
112
  Of course, I should also 
note that a much lower percentage of couples now have a single earner than in 1948.  Still, those 
couples remain a significant share of the population amounting to tens of millions of people.
113
   
Americans’ responsiveness to tax incentives in making marriage decisions modestly 
strengthens the case in favor of returning to individual taxation of all married couples.
114
  One of 
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 See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 15 at 792-795 (making the rise of cohabitation the central reason that we 
should be paying more attention to “tax marriage effects”); Chade and Ventura, supra note 26, (showing in a formal 
theoretical model that increasing the acceptability of cohabitation makes the “number of marriages become[] more 
sensitive to changes in differential tax treatment [of marriage]).” 
112
 The Revenue Act of 1948 may have had particular salience due to widespread coverage of the benefits 
accruing to community property couples from income splitting and therefore had a larger effect than it otherwise 
would have. Thus, arguably, the effect of the 1948 Act may not be a floor for today’s less salient marriage bonuses, 
but the rise in cohabitation and increasing size of the bonuses seems likely to outweigh this factor.    
It is also worth observing that the effect of taxes on marriage today may be qualitatively different than it was 
during the study period.  Nearly all higher income men in the study period married eventually. Today that is no 
longer true and the rise in cohabitation may mean that the effect of taxes on marriage will be as much about whether 
someone ever marries, as when.    
113
 Using census data, I calculate that in 1950 about 70% of married couples with total income of $50,000 to 
$110,000 (in 2016 dollars) were single-earner.  Based on the 2015 ACS survey, about 35% of married couples with 
income between $50,000 and $110,000 were single-earner.  Both figures exclude couples with no one in the work 
force (e.g., retirees).  Note also that while today a lower percentage of married couples are single-earner, a higher 
percentage of single-earner couples earn enough to be eligible for sizeable marriage bonuses.  These effects come 
close to offsetting  in estimating the total proportion of couples affected by large marriage bonuses.       
114
 This would presumably require Congress to use statutory language that would clearly overrule Seaborn.  It 
would also put increased pressure on preventing income shifting within couples. Congress could largely prevent 
income shifting by adopting a hybrid form of taxation with individual taxation of wages and salary and some form 
of joint taxation of capital income (e.g., capital income is pooled among spouses and then taxed on a separate 
schedule or at the marginal rate of the higher earner, etc.).  This hybrid system would sacrifice full marriage 
neutrality, although the non-neutral effects of joint taxation of capital would be concentrated on the wealthy. As 
explained in note 18, this system would actually follow most of the other countries which have switched to 
“individual” taxation since 1970.   
The problems of inter-spousal income shifting should not be taken lightly.  Stephanie Hunter McMahon has 
argued that the U.K.’s difficulties containing inter-spousal income shifting may well have outweighed the benefits of 
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the problems with joint taxation is that it distorts individuals’ incentives to marry.  The greater 
their responsiveness to these incentives, the greater is the cost in terms of economic efficiency in 
terms of distorting couple’s decisions to marry or not.115 These costs are in addition to the 
efficiency losses imposed by joint taxation’s tendency to raise the marginal tax rate on the lower 
earning member of the couple, still more often a woman, who is more likely to drop out of the 
labor force in the face of high taxes than the higher earning member.
116
  It is of course true that 
the societal choice between individual and joint taxation of married couples turns on far more 
than just efficiency.  Rather questions of equity are paramount and it is beyond the scope of this 
Chapter to restate those arguments here.  Nevertheless, in the overall societal calculation as to 
how married couples should be taxed, it is important to learn that joint taxation’s distortions on 
these choices are substantial.      
Many people, of course, believe the government should encourage couples to marry.
117
  
They might view my primary results as pushing for the U.S. to move back toward the 1948 to 
1969 system with joint taxation with income splitting in all brackets.  Yet I do not think that 
                                                                                                                                                             
its shift to individual taxation in 1990.  See Stephanie Hunter McMahon, London Calling: Does the UK's Experience 
with Individual Taxation Clash with the US's Expectations, 55 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 159 (2010). 
115
 See Listokin, supra note 3. 
116
 See e.g., Zelenak, supra note 3, at 365-369.  As discussed in note 114, observe, however, that joint taxation 
can also be cast as improving economic efficiency by reducing wasteful tax planning and avoidance in inter-spousal 
tax transfers and the need to police such transfers.   
117
 From an efficiency point of view, the government should encourage marriage if there would be positive 
externalities (or perhaps positive internalities) resulting from the new marriages induced by the policy, which exceed 
the cost of the program. See Listokin, supra note 3 at 195.  There is a wide literature showing marriage is associated 
with greater longevity, family income, and self-reported happiness.  See e.g., Robert E. Emery, Erin E. Horn & 
Christopher R. Beam, Marriage and Improved Well-Being, in MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS LAW, POLICY, AND 
THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY FAMILIES (Marsha Garrison & Elizabeth S. Scott eds., 2012).  
The marriage of a child’s parents is also associated with better educational and other outcomes for that child. See 
e.g., Linda J. Waite, Does Marriage Matter?, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 483, 493-495 (1995).  The difficulty in this literature 
is identifying causation.  Some of marriage’s association with these positive outcomes is likely explained by 
selection in who gets married and stays married, but it is unclear how much. I am not aware of a study which 
identifies genuinely exogenous variation in marriage which would untangle this issue. In addition, even if marriage 
is in fact good for those who have already taken it up, that does not necessarily imply that the same benefits will 
flow to those who would not have married at that point but were induced to wed by government policies.  
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conclusion is warranted.  Even putting aside the problems joint taxation creates by reinforcing 
gender roles, etc., the vast majority of the benefit from full income splitting in all income 
brackets accrues to the very rich.  In unreported regressions, I find little evidence that the richest 
men, who enjoyed the largest marriage bonuses, reacted more strongly than middle class men 
who saw smaller bonuses.
118
  This is not terribly surprising: assuming the marginal utility of 
income declines as men grow richer, wealthy men should react less, per dollar, to changes in tax 
incentives for marriage.
119
  Thus for the richest men there are offsetting effects. They are less 
responsive per dollar of tax incentives, but get the largest marriage bonuses under joint taxation 
with income splitting in all brackets.  This leads to the rich reacting in about the same way as 
upper-middle income men to joint taxation with income splitting.  In addition, dual-income 
couples get little or no tax benefit from marriage under joint taxation with income splitting. 
Assuming the government’s goal is to encourage marriage in general—given a fixed cost to the 
fisc—it would be more effective to use individual taxation and provide a fixed subsidy for 
marriage in the form of a credit to all Americans.
 
This would provide equal incentives for dual 
income couples to marry and not focus so much of the subsidy on the very rich.
120
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 Although number of very high income men in the sample is small, making statistical inference less precise, it 
is possible to rule out at the 95% level that the rich react as much, per dollar of tax incentive, as upper-middle 
income men.   
119
 In an economic model of marriage, a person will implicitly trade off the additional utility provided by the tax 
incentives in favor of marriage, with other factors which would otherwise cause her to marry later absent those tax 
incentives (e.g., waiting a bit longer to marry to better understand whether she is compatible with her potential 
spouse).  Richer persons will get less additional utility, per dollar, from the tax incentives.  By contrast, we would 
not expect the strength of the factors pushing toward later marriage to vary much by income.        
120
 The results of the paper actually provide some justification for the current structure of marriage bonuses in 
the income tax for single-earner couples, which provide full income splitting couples making up to around $150,000 
combined, with additional bonuses tapering off thereafter.  Nevertheless, if encouraging marriage is the goal, it is 
unclear why we would use a system under which dual income couples receive little or no benefit (and above 
$150,000 face marriage penalties).  Moreover, there remain marriage penalties built into many programs designed to 
help lower income Americans, including those built into the tax code like the EITC.  
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CONCLUSION 
This Chapter has detailed the history of how the U.S. tax system attempted to integrate a 
tax system based on the individual with community property systems where the family 
represents the fundamental unit.  The inherent tensions in this process created an unusual series 
of tax changes that provided for joint taxation with full income splitting for married couples in 
some states well ahead of others. An empirical examination of this natural experiment strongly 
indicates that tax incentives had an important effect on marriage rates and fertility.  This suggests 
that the effect of taxes on marriage formation and fertility should be accounted for in considering 
how we should tax families today.  
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Chapter 3 Economic Crisis and the Integration of Law and Finance: The Impact of 





Financial economics has become ever more integrated into corporate and securities law, a 
trend that started decades prior to the financial crisis of 2008 to 2009.122 This is as it should be. 
Corporate and securities law is, at its core, about valuation. Investors provide to a corporation the 
funds with which it acquires real assets. The investors receive in return financial claims 
(securities) on the corporation’s future cash flows. The size of these future cash flows then 
depends importantly on management’s choice of what real assets to acquire and how well these 
assets are managed over time. The capital market’s pricing of the financial claims acquired by 
investors is in effect a valuation of these future cash flows.123 Corporate law provides a 
framework within which a firm’s managers make these investment and operating decisions. 
Properly designed, this legal framework helps spur management to choose and deploy assets in 
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 This chapter was published first in 116 Columbia Law Review 325 (2016).  
 122. The interaction of corporate law and finance began in earnest with Michael Jensen and William Meckling’s 
seminal article on the agency costs at the heart of public corporations. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, 
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976); see 
also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in The Anatomy of Corporate 
Law 21 (R. Kraakman et al., eds. 2004) (discussing centrality of agency theory to structure of corporate law). A 
series of influential articles linking the legal system to corporate finance and the structure of capital markets further 
evidences how law and finance came to be linked. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei 
Shliefer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. Pol. Econ. 1113, 1114–16 (1998) (presenting cross-country 
study of links between investor legal protection and development of strong capital markets). For an example of 
current scholarship that is shaped by the intersection of law and finance, see Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, 
Corporate Control and Credible Commitment, 43 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 119, 121 (2015) (analyzing controlling 
shareholders’ extraction of private benefits of control in corporate-finance terms). 
 123. See Richard A. Brealey, Stewart C. Myers & Franklin Allen, Principles of Corporate Finance 80 (11th ed. 
2014) (defining market value of debt and equity securities as discounted present value of those securities’ future 
cash flows). 
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ways that maximize the value of the firm’s expected future cash flows. The framework’s 
effectiveness, however, depends in part on the precision with which the capital market prices 
these financial assets.124 Securities law can enhance price accuracy, for example, by mandating 
that corporations disclose certain information and by regulating the workings of the securities 
markets and the behavior of those who trade in them.125 The better corporate and securities law 
perform these tasks, the more valuable the corporation’s underlying business and 
correspondingly, the financial claims that the corporation issues.126 
The 2008 financial crisis raised many questions for financial economics and financial 
regulation.127 Relatively unappreciated so far, however, are the puzzles the crisis poses for 
understanding how the capital market prices common stocks and in turn, for the intersection 
between law and finance. During the crisis, there was a dramatic spike, across all industries, in 
“idiosyncratic risk”128—that is, in the volatility of individual firm’s share prices after adjustment 
for movements in the market as a whole.129 This phenomenon, it turns out, is not limited to just 
                                                 
 124. See Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 237, 252–60, 264–67 
(2009) [hereinafter Fox, Civil Liability] (“More information, with the resulting increase in price accuracy, improves 
the control market’s effectiveness in limiting the agency costs of management.”). 
 125. Consistent with this view, the growing law and finance literature finds that effective corporate and securities 
law is a precondition for the sophisticated capital markets and corporate ownership structures that appear most 
closely associated with economic growth. See, e.g., La Porta et al., supra note 122, at 1152 (examining evidence and 
concluding strong investor-protection laws correlate with economic growth). Securities law also can improve pricing 
accuracy by facilitating the efficiency of capital market microstructure through regulation. We need not address this 
function here. 
 126. See Jesse H. Choper, John C. Coffee, Jr. & Ronald J. Gilson, Cases and Materials on Corporations 177–78 
(8th ed. 2013) (discussing valuation of financial assets). 
 127. See, e.g., Gary Gorton, Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don’t See Them Coming 221 (2012) 
(reviewing past misunderstandings of financial crises); Robert E. Hall, The High Sensitivity of Economic Activity to 
Financial Frictions, 121 Econ. J. 351, 371 (2011) (arguing standard macroeconomic theory does not explain why 
drops in output and employment persist for significant periods after financial crisis is resolved); Robert E. Hall, Why 
Does the Economy Fall to Pieces After a Financial Crisis?, J. Econ. Persp., Fall 2010, at 3, 3 (2010) (same); see also 
Andrew W. Lo, Reading About the Financial Crisis: A Twenty-One-Book Review, 50 J. Econ. Literature 151, 154–
55 (2012) (presenting useful reviews of twenty-one books drawn from postcrisis deluge of works analyzing crisis 
and appropriate responses). 
 128. See infra section I.A (discussing spike in idiosyncratic risk during crisis). 
 129. See Brealey, Myers & Allen, supra note 123, at 174 (defining and comparing “[firm-] specific risk” and 
“market risk”). 
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the most recent economic crisis. We show here for the first time that a dramatic spike in 
idiosyncratic risk has occurred with every major downturn since the 1920s.130 This association—
between economic crisis and a spike in idiosyncratic risk—is important to the law for two 
important reasons. First, the spike is caused by a crisis-induced sharp increase in the importance 
of new information specifically concerning individual firms. Information—its value and its 
disclosure—is at the center of much of corporate and securities law. Second, idiosyncratic price 
changes are important because they are at the core of event studies, an econometric technique 
that, over the last few decades, has moved from an academic tool to assess the impact on stock 
price of particular corporate actions to providing the central means by which corporate and 
securities law is applied to specific cases.131 For example, the Supreme Court recently confirmed 
the centrality of event studies in securities fraud class actions,132 the predominant form of private 
securities litigation today.133 
Now consider the 2008 to 2009 financial crisis’s impact on the stock prices of individual 
firms. The volatility of individual stock prices increased sharply during the crisis.134 A portion of 
this increase is explained by economy-wide factors like changes in general economic conditions 
that affect share prices of all stocks. But much more than this was going on. The larger part of 
the increase in each firm’s overall share price volatility was due to a dramatic rise—five-fold as 
measured by variance—in idiosyncratic risk, the portion of the volatility that cannot be explained 
by changes in factors that affect all firms. Rather, there was a large increase, relative to noncrisis 
                                                 
 130. See infra section I.B (presenting empirical data on crises since 1920s). 
 131. See infra Part III (discussing use of event studies in securities litigation). 
 132. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2415 (2014) (discussing event studies in 
securities litigation). 
 133. See Merritt B. Fox, Securities Class Actions Against Foreign Issuers, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 1173, 1176 (2012) 
[hereinafter Fox, Securities Class Actions] (noting fraud-on-the-market class actions “give rise to the bulk of all the 
damages paid out in settlements and judgments pursuant to private litigation under the U.S. securities laws”). 
 134. See infra section I.A (presenting empirical data from 2008–2009 financial crisis). 
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times, in the extent to which an individual firm’s share price deviated independently from the 
change in the market as a whole. 
This crisis-related spike in idiosyncratic risk presents a puzzle that is important to 
understanding how law and finance interact. A firm’s share price moves because there is news: a 
bit of information that changes expectations about the firm’s future cash flow and hence the 
value of the firm’s shares.135 So for example, the announcement that a defense firm received a 
profitable government contract that was previously thought possible, but not certain, is news: 
The chance that the contract would not be received is eliminated. In an efficient market, as soon 
as a bit of news is revealed, it is promptly and fully reflected in price.136 News is thus by 
definition unpredictable—to be news it cannot be anticipated and thus already incorporated in 
the firm’s stock price—with its importance determined by how much the news changes 
expectations of a firm’s future cash flows. Future price changes are the result of subsequent 
news. 
Some news affects expectations about the future cash flows of most or all firms because it 
concerns the overall state of economy—for example, the future rate of economic growth, 
employment levels, interest rates, or inflation. For any given firm’s stock, the portion of the total 
variability in its share price due to such generally applicable news is referred to as the stock’s 
“systematic” risk, or volatility. The remaining variability in the firm’s share price is due to news 
that affects expectations about its particular cash flows and not about the cash flows of most or 
                                                 
 135. See Brealey, Myers & Allen, supra note 123, at 365 (“[S]tock prices and company values summarize 
investors’ collective assessment of how well a company is doing, both its current performance and its future 
prospects.”). 
 136. See, e.g., id. at 324–25 (noting large body of accumulated empirical evidence that publicly traded issuer 
shares listed on exchanges such as NYSE and NASDAQ show immediate reactions to revelations of news, after 
which prices follow random walk). 
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all other firms in the market—for example news of a labor strike,137 an R&D breakthrough,138 or 
a regulatory development.139 The literature variously refers to this as “idiosyncratic,” 
“unsystematic,” “firm-specific,” or “unique” risk, or volatility.140 Thus, the five-fold increase in 
idiosyncratic volatility during the 2008 to 2009 financial crisis tells us that each bit of news 
affecting only a particular firm altered, much more than in normal times, expectations concerning 
that firm’s future cash flows. In essence, during a crisis, all firms share an increased sensitivity to 
bits of news that, for each, will not affect most other firms. As a consequence, for example, on 
any good day for the market as a whole, there are far more big losers than in normal times and on 
any bad day, far more big winners. 
The puzzle is why. An economic crisis concerns problems in the economy as a whole. Why 
would a crisis suddenly increase the importance of new information that is independent of the 
effect on the company of news about the overall economy? In this chapter, we take up both the 
causes of this large, crisis-induced increase in idiosyncratic risk and its implications for how the 
legal system uses finance, topics yet to be addressed in either the financial-economics or legal 
literature. 
                                                 
 137. See John Dinardo & Kevin F. Hallock, ‘When Unions Mattered’: The Impact of Strikes on Financial 
Markets, 1925–1937, 55 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 219, 226–32 (2002) (employing event study methodology to find 
significant negative impacts of labor-strike news on affected firms’ share prices). 
 138. See, e.g., Marta Falconi & Neil Maclucas, Novartis Boosted by Heart Drug Trials, Wall St. J. (Mar. 31, 
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230415720 
4579473051376848032 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Novartis AG said Monday it would seek approval 
for an experimental heart failure treatment sooner than it had expected . . . . The news helped bolster shares of 
Novartis, which surged 3.31% in late morning trading . . . .”). 
 139. See, e.g., Matthew Curtin, Volkswagen Shares Tumble Following Emissions Allegations, Wall St. J. (Sept. 
21, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/volkswagen-shares-driven-lower-1442826436 (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (“The auto maker’s nonvoting shares . . . were down 21% in morning trading amid fears of a huge fine 
in the U.S. as well as long-term damage to the reputation of Europe’s biggest auto maker by sales.”). Stock prices 
are also affected by background noise in the securities markets—movements that are uncorrelated with any new 
information. Thus, idiosyncratic risk will at all times include this background noise. For purposes of this Article, we 
focus on information-based idiosyncratic risk. 
 140. See Brealey, Myers & Allen, supra note 123, at 174 n.25 (“Specific risk may be called unsystematic risk, 
residual risk, unique risk, or diversifiable risk.”). 
  55 
Part I begins by documenting more fully the link between economic turmoil and 
idiosyncratic risk. Expanding on earlier work by Campbell et al.,141 we conduct an empirical 
review, extending back to 1926 and forward to the present. This review shows, for the first time, 
that every major economic downturn in this eighty-five-year period has been accompanied by a 
substantial spike in idiosyncratic volatility. 
Part II seeks to explain why difficult economic times, which are defined in terms of market-
wide phenomena, make the future of individual firms more difficult to predict and so make 
individual stock prices more volatile, independent of the crisis making the overall economy’s 
future performance harder to predict. We canvass several complementary answers. One is that, 
compared to ordinary times, information about a firm contained in current news may become 
more important in predicting its future cash flows relative to the role of the already existing stock 
of knowledge in making such predictions. A second explanation is that the quality of 
management becomes more important in crisis times. Consequently, the ordinary flow of new 
information about this subject can cause bigger movements in price because each bit tells the 
market about something—the quality of management—that the market now regards as more 
important than it did in ordinary times. A third is that crisis creates uncertainty as to what factors, 
and hence what information, are important to valuation. Because of this uncertainty, a broader 
range of information has valuation implications and therefore stock prices move more frequently. 
Parts III and IV turn to the implications of our empirical results and of their possible 
explanations for a number of legal issues that depend analytically on valuation methodology: 
determining materiality and loss causation in fraud-on-the-market securities litigation, 
                                                 
 141. John Y. Campbell, Martin Lettau, Burton G. Malkiel & Yexiao Xu, Have Individual Stocks Become More 
Volatile? An Empirical Exploration of Idiosyncratic Risk, 56 J. Fin. 1, 3 (2001) [hereinafter Campbell et al., 
Empirical Exploration] (finding market-, industry-, and firm-level volatility all “increase substantially in economic 
downturns and tend to lead recessions”). 
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determining materiality in cases involving claims of insider trading or of misstatements or 
omissions in registered public offerings, and determining the extent of deference that should be 
paid to a corporate board that rejects an acquisition offer at a premium above the pre-offer 
market price. Litigation with respect to each of these matters has, over the last few decades, 
increasingly involved the empirical analysis—through the use of event studies—of the 
idiosyncratic portion of share returns of the companies involved. 
The analysis in Part IV yields a number of important insights, starting with ones relating to 
the use of event studies in fraud-on-the-market class actions, the actions that give rise to the bulk 
of damages and settlements paid out as the result of private securities litigation. We show that the 
conventional use of event studies during periods of economic-crisis-induced increased volatility 
results in understating the number of occasions when a corporate misstatement can be shown to 
have had a meaningful impact on a firm’s stock price. Lowering the standard for statistical 
significance in crisis times would help to correct for this problem but causes an offsetting 
problem: With a lower standard, liability is imposed more frequently where the misstatement in 
fact did not have a sufficient impact on price to justify the costs associated with imposing 
liability. In the end, this analysis shows that lowering the standard in times of crisis is, on 
balance, no more likely to improve than to harm social welfare. This suggests that during crisis 
times, Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement actions are especially important 
because they offset the reduced effectiveness of private litigation. 
We reach a similar conclusion with respect to insider trading and public offerings of 
securities. This has particular significance because the information-based explanations that we 
find most persuasive for why economic crises lead to spikes in idiosyncratic risk suggest that, in 
crisis times, insiders have substantially more opportunities to profit from trading on the 
  57 
nonpublic information that they possess and issuers have more opportunities to sell securities at 
an inflated price. 
Finally, “substantive coercion” is rarely a serious justification for target corporation 
deployment of takeover defenses, but crisis-induced increases in idiosyncratic risk provide an 
unusually plausible claim that target shareholders may make a mistake in tendering into a hostile 
offer. However, the example of two cases that raise the issue close in time to financial crises—
Quickturn142 and Airgas143—shows that even a substantive coercion claim based on a crisis-
induced spike in idiosyncratic risk is very difficult to demonstrate.144 
I. THE EMPIRICAL RECORD 
In this Part, we demonstrate empirically both that there was a sharp increase in idiosyncratic 
risk during the 2008 to 2009 financial crisis and that this is not an isolated incident. An increase 
in idiosyncratic risk is associated with poor macroeconomic performance throughout an eighty-
five-year period going back to 1926. We show as well that the increase was felt by firms across 
all industries. Moreover, while some of the increase in idiosyncratic risk is due to the simple fact 
that the share prices of most firms fell dramatically during the crisis, thereby increasing risk 
because of the resulting higher firm debt–equity ratios, much of it is not. 
                                                 
 142. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998). 
 143. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
 144. We refer occasionally to an online appendix that contains additional technical information, further empirical 
results, and demonstrations of the robustness of our findings. See Edward G. Fox, Merritt B. Fox & Ronald J. 
Gilson, Economic Crises and the Integration of Law and Finance: The Impact of Volatility Spikes app. (2015), 
https:// 
sites.google.com/site/volatilityspikesappendix/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Appendix] 
(providing technical information and further results and demonstrating robustness).  For ease of reference, the 
appendix is also included as Appendix 2 at the end of this dissertation.  
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A. The 2008 to 2009 Financial Crisis 
The 2008 to 2009 financial crisis illustrates starkly the spike in idiosyncratic risk associated 
with economic crises. From July 1, 2008, to June 30, 2009, firms in the S&P 100 experienced a 
five-fold increase in the average idiosyncratic volatility, as measured by variance, compared to 
2006 to 2007 and a three-fold increase compared to 2007 to 2008. While 2008 to 2009 was a 
period of enormous general economic turmoil145—recall that Lehman Brothers failed146 and AIG 
was essentially nationalized within seven days in September 2008147—this increase in 
idiosyncratic volatility reflects movement in individual firm prices that cannot be explained by 
the direct impact of general economic conditions. While the most extraordinary increases were 
among financial firms in the index—forty-fold during the crisis relative to 2006 to 2007—
nonfinancial firms increased volatility almost four-fold themselves.148 Just as dramatically, 
idiosyncratic risk then returned to approximately normal levels by June 30, 2010. Thus, we see a 
                                                 
 145. See Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, BEA 09-29, Gross Domestic Product, 1st Quarter 
2009 (Final), Corporate Profits, 1st Quarter 2009 (Revised) (2009), 
http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2009/gdp109f.htm [http:// 
perma.cc/533U-PYGV] (“Real gross domestic product—the output of goods and services produced by labor and 
property located in the United States—decreased at an annual rate of 5.5 percent in the first quarter of 2009 . . . .”); 
Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, BEA 09-11, Gross Domestic Product: Fourth Quarter 2008 
(Final), Corporate Profits, Fourth Quarter 2008 (2009), http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2009 
/gdp408f.htm [http://perma.cc/9B73-7NWA] (“Real gross domestic product . . . decreased at an annual rate of 6.3 
percent in the fourth quarter of 2008 . . . .”); David M. Herszenhorn, Bailout Plan Wins Approval; Democrats Vow 
Tighter Rules, N.Y. Times (Oct. 4, 2008), 
http://nytimes.com/2008/10/04/business/economy/04bailout.html?pagewanted=all (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (noting former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson in 2008 urged “emergency bailout legislation with a 
warning that the American economy was at risk of the worst economic collapse since the Depression”). 
 146. See Lehman Makes It Official in Overnight Chapter 11 Filing, Wall St. J.: Crisis on Wall St. Blog (Sept. 15, 
2008, 7:40 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/wallstreetcrisis/2008/09/15/ 
lehman-makes-it-official/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy Monday in New York, as expected . . . .”). 
 147. See Edmund L. Andrews, Michael J. de la Merced & Mary Williams Walsh, Fed’s $85 Billion Loan Rescues 
Insurer, N.Y. Times (Sept. 17, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com 
/2008/09/17/business/17insure.html?pagewanted=all (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“Fearing a financial 
crisis worldwide, the Federal Reserve reversed course on Tuesday and agreed to an $85 billion bailout that would 
give the government control of the troubled insurance giant American International Group.”). See generally Andrew 
Ross Sorkin, Too Big to Fail (2009) (providing detailed narrative account of 2008 crisis at Lehman Brothers and 
AIG). 
 148. These were firms in the S&P 100 as of March 9, 2009. Our analysis of all firms traded on the NYSE, 
NASDAQ, and AMEX yielded similar results. 
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spike-like pattern of crisis-induced increase in idiosyncratic risk. Over a one-year period 
idiosyncratic risk increases sharply and then, just as sharply, returns to precrisis levels. These 
results are depicted graphically in Figure 5 and are reported in Table 6 below.149 
Figure 5: Idiosyncratic Risk 2004–2010 
 
  
                                                 
 149. Figure 1 is calculated by first estimating the company-specific volatility for each firm that trades on the 
NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ on each day in 2004 to 2010. This volatility is found using the variance of the error 
term in a CAPM regression over the last year. So the volatility on January 1, 2005, represents what happened from 
January 1, 2004, to December 31, 2004. Likewise January 2, 2005, represents what happened from January 2, 2004, 
to January 1, 2005. We then average the results for each day, weighting by market capitalization of the firm. Table 6 
uses the same method, but only for S&P 100 firms. In each case, this company-specific volatility is measured by 
using the variance of the error term in a market model regression of the firm’s daily returns (percentage changes in 
stock price) over the last year. This regression estimates the firm’s β, which captures how, on average over the year, 
the firm’s daily stock price responds to price changes in the market as a whole. See generally Brealey, Myers & 
Allen, supra note 123, at 178–82 (“If you want to know the contribution of an individual security to the risk of a 
well-diversified portfolio . . . you need to measure its market risk, and that boils down to measuring how sensitive it 
is to market movements. This sensitivity is called beta (β).”). On any given day, this β can be used to estimate a 
predicted return for the firm based only on market performance. The error term for the day is the difference between 
the firm’s actual return and this predicted term. The variance of this error term over all the trading days of the year is 
thus a measure of how much the firm’s share price is being moved around by news that is independent of the news 
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Table 6: 
Idiosyncratic Risk of S&P 100 Firms, 2005–2009 
  Market-Cap-Weighted Annual Idiosyncratic Risk 
Period  All  Financial150  Nonfinancial 
July 1, 2005–June 30, 2006  3.5%  1.8%  3.8% 
July 1, 2006–June 30, 2007  3.3%  1.7%  3.6% 
July 1, 2007–June 30, 2008  5.7%  8.9%  5.4% 
July 1, 2008–June 30, 2009  18.2%  74.0%  13.3% 
B. Looking Back over Eight Decades 
A relationship between downturns in GDP and idiosyncratic risk was first noted by 
Campbell et al. in 2001.151 They found that over the thirty-five-year period from 1962 to 1997, a 
sharp increase in idiosyncratic risk was associated with the 1970, 1974, 1980, 1982, and 1991 
recessions as well as with the October 1987 market break.152 Campbell et al. did not, however, 
consider earlier crises, including the stock market crash of 1929 and the period of the Great 
Depression. Nor, of course, could they have considered the dot-com boom and bust in the early 
2000s or the Great Recession of 2008 to 2009. 
We have performed a study similar to Campbell et al. but extended the period covered from 
1926 to the present. As depicted in Figure 6 below, the results indicate that this pattern of 
increased idiosyncratic risk associated with poor macroeconomic performance repeats itself 
throughout the much longer eighty-five-year period, with particularly high levels of idiosyncratic 
risk at the time of the stock market crash of 1929, the early years of the Great Depression in the 
early 1930s, the economy's retreat into deep recession in 1937, and the financial crisis of 2008 to 
                                                 
 150. The companies analyzed in Table 6 were part of the S&P 100 as of March 2, 2009. By that point, the 
financial firms in the index were the ones who had weathered the crisis relatively well. Therefore, the exponential 
increase in volatility for financial firms is not attributable to companies like AIG, Bear Stearns, and Lehman. 
 151. Campbell et al., Empirical Exploration, supra note 141, at 3. 
 152. See id. at 13 fig.4 (showing “[a]nnualized firm-level volatility”). 
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2009.153 We also find that idiosyncratic risk increases at times of market boom as well, although 
the relationship is weaker—a point to which Part III will return. 
Figure 6: Idiosyncratic Risk 1925–2010 
 
C. Sectoral Analysis 
As shown in Table 6, the increase in financial-sector volatility during the 2008 to 2009 crisis 
dramatically outpaced that in the nonfinancial sector. It is therefore reasonable to ask whether the 
average increase among nonfinancial firms during the crisis was simply the shadow of the crisis 
in finance falling on a few adjacent industries such as construction. The answer is no. There was 
a substantial increase in average idiosyncratic volatility in each of the sixty-two-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) industries surveyed.154 Every industry saw its idiosyncratic 
                                                 
 153. The results depicted in Figure 2 are obtained in the same manner as those in Figure 1. See supra note 149 
(describing analysis). Our method is slightly different than that used by Campbell et al., but our results for the period 
that our study and theirs overlap are very similar. Appendix, supra note 144, at fig.(2)A-2. 
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volatility, as measured by variance, increase more than 50%, and in fifty-eight of sixty sectors it 
more than doubled.155 
Although firms in every industry experienced significant increases in idiosyncratic risk, 
what distinguishes those industries that experienced the greatest increase? Interestingly, the 
sectors whose firms would typically be seen as the riskiest prior to the crisis—those whose stock 
prices were most sensitive to changes in general economic conditions (i.e. those firms with the 
highest precrisis β (beta))156—were not the sectors in which idiosyncratic risk increased the most. 
Rather, it was those sectors with relatively low precrisis βs that saw the largest increases in their 
idiosyncratic risk. 
While a high absolute level of β prior to the crisis does not explain the impact of an 
economic crisis on a company’s idiosyncratic risk, there is a significant relationship between 
crisis period increases in β and the industries that showed the largest increases in idiosyncratic 
risk.157 That is, those firms whose stock prices became more sensitive during the crisis to 
changes in the overall economy, even though they had a low precrisis β, also tended to have the 
greatest increase in idiosyncratic risk.158 This finding supports the first of our possible 
                                                 
 155. Codes 60–67 are financial. The largest increases among nonfinancial firms were in hotels, amusement 
services, lumber, and social services. As Figure A-3 in the online appendix shows, controlling for industry-specific 
factors, along with those of the overall market, does not alter the results. Appendix, supra note 144, at fig.(2)A-3. 
 156. See Brealey, Myers & Allen, supra note 123, at 178–82 (defining “beta” as measure of “how sensitive” 
particular asset “is to market movements”). 
 157. The results noted in this paragraph are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of financial firms. 
 158. One question about this finding should be addressed. We measure a firm’s idiosyncratic volatility by 
running a market model, see John Y. Campbell, Andrew W. Lo & A. Craig MacKinlay, The Econometrics of 
Financial Markets 149–80 (1997) [hereinafter Campbell, Lo & MacKinlay, Econometrics], to net out the impact of 
the broader market on the individual stock. In so doing, we estimate the firm’s β, which captures how the firm’s 
stock responds to changes in the market. Supra note 149. Using this β allows one to estimate a predicted return for 
the firm based only on market performance. The idiosyncratic risk is derived from how much the actual return varies 
from the predicted return. If the estimated β departs from the “true” β, the predicted return will be less accurate. This 
will increase measured idiosyncratic risk regardless of whether the estimated β is too large (in which case when the 
market goes up, the predicted return will be too positive and if the market goes down, too negative) or whether β is 
too small (in which case when the market goes up, the predicted return will not be positive enough and when the 
market goes down, it will not be negative enough). 
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explanations for the reported crisis-related increase in unsystematic risk: When a firm is subject 
to a structural change in the economy, as reflected by an increase in the firm’s β, each new bit of 
firm-specific information will take on greater significance and hence move price more. 
D. The Effects of Leverage 
An alternative explanation for all or part of our reported increase in firm-specific volatility 
during economic crises is that the increase is caused by an increase in firms’ leverage. Because 
the value of most firms’ equity decreases during crises, their debt–equity ratio increases corre-
spondingly. The 2008 to 2009 financial crisis illustrates the phenomenon: From peak to trough, 
the market capitalization of all firms in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database declined 55%. It is well understood that an increase in a firm’s debt–equity ratio 
increases the variability of both the systematic and, of particular interest to us, the idiosyncratic 
portions of a firm’s returns.159 This is because debt is paid first from the firm’s underlying cash 
                                                                                                                                                             
As detailed in section I.D and in the online appendix, for the typical firm this estimate of β, though unbiased, is 
less accurate during crisis times than in normal times because the actual value of β over the period of the year is 
likely to change more in crisis times due to changes in the firm’s leverage triggered by sharp changes in the value of 
its equity. Appendix, supra note 144, at 8–11. Thus, one might speculate that the reported result—that firms in 
sectors whose βs, as we estimated them, increased the most also had the largest increases in idiosyncratic risk—
might be an artifact of this less accurate assessment of their βs rather than evidence of a positive relationship 
between an increase in a firm’s true β during crisis and firm-specific risk. The underlying intuition would be that 
most of the firms whose βs appeared to have experienced the greatest increases might in fact be those whose 
estimated βs, by chance, deviated the most on the upside from their actual βs. If this is correct, then our assessments 
of their idiosyncratic risk would also be more inflated than firms where the estimated β was closer to the true value. 
This concern, however, appears to be unwarranted. If it were correct, we should, for the same reasons of chance, 
also see an increase in firm-specific risk in sectors whose estimated βs dropped dramatically during the crisis 
because they would have a concentration of firms whose estimated βs deviated the most on the downside from their 
true values. In fact, sectors whose estimated βs dropped during the crisis were no more likely to see a relatively large 
increase in firm-specific risk than those whose estimated βs were unchanged. 
As a further sensitivity check, we also measured firm-specific risk using very short periods (twenty trading 
days) to minimize the possible impact of the decline in the accuracy of our β estimates compared to those based on a 
full year, during which the value of the true β may have shifted much more substantially than in a month. The 
results, reported in the appendix, are very similar to those presented in the text, again suggesting that the decline in 
the accuracy of our β estimates does not explain the results presented in the text. Id. at 12. 
 159. See Brealey, Myers & Allen, supra note 123, at 434–35 (“The expected rate of return on the common stock 
of a levered firm increases in proportion to the debt-equity ratio . . . .”); Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The 
Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261, 267–72 (1958) (“[T]he 
expected yield of a share of stock is equal to the appropriate capitalization rate ρk for a pure equity stream in the 
class, plus a premium related to financial risk equal to the debt-to-equity ratio times the spread between ρk and r.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
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flows, with equity receiving whatever residuals there are. Absent insolvency, the residual going 
to equity thus bears all the variability in the firm’s cash flow. When the total value of the equity 
in a firm is reduced, this variability will be concentrated on fewer dollars of equity and so the 
return on each such dollar varies more. 
Perhaps, then, the crisis-related spikes in idiosyncratic risk simply reflect the effect of the 
crisis-related decreases in equity value.160 Then there is no puzzle to explain, and the focus can 
turn directly to the legal implications of these findings. To address this possibility, we added 
explicit controls for the effect on idiosyncratic risk of the increase in leverage.161 As depicted in 
Figure 7, however, no more than one-quarter of the observed increase in idiosyncratic volatility 
in the most recent crisis was due to the leverage effect that arises from depressed share prices.162 
Thus, the puzzle with which this Part began still remains: Why, during periods of economic 
crisis, are large increases in idiosyncratic risk consistently associated with a company’s stock? 
We address this puzzle in the next Part. 
                                                 
 160. We are grateful to Mark Weinstein for raising this point. 
 161. For each firm, we adjust for the effect of leverage by deflating the unadjusted daily volatility by multiplying 
it by the firm’s Equity/(Debt+Equity) on that day. For more details, see Appendix, supra note 144, at Fig. (2)A-6 
(explaining mathematical computation of unlevered β based on firm’s ratio of debt to equity). 
 162. The online appendix also discusses and seeks to control for a second leverage-related impact on our measure 
of idiosyncratic risk, a changing (“unstable”) β during the observation period. Id. at 11. This too will increase the 
level of idiosyncratic risk measured for the typical firm. We find, however, that the second effect is in fact even less 
important than the first and so explains relatively little of the crisis-induced increase in idiosyncratic risk that we 
have observed. 
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FIGURE 7: IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK OF S&P 100 FIRMS ADJUSTED FOR LEVERAGE 
 
II. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS 
As noted above, Campbell et al. first reported that idiosyncratic risk increases during crisis 
periods.163 Their focus, however, was not on explaining this link, but on explaining what they 
saw as a secular increase in idiosyncratic volatility from 1962 through 1997. We focus here on 
the puzzle presented by extending their observation period to the eighty-five years from 1926 
through 2010. From the lead up to the Great Depression through what has come to be called the 
Great Recession, economic downturns repeatedly coincide with spikes in idiosyncratic volatility. 
Why should a crisis be associated with an increase in risk unrelated to the general economic 
disorder? We consider three possible explanations. One, explored in section II.A is that, 
compared to ordinary times, information about a firm contained in current news may become 
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more important in predicting its future cash flows relative to the role of the already existing stock 
of knowledge in making such predictions. A second explanation, explored in section II.B, is that 
the quality of management becomes more important in crisis times. Consequently, the ordinary 
flow of new information about this subject can cause bigger movements in price because each bit 
tells the market about something—the quality of management—that the market now regards as 
more important than it did in ordinary times. A third explanation, explored in section II.C, is that 
crisis creates uncertainty as to what factors, and hence what information, are important to 
valuation. Because of this uncertainty, a broader range of information has valuation implications 
and therefore stock prices move more frequently. These three explanations share a common 
theme: Economic crises increase both the frequency and the impact of news with valuation 
consequences for an individual company’s stock. New information becomes more valuable and 
more information is likely to be new, with the consequence of increased idiosyncratic volatility. 
A. Current News Becomes Relatively More Important 
In a rational market, share price at any given moment reflects the aggregate of investors’ 
predictions of an issuer’s future net cash flows.164 These predictions are based on a large 
collection of bits of information, much of it accumulated over a period of years, but some of 
which at any time is new. In an informationally efficient market, the new information in each bit 
is by definition unpredictable before it is received. This new information is what causes the 
issuer’s share price to fluctuate in a random walk: If new information cannot be predicted, then 
neither can the direction of its impact on price. How much a stock’s price moves one way or the 
                                                 
 164. See Brealey, Myers & Allen, supra note 123, at 80 (noting present value of share of stock equals expected 
future dividends per share, discounted to present value). 
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other depends on the predictive importance of the new bit of information relative to the 
predictive value of the previously accumulated information concerning that stock. 
A first explanation for the association between economic crises and spikes in idiosyncratic 
volatility is that during an economic crisis, each bit of new information is likely to be more 
important relative to the existing stock of information for predicting the future. This should be 
true not only for information relevant to predicting the economy’s overall performance but also 
for information that is relevant to predicting the future cash flows of only a single firm. 
One reason that the predictive importance of firm-specific new information increases in an 
economic downturn is that investors expect structural changes in the economy to accompany a 
downturn. This is at least in part true because major downturns are usually the result of 
imbalances in the economy: in the case of the recent financial crisis, an unsustainable level of 
resources going into construction of residential and commercial buildings and into the financial 
industry. But the exact nature of this structural change and its implications, good or bad, for any 
particular firm might not yet be fully understood, as the deluge of books seeking to explain the 
Great Recession strikingly demonstrates.165 In essence, an economic crisis “shakes the box.” 
Everyone knows that when things settle down, the relations among firms, and those between 
each firm and its suppliers and customers, are likely to be different than before the crisis. 
Relative to each other, some firms will gain and others will lose from these changed relations. 
But no one is yet sure exactly what pattern these new relations will take and hence what 
companies will be the winners or losers. A new bit of firm-specific information can have a bigger 
                                                 
 165. See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Getting up to Speed on the Financial Crisis: A One-Weekend-Reader’s 
Guide, 50 J. Econ. Literature 128, 128–29 (2012) (proposing “reading list” of sixteen key documents for 
understanding crisis); Lo, supra note 127, at 154 (reviewing twenty-one books about crisis). 
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price impact than in normal times because the bit may disclose something about this new pattern 
of relations. 
Consider, for example, a not-fully-anticipated quarterly earnings announcement that is 10% 
lower than would have been predicted by the earnings path over the previous few years. This 
shortfall could be due to random firm-specific factors not likely to repeat themselves, or it could 
be due to a more enduring change in the fundamental factors shaping the environment in which 
the firm operates—the costs of its inputs, the market for its outputs, or the technology that the 
firm uses to transform one into the other—that will continue to influence the firm’s cash flows 
for many periods to come. A not-fully-anticipated quarterly earnings shortfall typically would 
have some impact on investor predictions about a firm’s future cash flows and hence on its share 
price. In making these predictions in normal times, however, investors might assign much more 
weight to the firm’s longer-term history of earnings because they are indicative of the 
environment within which the firm had been operating and there would be little reason to believe 
that the environment had changed radically during this most recent quarter. 
During an economic crisis, in contrast, changes in the structure of the economy that 
significantly impact the firm are much more likely. However, there will at first be no clear 
understanding of the nature of these changes. The new piece of information concerning the 
quarterly earnings shortfall thus takes on more importance because there is a greater likelihood 
that the change in earnings is due to changes in more enduring factors affecting the long-run 
success of the firm, rather than to fluke factors unlikely to repeat themselves. Put differently, in 
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such times, new information takes on greater importance because the economic crisis degrades 
the value of the old stock of information in helping to predict the future.166 
This explanation is consistent with a second feature of our results. As shown in Figure 5, the 
crisis-induced increase in idiosyncratic risk is truly spike-like: The increased volatility disappears 
as quickly as it appears. This suggests that once the market figures out the new shape of the 
postcrisis structural relationships, idiosyncratic risk returns to historical levels. In this 
explanation, new information is important to understanding the crisis-induced change in the 
structure of relationships among firms, and the volatility spike is the artifact of that importance. 
Once it is understood, the cause of increased idiosyncratic volatility disappears because new 
information no longer carries the extra, crisis-related capacity to cause large changes in 
predictions. 
The structural change explanation for the increase in idiosyncratic volatility during crisis 
periods is also supported by the finding that firms in sectors that experienced the largest increase 
in their βs during the recent financial crisis—that is, ones that relative to other firms became 
more sensitive to factors that affect the market as a whole—also displayed the greatest increases 
in idiosyncratic risk.167 It is reasonable to think that firms that were most affected by crisis-
induced changes in the structure of the economy would tend to experience the biggest changes in 
their βs. These are the firms for whom, during a crisis, new bits of information would have the 
most predictive power relative to the prior stock of knowledge. In accordance with our first 
                                                 
 166. It should be noted that, even in normal times, a relatively small earnings shortfall from what was expected 
can have a significant effect on price. The earnings miss may indicate that despite all efforts to massage the 
numbers, the company still could not make the estimate, which suggests that something more important than a small 
miss has occurred. In crisis times, though, the shortfall would still, for the reasons discussed in the text, be expected 
to lead to an even bigger price decline. 
 167. See supra section I.C (presenting sectoral-analysis findings). 
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explanation, these are the firms that would display the greatest increases in idiosyncratic 
volatility. 
A period where the market is rising rapidly, for example during the Internet boom, also may 
signal disruption and structural change, where again new information takes on more importance. 
Our findings are consistent with this circumstance as well—idiosyncratic risk goes up in sharp 
market upturns.168 The increase is not as great as in market downturns, but the smaller impact is 
likely at least in part due to the deleveraging effect of rising stock prices, the opposite of the 
leverage effect we analyzed in section I.D. 
The following hypothetical demonstrates the first explanation. Imagine that you have a 
barrel with 200 colored balls in it, divided in a ratio between red and green that you are trying to 
estimate. Each period, you randomly draw one ball, note its color, and put the ball back in the 
barrel. After, say, twenty periods, you will have a pretty good sense of the ratio in the barrel, and 
you will not change your estimate very much based on whether the twenty-first ball drawn is red 
or green. Now suppose that of the 200, 100 randomly selected balls are taken out of the barrel 
and 100 new balls are substituted for them. The newly substituted balls have an unknown ratio of 
red to green that might be quite different than the ratio of the 200 original balls. When you take 
out the twenty-second ball, the outcome (that is, the new bit of information)—whether it is red or 
green—will change your estimate of the ratio in the barrel much more than it would have absent 
the substitution. 
B. Information Concerning Quality of Management Becomes More Important 
The phenomenon of crisis-enhanced new information has a special role when the 
information concerns the quality of management. When troubled times sharply change the 
                                                 
 168. Supra Figure 2. 
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overall business environment, the importance of an established firm’s management becomes 
more like the importance of a startup’s management in normal times. Management confronts 
more, and more important, decisions than in normal times. 
It is well recognized that startup management has special importance because the company’s 
value is primarily comprised of future growth options, as opposed to being based on the cash 
flows from an existing business.169 At this early stage, management needs to make more choices 
of the kind that shape the fundamental direction of the firm. Moreover, the consequences of these 
choices are less obvious than they are with an established firm in normal times because there is 
no history of the consequences of making similar decisions in the past. Having high-quality 
managers—persons who are better at predicting the consequences of their more difficult choices 
despite the lack of such history—will thus have a larger impact on expected performance. Crisis 
thus can put the managers of even mature firms in a situation closer to that of a startup. The 
sharp change in the mature firm’s business environment may force managers to make more 
fundamental choices, and history will be a less reliable guide as to their consequences. As a 
result, the quality of management has a larger impact on the firm’s future cash flows. 
In addition to the extent to which each bit of crisis-related information newly reveals 
something about the quality of a mature firm’s management, the subject that bit of new 
information concerns—management quality—also has greater implications for the firm’s future 
cash flows. Therefore, the significance of the bit in predicting these future cash flows becomes 
more important. As a consequence, the revelation of new information concerning management 
                                                 
 169. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 
55 Stan. L. Rev. 1067, 1076–77 (2003) (noting at start-up stage, “quality of the company’s management . . . takes on 
heightened importance because so large a portion of the portfolio company’s value depends on management’s future 
decisions”). 
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quality causes a bigger share price change and therefore, greater volatility than in noncrisis 
times. 
C. Model Failure: Ignorance Concerning What Facts Are Initially Relevant 
Investors’ expectations about a company’s future cash flows are typically based on an 
implicit model that tells them something about the meaning and importance of new information 
about the company. In essence, investors have a model that tells them what information is 
important for predicting future cash flows. In an economic crisis, systemic changes may make 
investors less confident that they still know which facts have valuation implications. Because of 
that uncertainty, a much wider range of facts potentially matter and so the appearance of more 
kinds of information will move prices. Moreover, any particular new bit of information can have 
greater importance. Not only does it directly tell investors something more about the firm’s 
future cash flow, it may also provide information about the shape of a new valuation model that 
suggests a different range of information that will be relevant to predicting the firm’s cash flows 
in the future. This may put an already existing stock of knowledge in new perspective, in effect, 
turning old information into new. Thus, new information and more kinds of information can 
potentially move price a great deal. 
This third explanation differs from the first explanation—that current news becomes more 
relevant—in that the situation in the first explanation could be fully described in terms of risk, 
while the third explanation resembles more Knightian uncertainty.170 Continuing with the 
analogy of sampling from a barrel of balls, you still need to estimate the ratio of the colors of the 
balls in the barrel, but you can no longer even be sure that there are only red balls and green balls 
                                                 
 170. See Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit 233–34 (1921) (distinguishing between risk, which can 
be predicted probabilistically, and uncertainty, which cannot). 
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after the substitution of the 100 new balls. Suppose, after this substitution, the twenty-second ball 
drawn is yellow, not red or green. The draw tells you not only something about the ratio of balls, 
it tells you that your old model—a two-color distribution—is no longer accurate. Thus, you get a 
whole new kind of information relevant to predicting the contents of the barrel.171 
III. THE EFFECTS OF CRISIS-INDUCED SPIKES IN IDIOSYNCRATIC VOLATILITY ON EVENT STUDIES  
Over the last few decades, financial economics and related econometric tools have become 
increasingly integrated into corporate and securities law analysis and practice. The synergy is 
straightforward: Financial economics speaks to how assets are valued and corporate and 
securities laws provide a structure in which value can be created. This sensible trend has 
proceeded, however, without an appreciation of the dramatic several-fold increase in 
idiosyncratic volatility accompanying economic bad times that we have documented here and 
sought to explain. Yet the sharp price drops that accompany bad times make these times precisely 
when there are more plaintiffs’ suits, more governmental enforcement actions, and more calls for 
regulatory change. This Part and Part IV take a fresh look at the link between financial 
economics and corporate and securities law in light of what we have shown is the predictable 
                                                 
 171. Warren Buffett has famously made a related point. In his terms, “[Y]ou only find out who is swimming 
naked when the tide goes out.” Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to Shareholders of 
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 10 (Feb. 28, 2002), http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2001pdf.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/QUJ7-X8PG]. 
Put more precisely, but less amusingly, good times allow a pooling equilibrium concerning firm quality, and the 
economic crisis results in separation. While Buffet’s point covers part of our analysis, it does not address an 
important aspect of our data. Our measure documenting the idiosyncratic volatility increase involves the variance of 
daily market-adjusted price changes over a twelve-month period. For most firms in the sample, much of the 
increased variance in the idiosyncratic portion of the firm’s returns comes from an increase in both the upside and 
the downside. In contrast, Buffet’s separating effect of bad economic times—revealing which are the bad firms and 
which are the good ones—would, for any given firm, work in just one direction. Moreover, if the large declines in 
share price associated with the revelation of dishonest or incompetent management drove a significant portion of the 
crisis-times increase in idiosyncratic risk, then, compared to normal times, the largest drops should explain a 
substantially higher portion (relative to what we have observed) of the total amount of such risk during the twelve-
month period. As discussed in the online appendix, in crisis and in precrisis times alike, about the same portion of 
total idiosyncratic risk is explained by the biggest drops, a result inconsistent with the “tide goes out” explanation. 
See Appendix, supra note 144, at 8 fig.(2)A-5 (comparing unadjusted market-cap-weighted volatility with estimates 
after truncating tails). 
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spike in idiosyncratic volatility that accompanies each major economic downturn. Sections IV.A 
and IV.B consider the impact of crisis-related spikes in idiosyncratic volatility on the use of event 
studies in connection with a number of issues that arise in securities litigation. Section IV.C then 
turns to the impact of these spikes on the extent to which incumbent management’s valuation of a 
target company should receive deference in the context of a contest for corporate control. 
Financial economics focuses centrally on what factors influence the price of a security. The 
inquiry can be framed by identifying an event that may influence a security’s price and then 
seeking to measure the impact of that event on the price of the security in question. Measuring 
the price impact of a particular event, however, requires isolating the effect of a single item of 
information—the occurrence of the event under study—from the cacophony of information 
constantly reaching the capital markets. This is the province of an event study.172 Over the last 
few decades courts have come, as a practical (and probably as a legal) matter, to require plaintiffs 
to conduct an event study for many securities fraud class actions to proceed.173 As we will see, 
the level of idiosyncratic volatility associated with a company’s stock is central to the event 
study methodology and the sharp spikes in such volatility that accompany economic crises cause 
problems. To see why, we need to start with a brief account of how an event study is conducted. 
                                                 
 172. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law Part I: Technique and Corporate 
Litigation, 4 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 141, 142 (2002) (explaining methodology of event studies focuses on movement 
of stock prices due to specific events); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law Part II: 
Empirical Studies of Corporate Law, 4 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 380, 380 (2002) (“[E]vent studies provide a metric for 
measurement of the impact upon stock prices of policy decisions.”). 
 173. See, e.g., Bricklayers & Trowel Trades Int’l Pension Fund v. Credit Suisse First Bos., 853 F. Supp. 2d 181, 
186 (D. Mass. 2012) (“An event study . . . often plays a ‘pivotal’ role in proving loss causation and damages in a 
securities fraud case. Given the difficulty inherent in proving the effect, if any, of a single news item on the price of 
a stock, many courts require them in such cases.” (citation omitted)); In re Williams Sec. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 2d 
1195, 1272–73 (N.D. Okla. 2007) (“‘ [A] number of courts have rejected or refused to admit . . . damages reports or 
testimony by damages experts in securities cases which fail to include event studies or something similar.’” (quoting 
In re Imperial Credit Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1015 (C.D. Cal. 2003))). 
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A. Event Study Basics 
It would be very useful to be able to identify the impact of a particular event on a stock’s 
price. For example, on the day that any particular item of news relating to a specific issuer 
becomes public, say the announcement of an acquisition, other bits of news concerning the 
company also may affect its share price. So the mere fact that the share price moved up or down 
that day does not show that the price movement was caused by the acquisition. In assessing 
whether the acquisition will increase a firm’s value, it would be helpful to observe just the effect 
of the acquisition announcement—to separate the effect of the “event” from that of any other bits 
of news relevant to the company’s future cash flows and of random noise. An event study helps 
distinguish between the different possible influences on stock price in order to assess the extent 
to which a particular item of information affected price.174 
1. Determining the Market-Adjusted Price Change. — Conducting an event study begins 
with measuring the market-adjusted change in the issuer’ s share price when the item of interest 
becomes public. The market-adjusted change is the difference between the observed price change 
and what the change in overall stock market prices predicts would have been the issuer’s price 
change. This prediction is based on the historical relationship (usually over a one-year 
observation period ending shortly before disclosure of the item of interest) between price 
changes in the overall market and price changes of the issuer’s stock. 
                                                 
 174. Those familiar with event studies will recognize a fundamental difference between event studies as 
originally developed in financial economics and event studies as they are used in securities litigation. In financial 
economics, the key to an event study is that the task is to measure the effect of an event in general—does it affect 
stock price over a sample of companies that experienced the event?—not the effect of an event on a particular 
company’s stock price. The financial economics approach uses a sample of all companies that experienced the event 
in question to regress out the effect of all the other events affecting a company’s stock price. If the number of 
companies in the sample is large enough, the other events affecting particular companies cancel each other out. See 
Campbell, Lo & MacKinlay, Econometrics, supra note 158, at 149–80 (explaining event study methodology). 
A single-company event study, as used in the securities litigation context, must address the problem of other 
events occurring close in time to the event under study in other ways. The text is concerned with single-firm event 
studies. 
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Making this market adjustment removes the influence on the stock’s price of news that 
affects the price of all firms’ stock, i.e., bits of systematic news. What is left—the market-
adjusted price change—is the portion of the observed change in price that is due to firm-specific 
news or background noise. Because in securities litigation, the news item of interest relates 
specifically to the issuer, eliminating the impact of systematic news is critical.175 
To give an example, suppose that the share price of the issuer under study was $100.00 at the 
end of the trading day immediately preceding the item of interest’s disclosure and is $96.50 by 
the end of the day on which the item of interest is disclosed. Suppose as well that the market as a 
whole went down 1% on the day of the item of interest and that the issuer’s β is 1.5.176 Based on 
this historical relationship between day-to-day changes in the issuer’s share price and the 
corresponding market-wide price changes, we would predict that if firm-specific news, including 
the item of interest, had on a net basis no effect on the issuer’s share price, the issuer’s price 
would have dropped to $98.50. But in fact it dropped to $96.50. So the remainder of the 
observed price change—referred to as the market-adjusted price change—would be −$2.00, or 
−2.00%. As depicted in Figure 8, this is the portion of the total observed price change that can be 
attributed to firm-specific news.177 
                                                 
 175. Courts recognize the need to separate systematic from unsystematic movements in stock price based on the 
utility of single-firm event studies in accomplishing this. For examples of courts requiring the use of event studies to 
strip away any movement in price caused by market-wide trends for plaintiffs to establish loss causation, see 
Imperial Credit Indus., Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d at 1015–16 (rejecting testimony of plaintiff’s expert for failure to 
include “event study or similar analysis . . . [to] eliminate that portion of the price decline . . . which is unrelated to 
the alleged wrong,” but attributable to “market events for which Defendants cannot be held responsible” (citations 
omitted)); In re N. Telecom Ltd. Sec. Litig., 116 F. Supp. 2d 446, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[Plaintiff’s expert’s] 
testimony is fatally deficient in that he did not perform an event study or similar analysis to remove the effects on 
stock price of market and industry information . . . .”). 
 176. See supra note 149 (explaining concept of β). 
 177. See Campbell, Lo & MacKinlay, Econometrics, supra note 158, at 149–80 (discussing methodology of 
event studies). 
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Figure 8: Isolation of Firm-Specific News Through Market-Adjustment 
 
2. Judging the Market-Adjusted Price Change Against Its Historical Volatility. — The next 
step in an event study determines the likelihood that at least part of the observed market-adjusted 
price change results from the item of interest. In essence we are asking the following question: 
How likely is it that we would observe a market-adjusted price change of the magnitude that was 
observed on the day the item of interest was announced if in fact the change results solely from 
the day’s other bits of firm-specific news and background noise? This can be answered by 
comparing the issuer’s market-adjusted price change on the relevant date with the historical 
record of the daily, market-adjusted ups and downs in the issuer’s share price, typically over the 
approximately 250 trading days in a one-year observation period ending on a day shortly before 
the item of interest’s disclosure, i.e., by comparing the magnitude of the market-adjusted price 
change on the day of the announcement with the issuer’s historical idiosyncratic volatility. 
As a general matter, market-adjusted price changes, up and down, are distributed in a pattern 
closely resembling what would be produced by a normal (bell-shaped curve) probability 
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distribution with a zero mean.178 The conventional event study assumes that the same probability 
distribution generates the market-adjusted price change on each of the approximately 250 trading 
days during the observation period and the net price impact of all ordinary, day-to-day firm-
specific news and background noise other than any impact from the item of interest on the day 
that it is announced. Because of the size of the sample, the standard deviation of the observation 
period’s approximately 250 market-adjusted price changes is a fairly precise estimate of the 
standard deviation of this probability distribution. 
Because this probability function is a normal distribution, the net price impact of all the 
other firm-specific news of the day and background noise will be within plus or minus 1.96 
standard deviations of the mean, 95% of the time. From this, we can see that if the item of 
interest in fact had no impact on price, there is less than a 5% chance that we would observe a 
market-adjusted price change on the day it was announced that is plus or minus, more than 1.96 
standard deviations from the mean. Therefore, if we observe a market-adjusted price change this 
large, we can reject with at least 95% confidence the null hypothesis that the item of interest had 
no impact on price. Accordingly, observed market-adjusted price changes that are large enough 
to pass this test are often referred to as being statistically significant at the 95% level.179 
                                                 
 178. While the event studies used by experts in securities litigation cases almost universally assume that these 
price changes are normally distributed, it has been recognized for some time that the actual distribution of these 
changes is not perfectly normal. See, e.g., Stephen J. Brown & Jerold B. Warner, Using Daily Stock Returns: The 
Case of Event Studies, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 3, 4–5 (1985) (discussing non-normal distribution in daily stock returns). 
This has led some commentators to call for using another technique for conducting event studies in securities 
litigation situations. See, e.g., Jonah B. Gelbach, Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, Valid Inference in Single-Firm, 
Single-Event Studies, 15 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 495, 496–99 (2013) (explaining flaws of standard approach and 
proposing alternative test). The overall analysis in this Article would apply equally to these other techniques. 
 179. See generally Campbell, Lo & MacKinlay, Econometrics, supra note 158, at 149–80 (explaining history and 
methodology of event study analysis). As a technical matter, saying that we can reject the null hypothesis with “95% 
confidence” is the province of Bayesian statistics. Our terminology, however, is commonly used with event studies 
and shall be thought of as shorthand for saying there is a less than 5% chance of observing a result this extreme if 
the null hypothesis is true.  
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These points may be most easily understood by extending our example above. Suppose, for 
purpose of illustration, that the standard deviation of the market-adjusted price changes during 
the observation period was 1%. This would mean that on the day the item of interest is 
announced, the net price impact of the other firm-specific news and background noise would 
95% of the time be somewhere between +1.96% and −1.96%, as illustrated in Figure 9. It would 
be outside this range on the positive side 2.5% of the time and on the negative side 2.5% of the 
time. In our example, the observed market-adjusted price change on the day of the announcement 
of the item of interest was −$2.00 or −2.00%. This is more than 1.96 times the standard deviation 
of the day-to-day ups and downs in the market-adjusted price during the observation period, and 
so the price change was statistically significant at the 95% level. 
  80 
FIGURE 9: DEMONSTRATION OF TYPE I ERROR 
AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN ITEM OF INTEREST WITH NO NEGATIVE IMPACT ON PRICE WOULD 
BE ACCOMPANIED BY A MARKET-ADJUSTED PRICE CHANGE AS NEGATIVE AS −$2.00  
LESS THAN 2.5% OF THE TIME 
 
 
If the difference between the issuer’s market-adjusted price change when the event of 
interest is disclosed and its historic market-adjusted price change over the observation period is 
large enough to pass this test of statistical significance and no other important bits of firm-
specific information become public close in time to the event of interest, we can, with at least 
95% confidence, reject the null hypothesis that the observed market-adjusted price change was 
The mean of the distribution of the impact of firm-specific news and background noise other than the 
item of interest will be zero. So if the item of interest has no impact on price, the mean of the 
distribution of possible observed market-adjusted prices equals $98.50. The net impact of background 
noise and firm-specific news other than the item of interest will be negative by more than $1.96 (1.96 
standard deviations) no more than 2.5% of the time. This means that when the impact of the item of 
interest is zero, there is a 2.5% chance that the observed price will be equal to or below $96.54, i.e., 
the Type I error rate is 2.5%. 
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due entirely to factors other than disclosure of the item of interest. In other words, the observer 
can reject with this level of confidence the proposition that the item of interest had no effect on 
price.180 
B. Type I and Type II Errors in the Use of Event Studies for Securities Litigation 
A securities fraud class action typically is based on the theory that a corporate disclosure 
caused the issuer’s stock price to move in a particular direction. An event study is used to test 
that theory. For example, if the purchaser of a security claimed that a corporate misstatement 
inflated the price she paid and that she suffered a loss when the stock price dropped in response 
to the truth coming out, she would seek to prove that the corrective disclosure negatively affected 
the price.181 
As just discussed, because there are potentially many other bits of firm-specific news and 
general background noise affecting an issuer’s share price on the same day that the item of 
interest is announced, we cannot determine with certainty whether the item of interest had any 
negative impact on price. We instead use an event study to make a probabilistic assessment of 
whether the item in fact had an effect on the company’s share price. An event study addresses 
this question by providing a probabilistic assessment of whether the corrective disclosure had a 
                                                 
 180. The foregoing discussion presents a somewhat simplified version of the event studies that are typically 
conducted by experts giving testimony in securities actions. For example, there is usually a control for industry-
specific pieces of information as well as for systematic information, which will entail some complications 
concerning the proper definition of the industry. Also, sometimes the event window in which the market-adjusted 
price change is measured is longer than one day. In addition, often the baseline one-year observation period used to 
determine the standard deviation has removed days on which there are identifiable, obviously important bits of firm-
specific news and in parallel, there is an attempt to remove the impact of any other identifiable, obviously important 
bits of firm-specific news on the day that the item of interest is disclosed. For a discussion of these elaborations on 
the simple model presented here, see, e.g., Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha, The Loss Causation Requirement for Rule 
10b-5 Causes of Action: The Implications of Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 63 Bus. Law. 163, 166–67 
(2007). None of these elaborations of event-study methodology affect the points that we seek to make. 
 181. For purposes of illustration, we will assume throughout this Article that the legally relevant question is 
whether an item of news had a negative effect on price, but a symmetrical version of the discussion would be 
equally valid where the legally relevant question is whether the item had a positive effect on price—for example, in 
a case claiming that a proposed acquisition was favorable to shareholders. 
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negative effect on the company’s share price. As the question is usually put, did the issuer’s stock 
price decline by a statistically significant amount? For our purposes here, the critical fact is that 
this test will generate a certain rate of false positives (Type I errors) and of false negatives (Type 
II errors). Type I errors occur when the item of interest did not in fact have an impact on price 
but the observed market-adjusted price change on the day it was announced was sufficiently 
negative to nonetheless pass this test. Type II errors occur when the item of interest did in fact 
have an impact on price but the observed market-adjusted price change on the day it was 
announced was not statistically significant. 
Again, these two types of errors are most easily understood by going back to our example. 
When the standard deviation is properly specified, as will be the case in normal economic times,182 
the Type I error rate depends solely on the level of statistical confidence required by the test (for 
purposes of this discussion, 95%183). To pass the test, the observed market-adjusted price change 
on the day of the item of interest must be at least -$1.96. As depicted in Figure 9, there is only a 
2.5% chance that the other firm-specific news and background noise had a net price impact this 
negative. Thus, there is only a 2.5% chance that we would observe a market-adjusted price change 
this negative if the item of interest in fact had no negative impact on price: The Type I error rate is 
2.5%.184 Observed market-adjusted negative price changes more negative than this—in our 
example, the observed change of −$2.00 or −2.00%—pass the test. 
                                                 
 182. See infra section III.B.1 (identifying magnitude of Type I and Type II errors in normal economic times). 
 183. Cf. Shari Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey Research, in Reference Manual on Scientific 
Evidence 359, 381 (3d. ed. 2011) [hereinafter Manual on Scientific Evidence] (“Traditionally, scientists adopt the 
95% level of confidence . . . .  “); David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in Manual 
on Scientific Evidence, supra, 211, 245 (noting 95% is confidence level “most popular” in scientific literature). 
 184. The standard methodology is to use a “two-tailed” test, which looks only at the magnitude of the price 
change. The result is considered statistically significant at the 95% level if the observed price change is greater than 
1.96 times the standard deviation, whether positive or negative. The observed price change being statistically 
significant and negative implies that if the item of interest had no effect on price, there is no more than a 2.5% 
chance that we would observe a change this negative. 
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The Type II error rate—where the item of interest did in fact have a negative impact on price but 
the observed market-adjusted price change on the day it was announced failed the confidence test—
is a bit more complicated. The Type II error rate depends not only on the level of statistical 
confidence required by the test, again 95% for this discussion, but also on the magnitude of the actual 
negative price impact of the item of interest and the issuer’s idiosyncratic volatility as measured by 
its standard deviation. 
To see how this works, modify our continuing example slightly. Suppose, as depicted in Figure 
10, that an item of interest in fact had a −1.00% market-adjusted impact on the issuer’s stock price 
and that, as before, the standard deviation of market-adjusted price changes for this issuer was 1.00% 
over the measuring period. Recall again that the market-adjusted price change observed on the 
disclosure day is the combination of the item of interest’s price impact and the net price impact of all 
the other firm-specific bits of news and background noise on that day.185 The relevant question is: 
What is the likelihood that the observed market-adjusted price change on the disclosure day will be 
sufficiently negative to pass the 95% confidence standard, (i.e., more negative than −1.96%)? This 
will only happen if the net impact of all the other bits of firm-specific news and background noise on 
that day is at least −0.96% (which, when combined with the −1.00% impact of the item of interest, 
would in total be at least −1.96%). 
As depicted in Figure 10, this will be the case only about 17% of the time, or only about one 
time in six.186 Thus, one cannot necessarily infer from an observed market-adjusted price change 
                                                 
 185. The expected value of the effect on share price of these other factors is zero, but that only means that they 
are as likely to add to as to subtract from the negative effect on share price of the item of interest. As a highly 
simplified example, suppose there is one other piece of firm-specific information revealed to the market the same 
day. This other bit of news is unrelated to the news items of interest and if it were the only piece of firm-specific 
information revealed that day, would result in a positive price change of +3%. The observed market-adjusted change 
in price will be 2%, even if, as posited, the news item of interest itself affected price by −1%. 
 186. For a more detailed discussion of the general approach to calculating the chances of this kind of error, see 
Edward G. Fox, Merritt B. Fox & Ronald J. Gilson, Idiosyncratic Risk During Economic Downturns: Implications 
for the Use of Event Studies in Securities Litigation 7–11 (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 453, 2013) 
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failing the test that it likely did not affect price. Indeed, for an issuer with a standard deviation of 
1%, an item of interest with an actual impact on price of −1.00% will fail the test most of the time. 
Figure 10: Demonstration of Type II Error 
An Item of Interest Having an Actual Negative Impact of $1.00, the Observed Market 
Price Will Be Negative Enough to Be Considered Statistically Significant Only One Time in 
Six (A Type II Error Rate of 83%) 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
[hereinafter Fox, Fox & Gilson, Idiosyncratic Risk], http://ssrn.com/abstract=2314058 [http://perma.cc/7K5A-
NGS3] (expressing calculations mathematically). 
The mean of the distribution of the net impact of background noise and firm-specific news other than 
the item of interest will equal zero. So if the item of interest has a −$1.00 impact on price, the mean of 
the distribution of possible observed market-adjusted prices would equal $97.50. The observed market-
adjusted price must be at or below $96.54 to be considered statistically significant at the 95% level. The 
impact of firm-specific news other than the item of interest will therefore need to be negative by $0.96 
or more (0.96 standard deviations) for the observed market-adjusted price to be at or below $96.54. 
This will occur only 17% of the time which is about one time in six. Thus the Type II error rate for items 
of interest with a negative price impact of −1.00%—the rate at which items of interest with this negative 
an impact will fail the test— is 83%. 
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More generally, the odds of an item of interest that actually had a negative effect on price 
passing a test based on any given level of confidence depends on the size of the actual effect 
relative to the standard deviation of past day-to-day market-adjusted price changes. Also, the 
higher the required confidence level, the lower the rate of false positives (Type I errors) and the 
higher the rate of false negatives (Type II errors). As we will see, each kind of error can have 
negative social consequences when event studies are used in securities litigation. That 
assessment leads to the matter of special concern here: Economic crisis-related idiosyncratic 
volatility spikes make the problem of Type I and Type II errors significantly worse. 
1. The Magnitude of Type I and Type II Errors in Normal Times Using a 95% Confidence 
Level. — Our analysis starts by identifying the magnitude of Type I and Type II errors in normal 
times. This sets the baseline for our consideration of the impact of crisis-related volatility spikes. 
a. Type I Errors. — In normal economic times, it is conventionally assumed that the same 
probability distribution generates the market-adjusted price changes on each of the 
approximately 250 trading days during the typical one-year observation period prior to the item 
of interest’s disclosure.187 Thus, the standard deviation of the observation period’ s approximately 
250 market-adjusted price changes is a fairly precise estimate of the standard deviation of the 
probability distribution generating the net price impact of background noise and firm-specific 
information other than the item of interest on the day of its announcement. Under these 
circumstances, with a 95% confidence standard, the Type I error for a test of whether the item of 
interest had a negative impact on price is as calculated above: 2.5%. 
                                                 
 187. A visual review of Figures 1 and 2, supra, provides an empirical verification of the reasonableness of the 
assumption. In these Figures, each moment’s measure of idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation of market-
adjusted price changes over the previous twelve months. In other words it is a day-by-day look back over the prior 
twelve months. One can see that during normal times this measure stays quite steady from one day to the next. 
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b. Type II Errors. — Now consider what in normal times would be the Type II error rate 
associated with using the 95% confidence level if an item of interest in fact negatively affects the 
price by 5%.188 Again, background noise and firm-specific information other than the item of in-
terest will simultaneously affect the issuer’s market-adjusted price. Thus, the observed market-
adjusted price change in any given instance may differ, one way or the other, from 5%. Type II 
error occurs when the observed market-adjusted price change—the combination of the price 
impact of the item of interest and these other impacts—is not sufficiently negative to pass the test 
of statistical significance. The starting point is to calculate how negative the market-adjusted 
price change accompanying the item of interest’s announcement needs to be to pass the test, just 
as was done in the example above concerning Type II error depicted in Figure 10. In Figure 6 
above, market-cap-weighted average firm-specific volatility, as measured by variance, from the 
1970s until the advent of the financial crisis, was in the range of 6% to 10% during noncrisis 
years, with an average of approximately 8%. This annualized variance translates to a daily 
standard deviation of 1.78%.189 Again, for the observed market-adjusted price change to be 
considered statistically significant at the 95% level, the observed market-adjusted price change 
must be at least as negative as 1.96 times the standard deviation—it must be −1.96 x 1.78% = 
−3.49%. 
                                                 
 188. Securities lawyers often use 5% as a crude rule-of-thumb threshold percentage as a starting point for 
determining how much income or assets need to be misreported to be considered material. See infra note 243 and 
accompanying text (describing prevalence of 5% in securities litigation contexts). 
 189. Since our calculations are based on daily data, it is our annual variances that are interpolated using the 
following mathematical formula: 𝑉𝑎𝑟 ∑ 𝜀𝑖
252
𝑖=1 = 252 ∗ 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖) where ∑ 𝜀𝑖
252
𝑖=1  is the sum of the market-adjusted 
returns on each of the 252 trading days each year, and thus the left-hand side is the annual variance of market-
adjusted returns. The equality flows because the market-adjusted returns will be independent of one another in an 
efficient market. A reader can back out the daily variance by dividing the annualized numbers in Figure 2 by 252. 
The daily standard deviation is the square root of the daily variance. Due to the nonlinearity of variance, this is not 
the exact figure that we yield after marketcap weighting the standard deviations of the individual firms, but this 
difference is relatively minor. 
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The Type II error question is then how likely it is that the observed market-adjusted price be 
at least this negative when the actual price impact of the item of interest is −5%. The observed 
price change will be this negative unless the net impact of the other firm-specific news and 
background noise that day is +1.51% or more (so that, when added to the −5% impact of the item 
of interest, the combined impact is less negative than −3.49%). These other factors would have a 
net impact of +1.51% or more only about 20% of the time.190 This is the Type II error rate—the 
likelihood that this item of interest, which actually negatively affected price by 5%, would not be 
accompanied by a market-adjusted price change sufficiently negative to be statistically 
significant. In these circumstances, a securities fraud claim will fail despite the fact that the dis-
closure did in fact have a 5% impact on stock price.191 
Discussion can now move to the impact of crisis-induced increases in idiosyncratic volatility 
on event study methodology and hence on the conduct of securities litigation. 
2. Type I and II Errors in Periods of Crisis-Induced, High Idiosyncratic Risk. — A spike in 
idiosyncratic volatility has two implications for Type I and Type II errors. First, if the spike 
                                                 
 190. This calculation involves the distribution of possible observed values of the market-adjusted price change if 
the actual market-adjusted price impact of the tested item of news is −5%. The distribution of observed market-
adjusted price changes accompanying tested items of news with an actual impact of −5% will approximate a normal 
distribution with a mean of −5% and a standard deviation equal to the standard error of 1.78%, representing the 
effect, plus or minus, of the other ordinary bits of firm-specific information that move the issuer’s share price around 
every day. Since the observed change in prices will be considered statistically significant at the 95% level and have 
the right sign only if it is a decrease of greater than −3.49%, the question becomes: What are the chances that the 
observed change after imposition of the requirement will be at least this negative? The required negative change, 
−3.49%, is 0.85 standard deviations above −5%, and so, based on the normal distribution, there is then an 80.2% 
chance that the observed market-adjusted change in price will be a decrease greater than 3.49% and hence 
considered statistically significant at the 95% level in a two-tailed test. Thus, there is a 19.8% chance that the 
observed change will yield a false negative. In a related, more technical paper, we discuss in greater detail the 
general approach to calculating Type II errors. Fox, Fox & Gilson, Idiosyncratic Risk, supra note 186, at 7–11. 
In fact, market-adjusted stock returns do not appear to converge exactly to a normal distribution (they are 
“fatter” tailed, i.e., they exhibit more extreme returns than if they followed a normal distribution). We use the normal 
distribution because it is used in virtually all event studies for testing statistical significance. The points outlined 
above and below are only strengthened if returns are “fat tailed” because, if returns are fat tailed for a given level of 
Type I error, one must set an even more stringent cutoff for statistical significance than one would under the normal 
distribution, which would induce more Type II errors. 
 191. A first impression is that the likelihood of a mistake is too high to provide the foundation for the litigation of 
securities fraud cases. While that assessment is beyond the scope of our effort here, it is worth keeping in mind the 
alternative: two expert financial analysts offering nonempirically grounded opinions where the error term is likely 
both greater and completely impossible to estimate with any precision. 
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recently occurred and conventional event study methodology is employed, the test of statistical 
significance that identifies the size of a price change large enough to meet the 95% confidence 
level can drastically underestimate the actual extent of Type I error. Put simply, the standard 
deviation used for determining the statistical significance of the price change will understate the 
real standard deviation because of the crisis-induced increase in idiosyncratic risk—that is, 
securities fraud claims will succeed when they would otherwise have failed. While more 
advanced techniques address this underestimation, they raise other problems.192 Second, more 
generally, even where the cutoff for statistical significance properly takes into account the crisis-
induced spike in idiosyncratic risk and is set at the appropriate point to maintain the Type I error 
rate at 2.5%, a spike nonetheless can result in a several-fold increase in Type II error—that is, 
securities fraud claims will fail when they should have succeeded. 
a.  The Effect of a Recent Increase in Idiosyncratic Volatility. — Consider the situation 
where there has recently been a large increase in idiosyncratic volatility, as was the case in the 
fall of 2008 as the full dimensions of the financial crisis were just becoming apparent.193 This 
special situation poses problems for the conventional strategy for testing whether an item of 
interest in fact affected price. In particular, it undermines the use of a one-year measuring period 
before the occurrence of the event in question as a proxy for the forces generating idiosyncratic 
volatility at the time the item of interest is announced. 
The conventional event-study methodology assumes that the volatility in the company’s 
market-adjusted stock price at the time of the announcement is the same as during the preceding 
                                                 
 192. See infra notes 199–200 and accompanying text (explaining advanced Generalized Auto Regressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model). 
 193. For example, during seven days in September 2008, Lehman Brothers failed and the federal government 
effectively nationalized AIG. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis: 
It’s Still a Matter of Information Costs, 100 Va. L. Rev. 313, 375 (2014) (noting full effect of capital market crisis 
had not been fully realized by dates of Lehman Brothers failure and federal government’s intervention in AIG). 
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one-year observation period.194 In the special situation of a recent crisis-induced increase in 
idiosyncratic volatility, this assumption fails radically, resulting in an insufficiently negative 
cutoff and securities fraud actions succeeding when they should not. 
b.  Potential Understatement of Type I Errors. — In this special situation, the standard 
deviation of market-adjusted price changes during the one-year observation period will 
underestimate the daily net price fluctuation by the time of the item of interest’s announcement. 
This is because of the sharp increase in idiosyncratic risk that accompanies each crisis.195 With 
the cutoff for what is considered statistically significant then incorrectly based on a standard 
deviation smaller than what actually prevailed at the time of the event, more than 2.5% of the 
tested news items that in fact had no effect on price will be accompanied by market-adjusted 
price changes that satisfy this erroneous cutoff. Thus, the Type I error rate will be understated to 
the benefit of plaintiffs in securities fraud actions. 
A hypothetical provides a sense of the extent of the understatement of Type I errors. Assume 
that the standard deviation of firm-specific price changes during the observation period was 1.5% 
(the standard deviation for the average S&P 100 firm for the July 1, 2007, to June 30, 2008, 
period). Assume as well that the idiosyncratic volatility had increased to 2.7% (the standard 
deviation for such a firm in the July 1, 2008, to June 30, 2009, period) and that the event of 
interest occurs early in this second period. The observation period is thus July 1, 2007, to June 
30, 2008. Using the conventional methodology (a one-year pre-event estimation period), any 
observed market-adjusted price drop of 2.95% (1.96 x 1.5%) or more on the date the item of 
interest is disclosed would be statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. But by the date 
                                                 
 194. See supra section III.A.2 (describing conventional method of using standard deviation of observation 
period’s approximately 250 market-adjusted price changes as measure of the probability distribution generating the 
net price impact of background noise and firm-specific information other than the item of interest). 
 195. See supra Part I (summarizing empirical findings). 
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of disclosure the standard deviation of idiosyncratic volatility has risen to 2.7%. The result is that 
about 14% of the time, items of interest with no effect on price will be accompanied by market-
adjusted price changes sufficiently negative to be statistically significant.196 In effect, our event 
study is comparing apples and oranges: the current higher volatility with a cutoff based on the 
older lower volatility level. Thus, the Type I error rate would be almost six times the supposed 
2.5% level. As will be discussed in section IV.B.2, liability clearly should not be imposed on an 
issuer in a securities fraud claim where the misstatement in fact had no impact on price. Yet, with 
a recent increase in idiosyncratic volatility of this sort, using a conventionally designed event 
study to determine loss causation would increase six-fold the likelihood of liability being 
incorrectly imposed in such a situation. 
c.  Correcting for Understated Type I Errors and the Resulting Increase in Type II Errors. — 
One approach to addressing the problem of increased Type I error caused by the increase in 
idiosyncratic volatility after the estimation period ends is to begin the estimation period only 
after the idiosyncratic risk increases. Where the tested item of news occurs relatively soon after 
the increase in volatility, however, an estimation period beginning with the volatility increase and 
ending immediately before the item of interest will be shorter, possibly much shorter, than the 
conventional one-year period. This will result in less precise estimates of the relationship 
between the issuer’s stock price and the ups and downs of the market as a whole (i.e., the issuer’s 
β)197 and of the level of idiosyncratic risk. These less precise estimates ameliorate Type I error, 
but only by increasing Type II error.198 
                                                 
 196. This percentage reflects that −2.95% is 1.09 times the actual standard deviation of 2.70%. Based on 
standard statistical tables for the normal distribution, 14% of all outcomes are more negative than 1.09 standard 
deviations below the mean. 
 197. See Appendix, supra note 144, at 11 (showing how this will increase idiosyncratic risk). 
 198. One way to counter this problem of an abbreviated observation period is to extend the period forward 
beyond the date the tested item of news becomes public, but omit from the sample the price change on that date to 
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Another approach to addressing the conventional strategy’s significant understatement of 
Type I error when there is a recent increase in idiosyncratic volatility is to use a full one-year 
observation period that ends before the tested item of news becomes public, but to use more 
advanced econometrics that take into account the midstream change in idiosyncratic volatility.199 
The additional complexity of these techniques makes them harder for a court, let alone a jury, to 
evaluate. In particular, these models offer the expert performing the analysis relatively wider 
scope for important choices—that is, choices that importantly affect whether the securities fraud 
claim will succeed.200 In such circumstances, it is predictable that the plaintiff’s and defendant’s 
experts will disagree. The court may be ill-equipped to determine which expert to believe, and a 
jury will likely be utterly confused by what is a very sophisticated econometric debate. 
d.  The Effect of an Increase in Idiosyncratic Volatility More Generally. — If disclosure of 
the item of interest occurs at a time when idiosyncratic risk is sharply elevated by economic 
crisis, the Type II error rate for any maximum acceptable rate of Type I error will be much higher 
than it would be in normal times. While this problem begins as soon as there is an increase in 
idiosyncratic risk, for expository simplicity, we will disentangle it from the problem just 
discussed above by assuming that idiosyncratic risk has remained stable for more than a year 
                                                                                                                                                             
avoid having the event whose effect the study is trying to determine influence the measure. The downside is that the 
volatility induced by the tested item of news may seep into other days in the observation period, thus again 
increasing Type II error. 
 199. One method for dealing with shifting volatility is to use a GARCH model, which makes current volatility a 
function of past volatility and net-of-market returns. See Appendix, supra note 144, at fig.(2)A-9 (providing more 
detailed explanation and analysis using GARCH). GARCH is used frequently in academic studies of stock price 
volatility. See, e.g., A. Corhay & A. Tourani Rad, Conditional Heteroskedasticity Adjusted Market Model and an 
Event Study, 36 Q. Rev. Econ. & Fin. 529, 530 (1996) (applying GARCH in event study of divestitures). However, 
its use in litigation remains relatively rare. Other possibly useful methods flow from the literature identifying 
structural breaks in the data. See generally, e.g., Jushan Bai & Pierre Perron, Estimating and Testing Linear Models 
with Multiple Structural Breaks, 66 Econometrica 47 (1998). 
 200. For example, the expert must choose how many autoregressive terms to include in GARCH or how to 
identify the structural break. See Corhay & Rad, supra note 199, at 531–32 (providing model for estimating 
structural break). 
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before the item of interest occurs. This treatment controls for the mismatch between volatility 
levels during the estimation period and at the time the event occurs. 
Higher idiosyncratic volatility during the estimation period results in a larger standard 
deviation of the issuer’s past market-adjusted share price changes and consequently, a larger 
standard deviation with which to evaluate the price effect of the item of interest’s disclosure. As a 
result, the cutoff for an observed price change to be considered statistically significant must be 
more negative. Thus, for any given maximum acceptable level of Type I error, the observed 
change in market-adjusted price accompanying the particular event must be more negative for 
the change to be sufficiently negative to meet the required level of statistical confidence.201 
Consequently, the chance that an actual negative price effect of any given size will be 
accompanied by an observed price change that meets this standard is reduced. In other words, the 
greater the volatility, the greater the number of Type II errors for any given allowable number of 
Type I errors.202 In essence, the same level of price effect is harder to detect when more is going 
on in the background.203 
The spike in idiosyncratic risk accompanying the recent financial crisis provides a dramatic 
illustration of this point. Recall the hypothetical discussed above that considered the level of 
Type II errors in normal times when an event in fact has a −5% impact on price.204 Now consider 
an event with the same actual price impact of −5% but that occurs during crisis times with a 
                                                 
 201. For a formal demonstration of this point, see Fox, Fox & Gilson, Idiosyncratic Risk, supra note 186, at 7–
11. 
 202. Id. at 11 (showing mathematically that “if the Type I error rate is maintained at 2.5%, the Type II error rate 
jumps in crisis times from 19.8% to 66%”). 
 203. See id. (“[I]n high volatility times resembling the 2008–09 financial crisis, only a bit more than one in three 
disclosures that actually affected an issuer’s price by 5% would pass the test of being considered statistically 
significant at the 95% level, compared with . . . [over] four out of five . . . in normal times.”). 
 204. See supra section II.B.1.b (presenting hypothetical scenario). 
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spike in idiosyncratic risk of the magnitude observed during the recent financial crisis.205 Then 
the market-adjusted price change needed to meet the 95% confidence level standard jumps from 
−3.49% to −6.33%. This implies an increase in Type II error rate from 20% to 66%.206 So, in 
such high volatility times, about only one in three items of interest whose disclosure in fact 
affects an issuer’s share price by −5% would be accompanied by observed price changes 
considered statistically significant at the 95% level, compared with four out of five passing the 
test in normal times. More generally, whatever the level of maximum allowable Type I errors and 
whatever the actual impact of a misstatement on price, higher volatility results in a higher level 
of Type II errors.207 
IV. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF CRISIS-INDUCED SPIKES IN IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK 
Crisis-induced spikes in idiosyncratic risk can have important implications for corporate and 
securities law both through their effect on event studies and more generally. In this Part, we 
examine three examples: In section IV.A, establishing causation and materiality in fraud-on-the-
market securities class actions; in section IV.B, establishing materiality in other securities law 
                                                 
 205. For this example, we assume that the standard deviation increases from the normal-times level of 1.78%, see 
supra note 189, to 3.23%, approximately equal to the daily idiosyncratic volatility of the market cap-weighted 
average firm in the S&P 100 during the peak of the financial crisis. 
 206. Similarly to the calculations in supra note 190, this calculation involves the distribution of possible observed 
values of the market-adjusted price changes if the actual market-adjusted price impact of the corrective disclosure is 
−5%. The distribution of observed market-adjusted price changes accompanying corrective disclosures with an 
actual impact of −5% will approximate a normal distribution with a mean of −5% and a standard deviation equal to 
the standard deviation of 3.23%, representing the effect, plus or minus, of the ordinary bits of firm-specific 
information and background noise that affects the issuer’s share price every day during this period of high volatility. 
Since the observed change in prices will be considered statistically significant at the 95% level and have the right 
sign only if it is a decrease of 6.33%, the question becomes: What are the chances that the observed change will be 
of that magnitude? The required negative change, −6.33%, is 0.41 standard deviations beyond −5%. Based on 
standard statistical tables for the normal distribution, there is then only a 34% chance that the observed change in 
market-adjusted prices will be a decrease of at least 6.33% and hence statistically significant at the 95% level. Thus, 
there is a 66% chance that the observed change will yield a false negative. For a more detailed discussion of these 
points, see Fox, Fox & Gilson, Idiosyncratic Risk, supra note 186, at 10–11. 
 207. Fox, Fox & Gilson, Idiosyncratic Risk, supra note 186, at 7–9 (“The greater SD [standard deviation], for 
any given [actual impact on price], the greater the likelihood of Type II error.”). 
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contexts; and in section IV.C, judicial deference to board rejections of premium acquisition offers 
and the substantive coercion defense. 
A. Fraud-on-the-Market Shareholder Class Actions: Establishing Causation and 
Materiality 
The spike in idiosyncratic risk that occurs during financial crises causes a very substantial 
decline in the usefulness of fraud-on-the-market class actions in crisis times.208 These actions 
allow buyers in secondary securities markets to recover from the issuer losses that they incurred 
by purchasing at prices inflated by the issuer’s misstatements, without individual class members 
having to prove that they actually relied upon (or even knew about) the misstatement giving rise 
to their claim.209 These fraud-on-the-market actions, based on alleged violations of section 10(b) 
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated 
thereunder, currently produce the bulk of all the damages paid out in settlements and judgments 
pursuant to private litigation under the U.S. securities laws.210 Plaintiffs in these fraud-on-the-
market actions depend on the reliability of event studies. Idiosyncratic-risk spikes diminish that 
reliability for studies conducted during economic-crisis periods. 
                                                 
 208. A fraud-on-the-market action is an implied right of action for civil damages based on a misstatement made 
in violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78a--78pp (2012)), 15 U.S.C. § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015), and 15 U.S.C. § 
78j(b), promulgated thereunder. Rule 10b-5 provides in relevant part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security.  
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Any statement made by an issuer that is “reasonably calculated to influence the investing 
public,” for example by being made to the media, satisfies Rule 10b-5’s requirement that it be “in connection with 
the purchase or sale of a security,” even though neither the issuer nor its officials buy or sell shares themselves. SEC 
v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc). 
 209. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42, 250 (1988) (holding lower courts may apply fraud-on-
the-market presumption on rebuttable basis). 
 210. See Fox, Securities Class Actions, supra note 133, at 1176 & n.2 (citing interviews with practitioners and 
quantitative data about initial complaints). 
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The centrality of securities fraud class actions dates to the Supreme Court’s decision in Basic 
Inc. v. Levinson.211 Prior to that decision, courts required each plaintiff to prove that a 
misrepresentation was “a substantial factor in determining the course of conduct which results in 
[the recipient’s] loss.”212 Under this traditional, pre-Basic rule, securities fraud class actions were 
extremely difficult to prosecute. Absent the aggregation of claims (and associated economies of 
scale in litigation costs) that a class action allows, pursuing a securities fraud claim is infeasible 
for all but the largest traders. But certification of a shareholder class action seeking money 
damages requires that common issues of fact and law predominate,213 a requirement that cannot 
be met if each plaintiff must individually prove reliance and causation.214 
Basic fundamentally changed the manner in which causation could be proved. Under its 
then-new “fraud-on-the-market” theory, a material misstatement by an issuer whose shares trade 
in an efficient market is expected to affect the issuer’s share price.215 The Court said that because 
such misrepresentations will have an impact on the security’s price and because all traders rely 
on the price, individual reliance can be presumed rather than proven, thereby eliminating the 
need for proof of individual reliance.216 This presumption makes class actions economically 
                                                 
 211. 485 U.S. 224. 
 212. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d. Cir. 1965) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Restatement of Torts § 546 (Am. Law Inst. 1938)). 
 213. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
 214. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[A] fraud class action cannot be 
certified when individual reliance will be an issue.”). 
 215. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 246–47 (endorsing presumption that “market price of shares traded on well-
developed markets reflects all publicly available information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations”). 
 216. Id. at 247 (“Because most publicly available information is reflected in market price, an investor’s reliance 
on any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.”). 
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feasible, with the concomitant large potential exposure to issuers. The result was an enormous 
growth in securities fraud class action litigation.217 
This is where event studies come in. They are the predominant way that class action 
plaintiffs establish both the materiality of the misstatement and the causal link between that 
misstatement and their losses—that the issuer’s misstatement in fact inflated the prices the 
plaintiffs paid for their shares.218 Absent crisis-induced increases in idiosyncratic volatility, this 
methodology works reasonably well. But our finding of very large spikes in idiosyncratic 
volatility at times of economic crisis shows that it works less well during these periods, precisely 
the time when large price movements in individual stocks are likely to give rise to an increase in 
securities fraud actions. This reduced effectiveness of event studies during such periods raises 
important issues, discussed below, concerning both how courts should administer fraud-on-the-
market suits in such times and how these suits should fit into the larger framework of securities 
law enforcement. 
1. Fraud-on-the-Market Actions and the Importance of the Misstatement’s Effect on Price. 
— The first step in understanding the issues raised by our empirical results for fraud-on-the-
market actions is to examine how such an action works. 
                                                 
 217. In the five-year period beginning April 1988, shortly after the Supreme Court’s decision in Basic, and 
ending March 1993, the total cash amount paid to settle federal class actions alleging that issuer misstatements 
distorted share price was $2.5 billion. Vincent E. O’Brien & Richard W. Hodges, A Study of Class Action Securities 
Fraud Cases 1988–1993 I-5 (1993) (unpublished study) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). By the early 2000s, 
the total amount of such settlements had increased dramatically. Indeed, the value of settlements paid from January 
2005 through December 2007 (a period that includes the three blockbuster cases of WorldCom, Enron, and Tyco), 
including the disclosed value of any noncash components, totaled over $39.5 billion. Laarni T. Bulan, Ellen M. Ryan 
& Laura E. Simmons, Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Settlements: 2014 Review and Analysis 3 fig.2 
(2015), http://securities.stanford.edu/research-reports/1996-2014/Settlements-Through-12-2014.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/UAH6-SJPM]. This figure decreased to $9.2 billion for the three years beginning January 2012 and 
ending December 2014. Id. 
 218. A recent article sympathetic to plaintiffs explains the conclusion that an event study is mandatory for a 
securities class action case to proceed. See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Regressing: The Troubling 
Dispositive Role of Event Studies in Fraud Litigation, 15 Stan. J.L., Bus. & Fin. 183, 187 (2009) (“The interrelated 
questions of materiality, reliance, loss causation, and damages all require an event study for their resolution. The 
overriding substantive issue in securities fraud cases has become whether an expert has proffered an opinion based 
on a reliable event study.”). 
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a. The Stripped-Down Model of Fraud-on-the-Market Litigation. —Analyzed doctrinally, 
the legal issues in a fraud-on-the-market securities action (assuming the plaintiff establishes at 
the outset a public misstatement made with scienter by an issuer whose shares trade in an 
efficient market) are the materiality of the misstatement, loss causation, transaction causation, 
and damages.219 The litigation of such a claim can be described in terms of the allocation, 
between the parties, of the burdens of proof and persuasion on each of these issues at each stage 
of the litigation and the allowable forms of evidence.220 For our purposes here, however, these 
issues reduce to two: Did the misstatement inflate the price paid by more than a de minimis 
amount, and if so, did the plaintiff suffer a loss as a result? 
Where both these questions can be answered affirmatively, all the doctrinal elements for the 
cause of action will be satisfied.221 An investor who purchases shares of the issuer while the price 
is inflated by the misstatement, and who still holds the shares at the time the truth is revealed, has 
suffered a loss. She paid too much as a result of the misstatement, and because revelation of the 
truth dissipates this inflation, she has not been able to recoup her loss by selling into a still-
inflated market. Her loss thus satisfies the loss causation requirement (with transaction causation 
                                                 
 219. See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (“[T]he action’s basic elements 
include: (1) a material misrepresentation (or omission); (2) scienter . . . ; (3) a connection with the purchase or sale 
of a security; (4) reliance [or] ‘transaction causation’; (5) economic loss; and (6) ‘loss causation’ . . . .” (emphasis 
omitted) (internal citations omitted)). 
 220. See id. at 342–43 (noting plaintiff must independently establish causation and “an inflated purchase price 
will not itself constitute or proximately cause the relevant economic loss” because of “tangle of factors affecting 
price”). 
 221. This observation parallels Daniel Fischel’s insight in a seminal pre-Basic article that commented on lower 
court cases that were the origin of the fraud-on-the-market cause of action. Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern 
Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. Law. 1, 12–13 (1982). 
Fischel suggested that the adoption of the cause of action reflected an underlying view of the market that most 
investors were price takers. As a consequence, they are hurt by a misstatement because of its effect on price, not its 
effect on their decisions to buy or sell. Fischel observed that for an action based on this view, the traditional 
doctrinal issues of materiality, reliance, and damages reduce to a single inquiry: Did the misstatement affect price 
and if so by how much? Id. at 13. The Supreme Court cited Fischel’s article in Basic. 485 U.S. at 246 n.24. 
For an example of a judicial opinion explicitly endorsing this collapsing of the three traditionally separate 
doctrinal elements into a single empirical test, see In re Verifone Sec. Litig., 784 F. Supp. 1471, 1479 (N.D. Cal. 
1992) (noting fraud-on-the-market theory “subsumes” reliance, materiality, causation, and damages inquiries into 
single analysis), aff’d, 11 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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being satisfied as well by the mere fact that the situation receives the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption).222 The amount of this loss is her damages, thereby satisfying the damages 
requirement.223 As for the materiality requirement, the Supreme Court has held that a fact is 
material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it important 
in a decision whether to purchase or sell a security.224 Anytime a misstatement meaningfully 
inflates the price of a security trading in an efficient market, it has obviously had an actual effect 
on the behavior of investors. This strongly suggests that a reasonable investor, like those actually 
trading in the market, would have found it important.225 
b.  Focus on the Corrective Disclosure. — Where an issuer’s original misstatement hides a 
truth that is less favorable than the market’ s expectations for the issuer at the time the 
                                                 
 222. In the pre-fraud-on-the-market years before Basic, the courts refined their causation analysis to require two 
showings: transaction causation and loss causation. Transaction causation required the plaintiff to show she would 
not have purchased but for the misstatement. Loss causation required the plaintiff to show that the untruth was 
responsible for the loss in some reasonably direct or proximate way. See Merritt B. Fox, After Dura: Causation in 
Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 31 J. Corp. L. 829, 834–36 (2006) [hereinafter Fox, After Dura] (discussing pre-Basic 
framework). These concepts do not fit well with the alternative causal connection allowed in the fraud-on-the-
market actions, but the courts have maintained the two requirements. Transaction causation is presumed in any 
situation where the fraud-on-the-market presumption is allowed: where there is a material misstatement by an issuer 
whose shares trade in an efficient market. See, e.g., Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 178–83 (3d Cir. 
2000) (“[A] plaintiff in a securities action is generally entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reliance if he or she 
purchased or sold securities in an efficient market.”). A showing of loss causation requires not only that the 
misstatement inflated the issuer’s share price but also that there was a causal connection between this inflation and a 
loss by the plaintiff. Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 346–48 (2005) (holding plaintiffs did not adequately allege 
“proximate causation and economic loss”). Thus, the basic causal inquiry in the fraud-on-the-market theory is 
framed in terms of loss causation. 
 223. This corresponds to the “out-of-pocket” measure of damages that is standard in Rule 10b-5 cases. See Green 
v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1341–46 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the result in part) (describing out-of-pocket measure of damages and its application). 
 224. Basic, 485 U.S. at 232 (“We now expressly adopt the TSC Industries standard of materiality for the § 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 context.”). In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., the Supreme Court found that a fact is material 
“if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to 
vote.” 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1970). Materiality “does not require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the 
omitted fact would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote.” Id. Rather, it contemplates “a showing 
of a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance 
in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder.” Id. The Court went on to say, “Put another way, there must be a 
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as 
having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information available.” Id. 
 225. See, e.g., Teamsters Loc. 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier Inc., 546 F.3d 196, 207–08 (2d Cir. 
2008) (noting “it is difficult to presume that the market will integrate the release of material information about a 
security into its price” absent evidence of efficient market for that security); In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 
261, 273–74 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting “‘reasonable investors’ are the market” and in efficient market, information is 
reflected in price, so when information changes price, it must be important to reasonable investors). 
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misstatement is made, the misstatement will not increase the issuer’s share price. Instead, it just 
avoids the share-price decline that would have resulted from the truth. Because a substantial 
portion of all alleged issuer misstatements are of this kind,226 the inquiry into materiality and 
causation usually focuses on the market’ s reaction when the truth (the corrective disclosure) 
comes out. If the announcement of the truth causes the price to decline, the logic goes, the 
misstatement must have previously inflated the issuer’ s share price relative to what it would have 
been had the misstatement not been made. And in an efficient market, the disclosure of the truth 
guarantees that the inflation in the stock’ s price has been dissipated.227 
2. The Use of an Event Study to Establish that a Corrective Disclosure Has Had a Negative 
Impact on Price. — Event studies are commonly used in fraud-on-the-market suits for assessing 
the likelihood that a corrective disclosure has in fact negatively affected price by more than a de 
minimis amount.228 
a.  Event Studies as Evidence of Loss Causation and Materiality. — For investors who 
purchase an issuer’s stock after the issuer’s misstatement and still hold the stock at the time of 
the corrective disclosure, an event study that reveals a statistically significant, market-adjusted 
                                                 
 226. See, e.g., SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1220–21 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding possible “material 
misrepresentations” where issuer’s CEO “failed to publicly disclose in an analysts’ conference call and an earnings 
press report that [issuer] Gateway’s ability to meet analysts’ revenue growth expectations was based largely 
on . . . one-time . . . transactions”); Chamberlain v. Reddy Ice Holdings, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 2d 683, 702–04 (E.D. 
Mich. 2010) (noting plaintiff-shareholders pled materially false and misleading statements with sufficient 
particularity by alleging issuer hid violation of antitrust laws). 
 227. See Brealey, Myers & Allen, supra note 123, at 324–25 (summarizing “semistrong market efficiency” 
hypothesis, according to which “prices reflect . . . all . . . public information”). 
 228. See, e.g., In re Sadia, S.A. Sec. Litig., 95 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 806 (CCH) (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Vellrath 
conducted an event study of the daily movements in the price of Sadia’s ADRs [before and after issuer’s fraud-
related corrective disclosure] with the goal of identifying any ‘abnormal returns’, i.e., returns greater than or less 
than . . . one would expect on the security . . . .” (quoting Expert Report of Marc Vellrath, Ph.D., CFA, ¶41, In re 
Sadia, S.A. Sec. Litig., 95 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 806 (No. 1:08-CV-09528 (SAS)), 2009 WL 5164437)); Gen. Elec. 
Co. v. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 22–24 (D.D.C. 2009) (summarizing litigants’ use of event studies); In re Seagate 
Tech. II Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (“Defendants’ expert . . . conducted the econometric 
‘event study’ by noting the movement of the price of [issuer] Seagate common for each day in the class period and 
comparing it with an industry index.”); see also Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 218, at 187 (arguing “properly 
conducted event study . . . has become a substantive and essential element of a securities fraud claim itself”). 
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decline in price when the truth is revealed provides evidence of both materiality and loss 
causation.229 Indeed, some courts explicitly require the plaintiff to present, through expert 
testimony, an event study in order to make a showing of loss causation.230 
Conforming to the usual social science convention,231 courts generally have adopted the 95% 
confidence level as the standard to be used in securities litigation for determining the price effect 
of a corrective disclosure.232 In choosing this standard, the courts are in essence establishing the 
                                                 
 229. See, e.g., In re REMEC Inc. Sec. Litig., 702 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1266, 1275 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (noting 
“plaintiff must show . . . economic loss occurred after the truth behind the misrepresentation or omission became 
known to the market” and “decline in stock price caused by the revelation . . . must be statistically significant”); In 
re Imperial Credit Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1015–16 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (granting defendant 
issuer’s motion for summary judgment because plaintiff failed to provide “event study or similar analysis . . .  [to] 
eliminate that portion of the price decline . . . which is unrelated to the alleged wrong” and is instead attributable to 
“market events for which Defendants cannot be held responsible”), aff’d sub nom. Mortensen v. Snavely, 145 F. 
App’x 218 (9th Cir. 2005). Simply showing that the misstatement inflated price is not sufficient to establish loss 
causation. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–46 (2005) (holding plaintiffs must prove proximate cause 
and economic loss caused by misrepresentation). 
 230. See, e.g., Fener v. Operating Eng’rs Const. Indus. & Misc. Pension Fund (LOCAL 66), 579 F.3d 401, 409 
(5th Cir. 2009) (“Although analyst reports and stock prices are helpful in any inquiry, the testimony of an expert—
along with some kind of analytical research or event study—is required to show loss causation.”). Plaintiffs must 
generally provide this evidence at the summary judgment stage. See Mary K. Warren & Sterling P.A. Darling, Jr., 
The Expanding Role of Event Studies in Federal Securities Litigation, 6 No. 6 Sec. Litig. Rep. 19 (2009) (“[A]n 
event study is commonly the device that creates a triable question of fact . . . .The presence or absence of an event 
study may, therefore, result in summary judgment for the defendant or, in limited circumstances, the plaintiff.”). 
With respect to materiality, see In re Gaming Lottery Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶90,763, at 93,716, 
93,716 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2000) (event studies are “accepted method for the evaluation of materiality”); William O. 
Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice in a Time of Madness?, 54 Emory L.J. 843, 871, 874–
83 (2005) (collecting cases). 
 231. See Michael Cowles & Caroline Davis, On the Origins of the 0.05 Level of Statistical Significance, 37 Am. 
Psychol. 553, 553 (1982) (noting “conventional use of the 5% level as the maximum acceptable probability for 
determining statistical significance” in the social sciences and exploring convention’s origin); Kaye & Freedman, 
supra note 183, at 251 (“In practice, statistical analysts typically use levels of 5% and 1%. The 5% level is most 
common in social science, and an analyst who speaks of significant results without specifying the threshold probably 
is using this figure.”). 
 232. See, e.g., United States v. Hatfield, 795 F. Supp. 2d 219, 234 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (recognizing, in criminal 
securities fraud case, “95% confidence interval is the threshold typically used by academic economists in their 
work”); In re REMEC Inc. Sec. Litig., 702 F. Supp. 2d at 1266 (to establish loss causation, event study must show 
“decline in stock price caused by the revelation of that truth [is] statistically significant” (citations omitted)); 
Cornerstone Research, Estimating Recoverable Damages in Rule 10b-5 Securities Class Actions 9 (2014), 
https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/df483ce3-5fe3-41b8-ad83-f 
704dc8426f7/Estimating-Recoverable-Damages-in-Rule-10b-5-Securities-Class-Actions.pdf [http://perma.cc/8ZR3-
EYNK] (last visited Oct. 23, 2015) (“A confidence interval of 95 percent is often applied in academic event studies 
and frequently accepted by courts.”). Kaye & Freedman, supra note 183, at 251 n.101, note that the Supreme Court 
“implicitly” endorsed the 95% confidence level in two 1977 decisions. See also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United 
States, 433 U.S. 299, 311 n.17 (1977) (finding shortfall of black teachers hired by defendant school district 
“significant” because it represented “difference of more than three standard deviations”); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 
U.S. 482, 496 & n.17 (1977) (finding sufficient “proof . . . to establish a prima facie case of discrimination 
against . . . Mexican-Americans in . . . grand jury selection” where statistical evidence showed the observed number 
of Mexican American jurors was less than expected number by “greater than two or three standard deviations”). 
Kaye and Freedman point out that “[a]lthough the Court did not say so,” the differences treated as “significant” in 
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plaintiff’s burden of persuasion concerning whether the corrective disclosure in fact affected the 
issuer’s share price. The “null hypothesis” is that the corrective disclosure had no negative 
influence on price. If the plaintiff can persuade the fact-finder that the null hypothesis can be 
rejected with at least 95% confidence, the plaintiff has established both loss causation and 
materiality. 
b.  The Working Assumption that the 95% Standard Maximizes Social Welfare in Normal 
Times. — We will assume here that this adoption of the 95% standard in fraud-on-the-market 
suits is the correct, social-welfare-maximizing standard, at least in normal times.233 For our 
purposes, the assumption that 95% is the correct standard in normal times forms a useful baseline 
that conforms to current practice.234 This, in turn, allows a focus on the ultimate concern here: 
whether an economic crisis-induced spike in idiosyncratic risk changes the appropriate 
confidence-interval standard for event studies, regardless of what standard might be optimal in 
normal times. 
i. The Choice of Confidence Level Sets the Terms of the Tradeoff Between Type I and Type II 
Error. — An event study involves inevitable tradeoffs between Type I error and Type II error, 
with the terms of this tradeoff determined by the test’s chosen level of statistical confidence.235 
Recall that if the 95% confidence level is chosen, an event study will have a 2.5% Type I error 
rate, i.e., there is a 2.5% chance that a corrective disclosure that in fact has no effect on price will 
                                                                                                                                                             
Castaneda and Hazelwood School District “produce p-values of about 5% and 0.3% when the statistic is normally 
distributed.” Kaye & Freedman, supra note 183, at 251 n.101. 
 233. Although beyond the scope of this Article, this assumption is itself worthy of further consideration. See, 
e.g., Leslie A. Demers, Lost in Transposition: Erroneous Conflation of Statistical Certainty with Evidentiary 
Standards 3 (Feb. 27, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2225998 (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (describing errors courts make with 95% confidence-interval standard). 
 234. See supra note 232 (listing cases that applied 95% confidence-interval standard). 
 235. See supra section III.B (defining Type I and Type II errors and explaining tradeoffs between them). 
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be accompanied by an observed market-adjusted price change negative enough to pass the 
significance test (and allow the suit to go forward). 
The choice of the 95% confidence level also influences the Type II error rate, i.e., the chance 
that a corrective disclosure that in fact has a negative impact on price will be accompanied by an 
observed market-adjusted price that is insufficiently negative to meet the required confidence 
level (and so will not allow a class action suit to go forward). But an event study’s Type II error 
rate depends as well on how negative the disclosure’s actual price impact is and on the level of 
idiosyncratic volatility associated with the issuer’s stock. As we have seen, a corrective 
disclosure with a −5% price impact made by an issuer with what, in normal times, is the average 
level of idiosyncratic volatility, the choice of the 95% confidence level implies a Type II error 
rate of about 20%. 
More generally, holding constant the level of idiosyncratic volatility, the choice of the 95% 
confidence level implies a Type I error rate of 2.5% and a set of Type II error rates that 
correspond to the magnitude of a corrective disclosure’s actual negative impact on price. The 
more negative the actual impact, the lower the Type II error. In comparison, a confidence level 
stricter than 95% would imply a lower Type I error rate and a set of Type II error rates that, for 
each possible magnitude of negative impact on price, would be higher than it would be with the 
choice of the 95% confidence level. A confidence level less strict than the 95% level would have 
the opposite effects. 
Thus, holding constant the level of idiosyncratic volatility, there is, for any given negative 
impact on price, a tradeoff between Type I and Type II error rates, with the point on this tradeoff 
determined by how strict the chosen confidence level is. Thus, the choice of the confidence level 
is the choice of a set of tradeoff points, each corresponding to a particular magnitude of a 
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corrective disclosure’s actual negative impact on price. If idiosyncratic risk increases, the terms 
of this tradeoff worsen. For a given chosen level of confidence and Type I error rate, the Type II 
error rate corresponding to any particular magnitude of a corrective disclosure’s actual negative 
impact on price will be higher. 
ii. The Social Welfare Effects of Type I and Type II Error and the “Materiality Threshold.” 
— Assessing the social-welfare effects of these tradeoffs between Type I and Type II error starts 
with understanding both the social benefits and social costs of imposing section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 liability on an issuer for making a misstatement that inflates an issuer’s share price and 
how the extent of this distortion affects this calculation. Forcing the issuer to pay damages in 
response to a fraud-on-the-market action helps deter other issuers from making such misstate-
ments in the future. This penalty is the key private mechanism for enforcing the Exchange Act’s 
comprehensive system of mandatory disclosure applicable to publicly traded issuers—if the 
disclosure is not accurate, damages are assessed.236 The improved share-price accuracy and 
issuer transparency that result from greater compliance with this disclosure system increase 
social welfare by enhancing the efficiency with which resources are allocated in our economy.237 
This gain does not come for free; securities litigation uses scarce resources that could 
otherwise be deployed to other useful purposes. These resources include the lawyers’ and 
experts’ time on both sides of such litigation, as well as the time and effort expended by the 
                                                 
 236. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 229, 
266–74 (2007) (detailing methods and results of private enforcement). 
 237. Greater issuer transparency and more accurate prices in the secondary market signal when an issuer’s 
management is doing a poor job of utilizing the firm’s current assets and investing in new projects. Transparency 
and price accuracy help align the interests of managers with those of shareholders by boosting the effectiveness of 
share-price-based compensation, block-holder activism, and hostile-takeover mechanisms for reducing the agency 
costs of management. Greater transparency, by reducing the opportunities for insider trading, also adds to the value 
of an issuer’s shares by increasing their liquidity. These points are discussed in more detail in Fox, Civil Liability, 
supra note 124, at 252–60, 264–67 (“By reducing the amount of nonpublic information . . . ongoing periodic 
disclosure should therefore reduce bid/ask spreads, increase liquidity, and, consequently, reduce the cost of 
capital.”). 
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issuer’s executives and by the judiciary.238 The amount of resources consumed by such litigation 
is similar whether the original misstatement resulted in a large or small price distortion. Thus, 
ideally, liability should be imposed only in cases where, at the margin, the improvement in 
economic welfare from deterring issuer misstatements is at least as great as the social costs 
arising from prosecuting the action.239 This suggests, in turn, that there is some degree of price 
distortion (as proxied by the size of the corrective disclosure’s actual negative effect on price) 
below which price distorting misstatements should not be subject to fraud-on-the-market damage 
liability because the costs of the action would exceed the deterrence achieved. We will call this 
point the “materiality threshold”—the point at which the price distortion is large enough that 
deterring misstatements that have so significant an effect is worth the enforcement cost.240 
iii. The Meaning of the Assumption that the 95% Confidence Level Is Socially Optimal in 
Normal Times. — With this understanding of the social benefits and social costs associated with 
                                                 
 238. A reasonable estimate of the litigation costs for the legal and expert fees of both sides is $2.5 billion 
annually. See id. at 247 n.18 (“[T]his would suggest that the total annual legal expenses associated with these actions 
averaged about $2.46 billion . . . .”). This figure does not include the value of executive time devoted to defending 
the litigation or much of the judicial resources consumed by such litigation. Nor does it include the time and 
resources that honest executives devote to be sure that disclosures that they believe to be true do not, despite the 
scienter requirement, generate liability because of legal error. See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose, Fraud on the Market: An 
Action Without a Cause, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 87, 94 (2011), https://www.law. 
upenn.edu/journals/lawreview/articles/volume160/issue1/Rose160U.Pa.L.Rev.87(2011).pdf [http://perma.cc/R5PU-
MABT] (“[I]t is cheap and easy for corporate officers not to lie, but to avoid being misjudged a liar, they may spend 
excessive corporate resources scrubbing disclosures . . . .”). The figure also does not include efficiency losses from 
the decision of managers, out of fear of such liability, not to voluntarily disclose true information before disclosure 
is otherwise required. 
 239. This account of the potential social benefits of fraud-on-the-market litigation does not include providing 
compensation as a way of correcting for unfair investor losses or for an inefficient allocation of risk if investor 
losses are left where they originally lie. These compensatory rationales for imposing liability simply do not hold up 
under close examination, a view widely shared by commentators on the issue. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1534, 
1556–66 (2006) (arguing most compelling rationale for imposing securities fraud liability is “impact of fraud on 
investor confidence and thus the cost of equity capital” throughout economy); Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs 
and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 Va. L. Rev. 623, 632 (1992) (“It is therefore not surprising that 
Easterbrook and Fischel’s ‘net harm’ analysis reaches only tentative conclusions when applied to secondary-market 
frauds.”). The inadequacy of these compensatory rationales is explored in detail in Fox, Securities Class Actions, 
supra note 133, at 1192–99 (concluding “investor protection arguments for imposing liability on an issuer to deter 
misstatements are weak”). 
 240. What level the materiality threshold should be set at is subject to differences in opinion. These differences 
arise from different assessments of a variety of factors: the power of fraud-on-the-market suits to deter, the 
importance of finely accurate share prices, and the total social costs of such litigation. The same differences in these 
assessments lead to different views on the value of fraud-on-the-market suits as recently rehearsed in the various 
opinions in the Supreme Court’s decision in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
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imposing liability for misstatements made with scienter and how they relate to the 
misstatement’s actual effect on price, we can now explore the meaning of the assumption that, at 
least in normal times, the 95% standard constitutes the socially optimal set of tradeoff points 
between Type I and Type II errors. 
Type I error—with its resulting imposition of liability where the actual price impact of the 
corrective disclosure is zero—is the easy case: It unambiguously reduces social welfare. 
Litigation is costly and there is no gain in deterring misstatements so unimportant that their 
corrections have no effect on price. 
Assessing the welfare impact of Type II error is slightly more complicated. Consider first a 
misstatement whose actual impact on price is greater than the materiality threshold. Type II error 
with respect to whether its corrective disclosure had an actual negative effect on price reduces 
social welfare because the error results in a failure to impose liability in a situation where, by 
definition, imposing liability would have been socially desirable: The improvement in economic 
welfare from the issuer misstatements that would have been deterred would have been greater 
than the social costs of the legal action necessary to impose liability. For a misstatement whose 
actual impact on price is less than the materiality threshold, however, the opposite is the case. 
Type II error, by blocking imposition of liability in a situation where the social benefits are less 
than the social costs actually increases social welfare. 
The social impact of the chosen level of statistical confidence, therefore, needs to account 
for three factors: the social harm from its Type I error, the social harm from its Type II error with 
respect to the corrective disclosures of misstatements having actual price impacts greater than the 
materiality threshold, and the social gain (or social costs avoided) from its Type II error with 
respect to the corrective disclosures of misstatements having actual price impacts smaller than 
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the materiality threshold. Given these three factors, consider what is implied by the assumption 
that the 95% confidence level is socially optimal—that making the confidence standard stricter 
would reduce social welfare—in normal times.241 That is, upon requiring a stricter confidence 
level, the social-welfare loss from the increase in Type II error with respect to misstatements 
having price impacts greater than the materiality threshold (factor 2) would exceed the combined 
social-welfare gain from the decrease in Type I error (factor 1) and the increase in Type II error 
with respect to misstatements having price impacts less than the materiality threshold (factor 3). 
And it means that the net social-welfare impact of making the standard less strict would also be 
negative: The total losses from the increase in Type I error (factor 1) and from the decrease in 
Type II error with respect to misstatements having price impacts less than the materiality 
threshold (factor 3) would exceed the gain from the decrease in Type II error with respect to 
misstatements having price impacts greater than the materiality threshold (factor 2). If 95% is the 
socially optimal confidence level, requiring either a stricter or a laxer confidence level reduces 
social welfare. 
3. The Implications of Increased Idiosyncratic Risk for the Use of Event Studies in Fraud-
on-the-Market Suits. — As noted above, an increase in idiosyncratic risk leads to a worsening of 
the terms of tradeoffs between the Type I and Type II errors. Recall the example where the 
standard error increases from 1.78%, which was the average standard deviation for the 
idiosyncratic volatility of the typical firm from the 1970s up until the financial crisis, to 3.23%, 
the average such standard deviation at the height of the financial crisis.242 Recall that the 
cutoff—the minimum drop in the market-adjusted price that meets the 95% confidence 
                                                 
 241. That is, assuming social welfare will be lower if the chosen confidence level were either stricter or less strict 
than 95%. 
 242. See supra section III.B.1.b (discussing example); supra note 205 and accompanying text (discussing 
standard deviation at height of 2008 to 2009 financial crisis). 
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standard—jumps from −3.5% in normal times to −6.33% in crisis times. Maintaining the 95% 
standard during a crisis-driven high-volatility period means that for corrective disclosures with 
an actual price impact of −5%, the Type I error rate remains at 2.5%, but the Type II error rate 
more than triples from about 20% to 66%. The consequences of this worsening tradeoff for 
fraud-on-the-market litigation are dramatic: Liability would be imposed in only about one case in 
three for misstatements whose corrective disclosures have a −5% actual impact on price, 
compared with four cases out of five in normal times.243 
More generally, with idiosyncratic volatility for a firm’s stock at a normal level, the choice 
of the confidence level is the choice of a set of points on the tradeoff between Type I and Type II 
error, each point corresponding to a particular magnitude of a corrective disclosure’s actual 
negative impact on price. If idiosyncratic risk increases, the terms of this tradeoff worsen. So, for 
a given chosen level of confidence and hence given Type I error rate, the Type II error will be 
higher for any given actual negative impact on price. 
In the discussion that follows, we consider whether this sharp worsening of the Type I/Type 
II error tradeoff in high-idiosyncratic-volatility times suggests needed changes of law or policy. 
The discussion starts by exploring whether the apparent problem is in fact self-correcting. 
Some kinds of corrective disclosures will cause larger price drops during crises than normal 
                                                 
 243. Here and elsewhere in our discussions of the effect of idiosyncratic risk on event studies, we use a 
disclosure event with an actual impact on price of 5% as our example for comparative calculations of Type II error 
rates in normal and in crisis times. Five percent was chosen because a common rule of thumb used by securities 
lawyers is that information relating to a change in net income of 5% or more is considered material. See United 
States v. Nacchio, 519 F.3d 1140, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[A] 5% numerical threshold is a sensible starting place for 
assessing the materiality of [the alleged misstatements], but it does not end the inquiry. Special factors might make a 
smaller miss [of reported financial performance] material.”), vacated in part on other grounds on reh’g en banc, 555 
F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2009); see also SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45150, 45151 (Aug. 19, 
1999) (stating SEC staff has no objection to registrants using this “rule of thumb” in this fashion). A 5% decrease in 
the expected value of all future cash flows, discounted to present value at the discount implied in the market price 
before the decrease in expectations, would, in an efficient market, result in a 5% decrease in price. The policy-
derived materiality threshold discussed here actually may well be above or below 5% of net income but in the 
abstract, most people would agree that a misstatement that causes a 5% change in stock price warrants attention. 
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times, thus keeping pace as the cutoff for statistical significance grows during crises. For these 
types of disclosures, unambiguously no adjustment is needed. 
The market’s reaction to other kinds of important corrective disclosures, however, will not 
grow in crises. Thus, we go on to address directly the question of whether the worsened terms of 
the tradeoff between Type I and Type II errors warrants reducing the required level of statistical 
confidence to something below 95%. In other words, would it not make sense to accept a few 
more Type I errors to (partially) counteract the rapid increase in Type II errors during crises? 
While this idea has intuitive appeal, the discussion below shows that the welfare effects are 
in fact ambiguous. In one knife-edge case, reducing the confidence level will improve welfare. In 
all other cases, reducing the standard during crises will be helpful for some kinds of disclosures, 
but harmful for others, as compared to reducing the standard during normal times. Because it is 
unclear whether moving down from the 95% level will in fact be helpful in crises, we 
recommend a different kind of solution. In high-idiosyncratic-volatility times, the 95% standard 
should be maintained but, to compensate for the diminished effectiveness of private fraud-on-
the-market type enforcement, reliance on, and resources for, SEC enforcement actions should be 
increased. 
a. Is the Problem with Increased Idiosyncratic Volatility Self-Correcting? — Is it possible that 
the very event—economic crisis—that leads to the increase in idiosyncratic volatility also 
renders it inconsequential in terms of the worsening tradeoff between Type I and Type II error? 
The idea is that the crisis raises not only the size of the negative price change necessary to be 
statistically significant but also the size of the price drop from any corrective disclosure. Such a 
magnified impact is consistent with our explanations of crisis-induced increased idiosyncratic 
  109 
volatility: current news becoming more important relative to older news,244 news about the 
quality of management becoming more important,245 and increased ignorance concerning what 
facts are relevant.246 To see this, suppose that any one or more of these explanations is correct. 
Then corrective disclosures with actual negative impacts on price that, in normal times, would 
usually be accompanied by observed market-adjusted price changes sufficiently negative to meet 
the normal-times cutoff for the 95% normal-times confidence level (−3.49% in our example247) 
will, in crisis times, have an actual impact on price that is sufficiently more negative that their 
accompanying observed market-adjusted price changes would be sufficiently negative to meet 
the 95% confidence level’s more restrictive economic-crisis-times cutoff (−6.33% in our 
example248). For such misstatements, there is no need to worry about a policy response to the 
worsening of the terms of tradeoff between Type I and Type II errors because the corresponding 
magnification of the actual negative price impacts of their corrective disclosures erases the 
effect. 
While self-correction of this type will indeed help with regard to certain misstatements, a 
problem remains. Recall that the most convincing social benefit from allowing fraud-on-the-
market causes of action is that they deter price-distorting misstatements and so enhance 
allocative efficiency in the real economy.249 The absolute level of the distortion and how it 
compares to what we call the materiality threshold is what is important here, rather than how the 
distortion compares with some elevated level of overall idiosyncratic price volatility. 
                                                 
 244. See supra section II.A. 
 245. See supra section II.B. 
 246. See supra section II.C. 
 247. See supra section III.B.1.b (discussing Type II errors). 
 248. See supra section III.B.2.d (discussing effect of increase in idiosyncratic volatility). 
 249. See supra notes 236–238 and accompanying text. 
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There are two types of misstatements that in crisis times would move prices enough to meet 
the materiality threshold, but that are not of a nature where the self-correction described here 
would offset the crisis-elevated cutoff for 95% statistical significance. The first is where the 
misstatement’s actual impact on price in normal times meets the materiality threshold250 but this 
impact is not magnified by crisis. A statement by an issuer that it holds assets, such as oil 
reserves, that in fact do not exist is an example. The information-based explanations that we find 
most plausible for crisis-induced spikes in idiosyncratic volatility251 do not suggest that the 
actual price impact of such a misstatement would be magnified during crisis times, and so it 
would distort price no more in crisis than in normal times.252 As a result, in crisis times, the price 
effect of corrective disclosure would be significantly less likely to meet the 95% confidence 
level’s more stringent crisis-period cutoff and so the Type II error rate for this kind of statement 
will increase. The social benefit from deterring these kinds of misstatements, however, will still 
be as great as it is in normal times. 
The second kind of misstatement where self-correction would not suffice is the flip side of 
the first: a misstatement that, if made in normal times, would not distort prices sufficiently to 
reach the materiality threshold but if made in crisis times, is magnified in its price impact 
sufficiently to reach the materiality threshold. With this magnified impact on price, it becomes 
socially beneficial to impose liability when it would not be socially beneficial in normal times. In 
                                                 
 250. See supra note 240 and accompanying text (defining “materiality threshold” as degree of share-price 
distortion large enough that value of deterring misstatements responsible for distortion exceeds social cost of fraud-
on-the-market litigation required to deter it). 
 251. See supra Part II (postulating explanations that current news becomes more relevant during economic crises, 
information concerning quality of management becomes more relevant during crises, or crises cause uncertainty as 
to what information is even relevant to begin with). 
 252. Many disclosures will contain aspects that are “self-correcting” and others that are not. For example, if a 
company misses its earnings target by $1 per share, this can be thought of as two pieces of news: (a) shareholders 
have $1 less than they expected in assets and (b) earnings may be on a lower trajectory in the future. We expect the 
reaction to (b) to be amplified during the crisis but that part (a) will be evaluated the same way in both regular and 
crisis periods. 
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crisis times, however, the higher Type II error would reduce the likelihood that such 
misstatements would trigger liability. 
b. Does Increased Idiosyncratic Risk in Crisis Times Call for Reducing the Standard of 
Statistical Significance? — As we have just seen, for many important kinds of misstatements, 
crises will radically increase the number of Type II errors if we hold the number of Type I errors 
fixed. For the average firm, more than two-thirds of corrective disclosures causing a 5% drop in 
the stock price would be missed if we keep the 95% level during the most recent crisis. Even if, 
as we assume, the 95% confidence level is the socially optimal standard of statistical significance 
in normal times, maintaining the 95% standard during crisis times will result in a large increase 
in Type II errors. In essence, the question is whether any social gains from moderating the 
increase in Type II errors would outweigh the social losses from the increase in Type I errors. As 
we will see below, it is impossible to even make an educated guess as to the answer. It is just as 
likely that reducing the standard in crisis times would decrease social welfare as increase it. 
The analysis makes three principal points: 
1. To determine whether it would be desirable to relax the standard below the 95% 
confidence level in crisis times, the focus must be on whether, at the margin, the welfare gains 
from reduced Type II errors are greater when the standard is more relaxed in crisis times than in 
ordinary times. This is because the corresponding increase in Type I error will be the same in 
crisis times as in normal times and so the resulting social losses will be the same. 
2. Reducing the standard in crisis times will decrease Type II error by more than doing so in 
normal times for corrective disclosures with actual negative impacts on price greater than a 
particular magnitude (the “crossover point”), but will decrease Type II error by less than doing so 
in normal times where the actual negative price impact is less negative than this crossover point. 
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3. Except in the unlikely event that this crossover point coincidentally equals the materiality 
threshold,253 it will be very difficult to tell whether the welfare gains from reduced Type II errors 
are greater when the standard is relaxed in crisis times, compared to relaxing it in ordinary times. 
This is because there will be a range of negative price impacts where it is socially desirable to 
impose liability and where the reduction in Type II error is greater when the standard is relaxed 
in crisis times than in normal times. But there will also be a range of negative price impacts 
either where it is socially desirable to impose liability and the reduction in Type II error is instead 
less when the standard is relaxed in crisis times than in normal times, or where it is socially 
undesirable to impose liability and the reduction in Type II error is greater when the standard is 
relaxed in crisis times than in normal times. 
i. A Critical Question. — The assumption that the 95% confidence level is socially optimal 
in normal times means that, at the margin, the social loss from a small relaxation in the standard, 
with the resulting tiny increase in Type I error, just equals the social gain from the corresponding 
decrease in Type II error. It also means that the social loss from a more than infinitesimal 
increase in Type I error must be greater than the increase in social benefits from the 
corresponding decrease in Type II error. Hence, the assumption implies that in normal times 
there would be no improvement from a meaningful relaxation of the confidence standard. If an 
improvement were possible, the 95% standard would not be optimal. 
This analysis means that lowering the required confidence level below 95% can enhance 
welfare in crisis-induced, high-idiosyncratic-volatility times only if—contrary to normal times—
the social gain from a decrease in Type II error is greater than the social cost from the 
corresponding increase in Type I error. Because the confidence level is defined in terms of the 
                                                 
 253. That is, the minimum size of price drops from corrective disclosures that it is beneficial to deter with 
liability. 
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acceptable level of Type I errors, lowering the standard by a given amount in normal times and in 
high-idiosyncratic-volatility times results in the same increase in Type I error rate. So lowering 
the confidence level will have the same impact on Type I errors and the same negative effect on 
social welfare in both crisis and normal times.254 Thus, the critical question is whether, at the 
margin, reducing the standard in crisis times will result in greater social welfare gains from 
reduced Type II errors than reducing the standard in normal times would. 
In sum: 
1. Given the assumption that the 95% confidence level is socially optimal, if the level is 
relaxed in normal times, the social gain from the reduced Type II errors at the margin just equals 
the social cost from the increased Type I errors. 
2. The social cost from the increased Type I errors if the standard is relaxed in crisis times 
equals the social cost from the increased Type I errors from relaxing the standard in normal 
times. 
3. Thus, if the standard is relaxed in crisis times and the social gain from the reduction in 
Type II errors is greater than if it is relaxed in normal times, then the social gain from the 
reduction in Type II errors is greater than the social cost from the increase in Type I errors. This 
would mean that relaxing the standard in crisis times is a good thing to do. 
ii. The Type II Error Effects from Reducing the Confidence Level in Crisis Times Versus 
Normal Times and the Crossover Point. — For corrective disclosures with an actual negative 
impact on price greater than a particular magnitude (the crossover point), reducing the required 
confidence level from 95% to some lower level in crisis times will decrease Type II error by 
                                                 
 254. We are assuming, plausibly, that the costs and benefits of imposing liability for misstatements with any 
given price impact are the same in crisis and normal times. 
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more than doing so in normal times would. Where the actual negative price impact is less 
negative than this crossover point, however, doing so in crisis times will decrease Type II error 
by less than doing so in normal times would. The discussion that follows summarizes the 
reasoning as to why.255 
The first part of this proposition—relating to price impacts more negative than the crossover 
point—would seem to make intuitive sense. A crisis-induced increase in idiosyncratic risk 
increases Type II error for any level of price drop, so one would think that reducing the standard 
would be more effective at reducing Type II error when there was more Type II error to reduce. 
For the same reason, the second part of the proposition—relating to price impacts less negative 
than the crossover point—at first seems counterintuitive. 
An extreme example suggests why both parts of the proposition in fact make sense. Imagine 
that in crisis times, the standard deviation of the typical firm’s idiosyncratic volatility is 10%, 
whereas in normal times, it is 1%. Now compare the reduction in Type II error from lowering the 
confidence level in normal times versus crisis times where the actual negative price impact of the 
corrective disclosure is a large 20%. During normal times Type II errors for this kind of 
disclosure are essentially zero. This is because the net impact of other firm-specific news and 
background noise on the day of the disclosure is almost never so positive as to disguise the actual 
20% drop: The assumed 1% normal-times standard deviation of idiosyncratic risk tells us that the 
net impact of these other items will rarely move the price more than a few percent. So the Type II 
error rate with the 95% standard is almost zero. If the standard is lowered to 90%, the Type II 
error rate will be even closer to zero, but the reduction in Type II error from reducing the 
standard will be very small. 
                                                 
 255. We have presented a rigorous proof of this proposition in a different paper. Fox, Fox & Gilson, Idiosyncratic 
Risk, supra note 186, at 11–19. 
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In contrast, in crisis times, the standard deviation of 10% tells us that the net impact of other 
firm-specific news and background noise will move price much more relative to this 20% drop. 
The Type II error rate with the 95% standard would be 48%, whereas if the standard were 
relaxed to 90%, it would be 36%. Thus, for a corrective disclosure with a large actual price 
effect, reducing the confidence level results in a much larger reduction in Type II error in crisis 
times than it would in normal times. 
Where the negative price impact of the corrective disclosure is a much smaller 2%, the 
opposite will be the case. In normal times, the standard deviation of 1% tells us that other firm-
specific news and background noise will move price much more relative to an actual 2% 
negative price impact than to an actual 20% price impact. In this normal period, the Type II error 
rate with the 95% standard would be 48% and with the 90% standard it would be 36%. In 
contrast, in crisis times, an actual negative price impact of 2% is a drop in the bucket compared 
to the swings expected from the net impact of other firm-specific news and background noise. 
Type II error thus will be very large whichever confidence level is used. The results of an event 
study would be statistically significant at the 95% level only if the observed market-adjusted 
price change was −19.6% or more, and statistically significant at the 90% level only if it was 
−16.4% or more. To pass these tests, the net impact of other firm-specific news and background 
noise would have to be at least −17.6% and −14.4%, respectively. The net impact of these other 
items is slightly more likely to reach −14.4% or −17.6% or more during a crisis, but the 
difference in likelihood is small. Specifically, the Type II error with the 95% confidence level 
standard would be 96%. With a 90% confidence level, the Type II error rate would be 92%. 
Thus, for a corrective disclosure with a small actual price effect, reducing the required 
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confidence level results in a much smaller reduction in Type II error in crisis times than it would 
in normal times. 
Keeping in mind this extreme example, consider a more realistic example. Assume a 
corrective disclosure with an actual negative price impact of 5%. Recall that the observed 
market-adjusted price change will be the combination of this 5% drop and the net effect of the 
other bits of firm-specific news and background noise that affect the issuer’s share price the same 
day.256 The net impact of these other items is, on average, zero. So the distribution of possible 
observed market-adjusted price changes will be centered around −5%. How widely the returns 
are dispersed around −5%, however, is a function of the firm’s idiosyncratic volatility: the higher 
the volatility, the wider the dispersion. Figure 11(a) depicts two dispersions around −5% of 
possible observed market-adjusted prices for the corrective disclosure in our example. The 
shallower curve represents a standard deviation of 3.23%, the standard deviation of the typical 
firm in the recent financial crisis. The steeper curve represents a standard deviation of 1.78%, the 
standard deviation of the typical firm in normal times. 
 
                                                 
 256. See supra section III.B & fig. 6 (studying statistical causal link between factors such as public firm-specific 
information and observed price change). 
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Figure 11(a) When the Corrective Disclosure Causes A 5% Drop in Price 
—Comparing Regular and Volatile Periods 
 
Figure 11(b) 
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Figure 11(c) 




5% Drop—Reduction in Type II Error Moving To 90% Level in Volatile Periods 
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Figure 11(e):  
5% Drop—Reduction in Type II Error Moving To 90% Level in Regular Times 
 
Figure 11(f) 
5% Drop—Comparing Reductions in  
Type II Error Moving To 90% Level  
 
Now recall that the firm’s idiosyncratic volatility also determines how negative the observed 
market-adjusted price change must be for it to be considered statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence level.257 The cutoff is −1.96 multiplied by the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic 
                                                 
 257. See supra section III.B.1.b (mentioning relevance of firm-specific volatility on observed price change). 
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risk of the firm. So for this typical firm, this cutoff in the financial crisis was −1.96 x 3.23 = 
−6.33% and in normal times would be −1.96 x 1.78= −3.49%. Type II error—a corrective 
disclosure with an actual negative impact on price that fails the test—occurs when the observed 
market-adjusted price change is not sufficiently negative to meet the cutoff. 
Figures 11(b) and 11(c) display the Type II error rate using the distributions from 11(a) and 
the crisis- and normal-period cutoffs, respectively: In the figures, any observed market-adjusted 
price to the right of the applicable cutoff fails the test. For example, in Figure 11(b), because -5% 
is less negative than the 95% cutoff for crisis periods (−6.33%), the corrective disclosure in our 
example will only pass the test if the net impact of other bits of firm-specific news and 
background noise drives the price down by at least another 1.33%. This is 0.41 standard 
deviations below the distribution mean (which is −5%). For a normal distribution, this will 
happen only about one-third of the time, so the observed price will only be negative enough to 
pass the test about one-third of the time. As a result, Type II error in crisis periods will be about 
66% (i.e., the area marked under the curve to the right of the cutoff in Figure 11(b) is 66%). 
In contrast, as depicted in Figure 11(c), during normal times, the observed market-adjusted 
price will pass the test unless the net impact of these other items is sufficiently positive to drive 
the observed price up by at least 1.51%. This is 0.84 standard deviations above the mean, which 
with a normal distribution occurs only about 20% of the time (i.e., the marked area in Figure 
11(c) under the curve to the right of the cutoff point is 20%). In normal times, then, Type II error 
would only be 20%. 
Figures 11(d) and 11(e) graphically show what happens when we relax the statistical 
standard to 90%. The cutoffs then drop to −5.30% (−1.64 x 3.23%) during crisis times and 
2.92% (−1.64 x 1.78%) in normal times. The area under the curves in these two figures between 
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the 95% and 90% thresholds represents the reduction in Type II errors. The area in Figure 11(d) 
is larger than in Figure 11(e), indicating that a corrective disclosure with an actual negative 
impact on price of −5% is above the cutoff point: Type II errors decline after reducing the 
required confidence level by more during crisis times than during regular times. 
Figure 11(f) displays the same information as Figures 11(d) and 11(e), except that we have 
transformed the two distributions so they can be directly compared by turning them both into the 
standard normal distribution, centered at zero and having a standard deviation of 1.258 Observe 
two things. First, this transformation preserves the standard deviations we noted above, so that 
the threshold for 95% in crisis times starts 0.41 standard deviations below the mean and the 95% 
threshold in normal times starts 0.84 standard deviations above the mean. Second, observe that 
the interval between the 95% and 90% cutoff is the same length (.32) in both regular and crisis 
periods. This means comparing the reduction in Type II errors is easy: Whichever period’s 
interval is closer to zero (with a −5% actual impact, the crisis period) will see the larger 
reduction in Type II errors, since the normal distribution is at its highest at zero. 
This approach, depicted in Figure 11(f), can be used to compare the normal- versus crisis-
period reduction in Type II error from reducing the confidence level for corrective disclosures 
with any magnitude of actual negative impact on price. Figures 12(a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) depict 
these comparative reductions for actual negative impacts of 2%, 3%, 4.13%, 5%, and 6%, 
respectively. One can see from these figures that it will also always be the case that the crisis 
interval falls to the left of the normal-times interval (because the actual price impact relative to 
the standard deviation is always less negative in crisis times). One can see from Figure 12(c) that 
the crossover point will be where the two intervals are mirror images of each other, with the 
                                                 
 258. The math, though a bit difficult, is not important here. 
  122 
crisis-times interval on the negative side and the normal-times interval on the positive side. In all 
these curves, the distance under the curve from −1.96 to −1.64 (i.e., −0.32) is the same. For 
actual impacts (Figures 12(d) and 12(e)) that are more negative than the crossover point of 
−4.13%,259 the curve is higher over the interval representing the reduction in a crisis period, 
representing a larger area and hence a larger reduction in Type II error. For actual impacts below 
the crossover point (Figures 12(a) and 12(b)), the opposite is the case. 
Figure 12(a): Visualizing the Reduction in Type II Error in Altering Threshold 
2% Drop—Smaller than Crossover 
 
  
                                                 
 
259. The crossover point for relaxing the standard from the 95% confidence level to the 90% confidence level 
(i.e., allowing up to 5% Type I error instead of only 2.5% Type I error) when volatility increases for the typical 
company from a standard deviation of 1.78 to 3.23 (the normal times versus the financial crisis) is −4.13%. For the 
calculations, see Fox, Fox & Gilson, Idiosyncratic Risk, supra note 186, at 16–19. 
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Figure 12(b): 
3% Drop—Smaller than Crossover 
 
Figure 12(c) 
 4.13% Drop—Crossover Point 
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Figure 12(d):  
5% Drop—Larger than Crossover 
 
Figure 12(e):  
6% Drop—Larger than Crossover 
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iii. The Special Case Where the Crossover Point Exactly Equals the Materiality Threshold. 
— To assess the welfare impact of lowering the confidence level in crisis times, consider first the 
special case where the Type II error crossover point exactly equals the materiality threshold, as 
depicted by the first bar in Figure 13. In this special case, the impact on Type II errors from 
reducing the required statistical confidence would have an unambiguously greater net positive 
effect on social welfare in a period of crisis-induced high idiosyncratic risk than it would in 
normal times. To see why, recall that it is socially desirable to impose liability on misstatements 
made with scienter whose corrective disclosures have actual price impacts more negative than 
the materiality threshold because the social benefits from the deterrent effects of imposing 
liability exceed the litigation’s social costs.260 The converse would be true for misstatements 
whose corrective disclosures have actual price impacts smaller than the materiality threshold. 
For all corrective disclosures with actual price impacts more negative than the crossover 
point, reducing the confidence level will decrease false negatives more in high-idiosyncratic-
volatility times than in normal times. Where the crossover point just equals the materiality 
threshold, this is exactly the range of price impacts where reducing false negatives is welfare-
enhancing. This is because it is desirable for liability to be imposed where the corrective 
disclosure’s price impact is more negative than the materiality threshold. 
For all corrective disclosures with actual price impacts less negative than the crossover 
point, lowering the confidence level in high-idiosyncratic-volatility times will decrease false 
negatives (Type II errors) by less than in normal times. Reducing false negatives for corrective 
disclosures with price impacts in this range is welfare-destroying because it is undesirable to 
impose liability where the corrective disclosure’s price impact is less negative than the 
                                                 
 260. See supra note 240 and accompanying text (explaining concept of “materiality threshold” as point at which 
price distortion becomes large enough to justify enforcement costs of deterring misstatements). 
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materiality threshold. So less reduction in false negatives is desirable because false negatives 
block imposition of liability and imposing liability is not desirable for corrective disclosures with 
actual negative price impacts this small. 
Now we can put the two cases together. As depicted in the first bar in Figure 13, over the full 
range of possible actual negative price effects from corrective disclosures, the impact on the 
Type II error rate from reducing the confidence level would increase social welfare in a period of 
high idiosyncratic risk. Compared to normal times, reducing the confidence level in crisis times 
would reduce the Type II error rate by more in the range where Type II errors are undesirable and 
reduce it by less in the range where Type II errors are desirable. Therefore, in this special 
situation, lowering the standard in volatile times would unambiguously increase social welfare. 
iv. The Ordinary Case Where the Crossover Point Does Not Equal the Materiality 
Threshold. — The special case described above, where the crossover point is exactly equal to the 
materiality threshold, would be pure coincidence because the factors determining each are 
independent. In the ordinary case, they would not be equal. As a result, the comparative welfare 
effects of lowering the confidence level in crisis times versus doing so in normal times become 
more complicated. If the crossover point is either more or less negative than the materiality 
threshold, there will be a range of actual negative price effects from corrective disclosures for 
which the impact on Type II errors from lowering the standard in crisis times will have a less 
positive, or a more negative, effect on social welfare than in normal times. 
First consider the situation, depicted in the second bar in Figure 13, where the crossover 
point is more negative than the materiality threshold. In this situation, for corrective disclosures 
with actual price impacts less negative than the crossover point but more negative than the 
materiality threshold, reducing the standard in high-volatility crisis times will reduce false 
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negatives by less than doing so in normal times. This is a range of actual price impacts where 
false negatives are undesirable. So for corrective disclosures with price effects in this range, 
lowering the standard in crisis times is, in terms of its impact on Type II errors, less socially 
beneficial than doing so in normal times. 
Next consider the opposite situation, depicted by the third bar in Figure 13, where the 
crossover point is less negative than the materiality threshold. For corrective disclosures with 
actual price impacts more negative than the crossover point but less negative than the materiality 
threshold, lowering the confidence standard in volatile times will reduce false negatives by more 
than doing so in normal times. This is a range of actual price impacts, however, where false 
negatives are desirable because it is undesirable to impose liability. So for corrective disclosures 
with price effects in this range, lowering the standard is, in terms of its impact on Type II errors, 
more socially harmful than doing so in ordinary times. 
Thus, in each of these two situations, for corrective disclosures with price impacts in the 
range between the materiality threshold and the crossover point, the welfare effects of reducing 
the confidence level in high-volatility crisis times would be less beneficial, more harmful, than it 
would be in normal times. For corrective disclosures that have actual price effects that are on 
either side of this range, the welfare effects of lowering the standard would be more favorable, or 
less unfavorable, in crisis times than in normal times, for the same reasons as in the special 
situation where the crossover point precisely equals the materiality threshold. 
If, as seems likely, the crossover point does not equal the materiality threshold—meaning 
there is a range of corrective disclosure price impacts that fall between these two points—what 
can we conclude about the social welfare effect of lowering the confidence level during crisis-
induced high idiosyncratic volatility times? Recall that the critical question is whether the 
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welfare benefits from the reduction in Type II errors are greater when the confidence level is 
relaxed in crisis times compared to ordinary times. Thus, we need to know whether the enhanced 
level of welfare gains with respect to corrective disclosures with price impacts outside this range 
on one side or the other dominate the reduced level of welfare gains, or increased level of 
welfare losses, with respect to corrective disclosures with price effects within this range. 
Answering this question requires knowing two things. First, one must know the distribution of 
misstatements in the economy in terms of their price effects (and hence the price effects of their 
associated corrective disclosures). And second, the answer also requires knowing, for corrective 
disclosures with each such level of price impact, the social gain or loss arising from weighing the 
deterrence benefits from imposing liability versus the costs of such litigation. We are currently 
far from knowing either of these things. 
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Figure 13: Type II Error Reduction from Reducing the Confidence Level for Statistical 
Significance in Crisis Times versus Normal Times and the Implications for Social Welfare 
 
For corrective disclosures with actual impacts more negative than the crossover point, reducing 
the standard in crisis times will decrease Type II error by more than doing so in normal times would. 
For corrective disclosures with actual impacts less negative than this point, reducing the standard in 
crisis times will decrease Type II error by less than doing so in normal times would. 
It is socially desirable to impose liability on misstatements made with scienter whose corrective 
disclosures have actual price impacts more negative than the materiality threshold and socially 
undesirable to impose liability for such misstatements when they have actual price impacts less 
negative than this point. 
The comparative welfare effects of lowering the standard in normal versus volatile times is 
depicted here with regard to three situations: (A) where the crossover point equals the materiality 
threshold, (B) where the crossover point is less than the materiality threshold, and (C) where the 
crossover point is greater than the materiality threshold. 
(+) = The welfare gains from reduced Type II errors are greater, or the welfare losses from 
reduced Type II errors are smaller, in crisis times than in normal times. 
(-) = The welfare gains from reduced Type II errors are smaller, or the welfare losses from 
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v. Summary and Conclusion. — Whether the steep increase in Type II errors during 
economic-crisis-induced periods of high idiosyncratic volatility warrants reducing the confidence 
level used in event studies of corrective disclosures in order to determine loss causation and 
materiality in fraud-on-the-market suits reduces to the following question: At the margin, does 
lowering the confidence level in crisis times increase social welfare through the reduction of 
Type II errors more than doing so in normal times does? This distillation follows logically from 
two observations. First, the negative welfare effect from a relaxed confidence level’s increase in 
Type I errors will be the same in crisis times as in normal times because, by definition, reducing 
the standard will increase Type I error by the same amount in each of these two periods. Second, 
in normal times, this negative welfare effect from a reduced confidence level’s increase in Type I 
errors will, at the margin, just equal the positive welfare effect from the reduced confidence 
level’s decrease in Type II error because this is a necessary condition for our starting assumption 
that in normal times the 95% standard results in the socially optimal set of points in the tradeoffs 
between Type I and Type II errors.261 Thus, reducing the confidence level in crisis times is 
desirable only if the resulting positive welfare effect from a reduced standard’s impact on Type II 
errors is greater in volatile times than in normal times. 
We have seen that it is impossible to determine, without considerably more information than 
appears to be available, whether this condition is met. The exception is the special—and purely 
                                                 
 261. See supra notes 232–234 and accompanying text (explaining assumption that 95% is socially optimal 
confidence level). 
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coincidental—case where the Type II error crossover point exactly equals the materiality 
threshold. That case would be a pure coincidence because the factors determining the crossover 
point are entirely independent of the factors determining the materiality threshold. 
The assumption that the 95% confidence level is the socially optimal point of tradeoff 
between Type I and Type II errors in normal times may, of course, be incorrect.262 But that would 
simply suggest that the standard be changed for normal times, an analysis that we do not 
undertake here (though our discussion identifies the nature of the inquiry). Regardless, the results 
here are generalizable from any such altered set point. If the optimal standard in normal times is 
something other than 95%, this analysis still suggests that without more information than we 
now have, we cannot have strong priors that welfare would be enhanced, rather than 
compromised, by lowering the required standard of statistical confidence during periods of 
economic crisis. 
c.  Shifting the Mix of Enforcement Mechanisms in Crisis Times. — The foregoing 
discussion shows that there are no simple answers to the questions that arise from using event 
studies to assess materiality and loss causation in fraud-on-the-market class actions in the face of 
economic crisis-induced increases in idiosyncratic volatility. We can say with certainty, however, 
that the dramatic worsening in the tradeoff between Type I and Type II errors makes the threat of 
fraud-on-the-market actions a comparatively much less useful tool for deterring price-distorting 
issuer misstatements in crisis times than in normal times. As has just been demonstrated, there is 
as much reason to believe that lowering the required confidence level in times of economic crisis 
will decrease social welfare as increase it. And if the required level of statistical confidence is 
maintained at 95%, the threat of such an action constitutes a considerably less effective deterrent. 
                                                 
 262. See supra note 233 and accompanying text (discussing assumption). 
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This loss of deterrence can be illustrated. Assume that if misstatements made with scienter 
distort prices by 5%, they surpass the materiality threshold, i.e., they are serious enough to incur 
the social costs of deterring them through private actions. As we have seen from our examples, 
crisis times would transform this useful cause of action from one that catches most such 
misstatements—four out of five—to one that catches many fewer—just one in three. And if the 
confidence standard is lowered to at least partially compensate for this loss in deterrence, a 
fraud-on-the-market class action becomes a costlier way to deter issuer misstatements because, 
among other reasons, of the corresponding increase in Type I errors. 
This very substantial decline in the usefulness of fraud-on-the-market class actions in crisis 
times has not been previously recognized. It suggests that during crisis times, more resources 
should be devoted to other methods for deterring price-distorting misstatements, for example 
stepped-up SEC enforcement actions. In contrast to fraud-on-the-market suits, the SEC is not 
required to establish loss causation in Rule 10b-5 enforcement actions.263 So in a crisis, the SEC 
will not have to prove loss causation in times when it is considerably less likely that the 
corrective disclosure of a misstatement that substantially distorts price will be accompanied by a 
statistically significant, market-adjusted price drop. The SEC still, of course, needs to establish 
that the misstatement was material, but unlike with respect to loss causation, the case law permits 
materiality to be proven other than through an event study.264 For example, the SEC could show 
the facial importance of the issuer’s misstatement, the extent to which analysts took note of the 
misstatement at the time it was made, and any price reaction at the time of the misstatement. 
                                                 
 263. See, e.g., SEC v. Kelly, 765 F. Supp. 2d 301, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[U]nlike a private plaintiff, the SEC 
need not allege or prove reliance, causation, or damages in an action under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.”); supra 
notes 209–225 and accompanying text (discussing requirements of fraud-on-the-market shareholder class actions). 
 264. See, e.g., SEC v. Lee, 720 F. Supp. 2d 305, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding SEC sufficiently pleaded 
materiality by alleging defendant’s false statements would have influenced reasonable investor). 
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Evidence that would suggest that the market-adjusted price drop at the time of any unambiguous 
issuer announcement of the truth might be smaller than the amount by which the misstatement 
inflated price also would be relevant. Possible explanations of how this could occur include 
insider trading based on the truth, rumors of the true situation circulating in the market, and the 
existence of a series of corporate announcements that dribbled the truth out in small doses in 
advance of the full corrective disclosure. All of these could lead to the market’s realizing the 
truth, often gradually, in advance of the full corrective disclosure and thus cause a smaller or 
nonexistent observed market-adjusted price change at the time of the disclosure.265 
Using these other indicia to determine whether a misstatement influenced price is a 
considerably more subjective exercise than the use of an event study. Indeed much of the event 
study’s appeal for the judiciary derives from its greater objectivity and transparency: Experts 
may differ in their methodology, but in comparison to, for example, the testimony of a financial 
analyst, the differences between competing methodologies are readily observable. This appeal is 
so important that in private suits, some courts will grant the defendant summary judgment on the 
issue of loss causation if the plaintiff does not introduce an event study showing a statistically 
significant, market-adjusted negative price change at the time of the corrective disclosure.266 But 
when the event study becomes a comparatively less powerful tool, alternative forms of evidence 
concerning loss causation and materiality become relatively more attractive. At least in theory, 
courts could give more importance to these other forms of evidence in fraud-on-the-market suits 
                                                 
 265. See Fox, After Dura, supra note 222, at 850–51 (explaining why share price does not necessarily drop 
immediately after corrective disclosure); David Tabak & Frederick C. Dunbar, Materiality and Magnitude: Event 
Studies in the Courtroom 7 (Nat’l Econ. Research Assocs., Working Paper No. 34, 1999), 
www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/ 
publications/archive1/3841.pdf [http://perma.cc/KUK3-FFLF] (discussing beginning event studies prior to actual 
announcement of news to correct for leakage before that time). 
 266. See, e.g., In re Imperial Credit Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1014–16 (C.D. Cal. 2003) 
(finding defendants entitled to summary judgment because plaintiffs failed to produce event study); In re Exec. 
Telecard, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 979 F. Supp. 1021, 1025–27 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (rejecting reliability of expert testimony due 
to failure to perform event study). 
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as well as in SEC enforcement actions in times of economic crisis.267 But it is likely that they are 
relatively more manageable in the hands of an administrative agency that can use prosecutorial 
discretion in deciding which cases to bring. 
B. Establishing Materiality in Other Securities Law Contexts 
The concept of “materiality” pervades securities law, reaching far beyond fraud-on-the-
market suits. This includes two particularly important areas where event studies are frequently 
used: insider trading regulation and section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act) 
litigation based on alleged misstatements or omissions in the registration statements of public 
securities offerings. Use of event studies to establish materiality in each of these important areas 
raises sufficiently distinct issues from their use in fraud-on-the-market studies to warrant 
separate discussion. 
1. Insider Trading. — One of the requirements of the longstanding prohibition under Rule 
10b-5 against insider trading is that the information on which the insider trades be “material.”268 
The doctrinal standard for materiality in insider trading cases under Rule 10b-5 is identical to 
that in Rule 10b-5 misstatement cases: whether there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
investor would consider the nonpublic information on which the insider traded to be important in 
a decision whether to purchase or sell the security involved.269 If the later public disclosure of 
this information changes the price of this security, it has had an actual effect on the behavior of 
                                                 
 267. For a view of one of the authors that as a general matter, some of these factors should, under certain 
circumstances, be taken into account by courts in fraud-on-the-market actions, see Merritt B. Fox, Demystifying 
Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 60 Bus. Law. 507, 523–25 (2005). For an opposing view that they never 
should be, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Causation by Presumption? Why the Supreme Court Should Reject Phantom 
Losses and Reverse Broudo, 60 Bus. Law. 533, 537 (2005). 
 268. See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (“An insider’s 
duty  . . . to abstain from dealing in his company’s securities arises only in ‘those situations . . . which are reasonably 
certain to have a substantial effect on the market price of the security if . . . disclosed.’” (quoting Arthur Fleischer, 
Jr., Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 
51 Va. L. Rev. 1271, 1289 (1965))). 
 269. See supra note 224 (explaining definition of materiality). 
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investors. Again, this change in price strongly suggests that a reasonable investor would have 
found the information important at the time that the defendant traded on it. As in fraud-on-the-
market cases, an event study is the financial economist’s standard tool for determining the 
likelihood that the disclosure of a previously nonpublic item of news in fact did change the price 
of a security. Not surprisingly, therefore, the courts in insider trading litigation have accepted 
event studies as at least one (preferred) way to establish the materiality of information.270 
The social gains from deterring trades based on inside information are somewhat different 
from the gains from deterring corporate misstatements, as are the costs from imposing liability 
for insider trading where the importance of the information is below a certain threshold. Still, 
there will be a point below which, if we knew for certain the impact of the information on price, 
we would not wish to impose liability—i.e, there is a policy-based materiality threshold. And 
because the tool that we have to measure that impact—the event study—gives us only 
probabilistic guidance as to what the actual impact of the information on price was, the issues 
associated with the tradeoff between Type I and Type II errors are the same as with fraud-on-the-
market suits. If the same required confidence level is maintained during periods of economic 
crisis-induced idiosyncratic risk as during normal times and if event studies are required to 
establish materiality, Type II errors will rise sharply and many more trades that in fact are based 
on information sufficiently important to meet the materiality threshold will not be actionable. But 
again, there are no strong reasons to believe that lowering the required confidence level, with the 
consequent increase in Type I errors, will increase, rather than decrease, social welfare. 
                                                 
 270. SEC v. Berlacher, No. 07-3800, 2010 WL 3566790, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2010) (referring to “event 
study as reliable and the best measure of materiality”); see also Mark L. Mitchell & Jeffry M. Netter, The Role of 
Financial Economics in Securities Fraud Cases: Applications at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 49 Bus. 
Law. 545, 572–84 (1994) (collecting cases). 
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Ultimately, just as with fraud-on-the-market actions during periods of crisis-induced spikes 
in volatility, event studies are a comparatively less powerful tool in these circumstances for 
discriminating between information that is and is not material in insider trading cases despite 
their advantage of being less subjective. This makes our discussion of alternative forms of 
evidence concerning proof of materiality in fraud-on-the-market class actions271 relevant to 
insider trading as well. Again, we suspect that increased permissibility of more subjective kinds 
of evidence during economic-crisis periods is more suitable in SEC enforcement cases because 
its capacity to use prosecutorial discretion cabins their inappropriate use in a fashion not present 
in cases brought by private parties.272 
The fact that event studies are, in crisis times, a comparatively less powerful tool for 
discriminating between information that is and is not material takes on special significance in 
insider trading cases given our explanations for what causes crisis-induced spikes in 
idiosyncratic risk. These explanations suggest that more kinds of information that insiders 
typically possess will be important in crisis times and will have a larger effect on price when they 
are eventually revealed than they would in normal times.273 This means that in crisis times, 
insiders would have many more opportunities to profit from insider trading on nonpublic 
information that in normal times would not be important enough to warrant deterring by 
                                                 
 271. See supra section IV.A (examining causation and materiality in fraud-on-the-market shareholder class 
actions). 
 272. See supra section IV.A. In a nonjury trial involving an SEC Rule 10b-5 action against a defendant accused 
of insider trading, at least one court has ruled that where the defense has introduced expert testimony based on an 
event study showing no statistically significant price reaction upon the public release of the information on which 
the defendant traded and the government, to show materiality, only offered the testimony of a financial expert who 
did not conduct an event study, the government failed to establish materiality. Berlacher, 2010 WL 3566790, at *7. 
We note that this case did not involve a situation where an economic crisis-induced spike in idiosyncratic risk 
devalued that defendant’s use of an event study. 
 273. Recall from our earlier examples that the standard error for the typical firm during the recent financial crisis 
was 3.23%, compared to 1.78% in the average year in normal times. Supra text accompanying note 242. This says, 
very roughly, that average bit information released by such a firm had almost twice the effect on price in crisis as it 
did in normal times. 
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privately imposed liability or governmental sanction. Yet assuming that the required level of 
statistical confidence is not changed, the very same larger standard error means that this larger 
number of more important bits of inside information that are now important enough to exceed 
the materiality threshold will on average be no more likely to be found by an event study to be 
material than they were in normal times when their price impacts were below this threshold. 
2. Materiality Under Section 11 of the Securities Act. — Section 11(a) of the Securities 
Act274 imposes liability on the issuer, the underwriters, and certain other persons for 
misstatements and omissions of required information in a registration statement for a public 
offering. As with corporate misrepresentations and insider trading under Rule 10b-5, the 
misstatement or omission is actionable only if it relates to a “material fact.” The doctrinal 
standard for materiality is the same as under Rule 10b-5.275 Assume that following their issuance, 
the offered securities trade in an efficient secondary market. If the registration statement contains 
a misstatement or omission whose subsequent correction changes the security’s price, the 
doctrinal standard would be met. As a result, here too the courts have relied heavily on event 
studies in determining whether the misstatement or omission was material.276 
Assessing the appropriate role of event studies in determining materiality and damages in 
section 11 cases and the implications of crisis-induced spikes in idiosyncratic risk requires a little 
background concerning the system of liability and the statutory measure of damages, including 
the allocation of burdens of proof and persuasion with respect to these elements. 
                                                 
 274. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012)). 
 275. See supra note 224 (explaining definition of materiality). The Supreme Court has yet to address the proper 
standard for materiality under section 11 of the Securities Act, but all the circuit courts that have addressed the 
question have applied the Northway definition of materiality in section 11 actions. See, e.g., Kronfeld v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 832 F.2d 726, 731 (2d Cir. 1987) (collecting cases). 
 276. See, e.g., In re World Access, Inc. Sec. Litig., 310 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1298–99 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (using 
parties’ event studies in determining materiality). 
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As for liability, section 11(a) imposes absolute liability on the issuer.277 When an issuer 
offers equities for sale and makes a price-inflating misstatement or omission, it receives the 
inflated sales price. Imposing liability simply returns the inflation to the buyer. At least in a 
transaction-cost-free world (including the absence of judicial error), doing so makes sense 
whatever the level of the issuer’s culpability, since the net effect will be as if the offering was 
priced correctly in the first place. Imposing absolute liability also creates incentives to take cost-
effective steps to avoid such price distorting behavior.278 
Now consider damages. For a plaintiff still holding her securities at the time of judgment, 
section 11(e) provides that the prima facie damages measure is the difference between the price 
paid for the security and its value on the date of suit, with the difference presumed to be caused 
by the misstatement or omission.279 But this crude measure and presumption obviously does 
nothing to correct for market-wide or firm-specific factors other than the misstatement or 
omission that may have influenced the security’s price after the plaintiff’s purchase. To address 
this gap, section 11(e) in effect shifts the burden of proving loss causation from the plaintiff to 
                                                 
 277. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc., 647 F.3d 479, 484 (2d Cir. 2011) (applying section 11’s 
scheme of absolute liability for issuers). 
 278. Section 11(a) also imposes absolute liability on other participants in the process: the issuer’s top managers, 
directors, and underwriters. However, section 11(b) grants these other participants an affirmative defense: They have 
no liability if they can show that that they engaged in adequate due diligence. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a), (b)(3). The overall 
liability scheme for these other participants is designed to motivate each of them, particularly the lead underwriter, 
to independently investigate the issuer and to participate actively in the drafting of the registration statement. 
Commentary by persons intimately involved with the creation of the Securities Act confirm that this in terrorem 
arrangement for imposing damages in the absence of adequate investigation was a critical part of the legislative plan 
to promote full disclosure. See William O. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 Yale 
L.J. 171, 173 (1933) (noting penalties are both “compensatory” and “in terrorem” in nature and therefore  are “set 
high to guarantee that the risk of their invocation will be effective in assuring that the ‘truth about securities’ will be 
told”); Felix Frankfurter, The Securities Act: II, Fortune, Aug. 1933, at 54, 109 (praising in terrorem effects of Act); 
see also Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (explaining courts 
must hold underwriters to high standard of diligence “since they are supposed to assume an opposing posture with 
respect to management”); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 696–97 n.48 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (“The 
purpose of Section 11 is to protect investors . . . . In order to make the underwriters’ participation in this enterprise of 
any value to the investors, the underwriters must make some reasonable attempt to verify the data submitted to them. 
They may not rely solely on the company’s officers or . . . counsel.”). 
 279. § 11(e), 48 Stat. at 83 (“The suit authorized under subsection (a) may be either (1) to recover the 
consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the 
tender of such security, or (2) for damages if the person suing no longer owns the security.”). 
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the defendant by granting the defendant an affirmative defense if it can prove the absence of loss 
causation; damages are reduced to the extent that defendants can show that events other than the 
misrepresentation or omission caused the price drop. 
The implications of economic-crisis-induced spikes in idiosyncratic volatility on 
determining materiality and damages/loss causation under section 11 track those under Rule 10b-
5. Each side will bear the burden of proving statistical significance with respect to the element on 
which it bears the burden of proof. The plaintiff, if it seeks to prove materiality through an event 
study, will succeed at doing so by showing a statistically significant drop in share price when the 
corrective disclosure was made. In turn, the defendant will use an event study to prove that the 
drop in security price was caused by events other than the corrective disclosure. The fact that 
each party will likely contest the other’s event study further complicates this event-study duel. 
Despite the complications, the analysis remains essentially the same. If the same standard of 
statistical significance is maintained during highly volatile times as in normal ones, Type II 
errors will rise sharply.280 Suppose the plaintiff is required to establish materiality through use of 
an event study. Crisis times will substantially diminish section 11’s capacity to create the 
situation that would have prevailed if the offering had been priced correctly in the first place and 
to deter future price- distorting misstatements and omissions in registration statements. 
The crisis-induced increase in idiosyncratic volatility has the same impact on the defendant’s 
effort to show that factors other than the corrective disclosure caused all or part of the price drop. 
Thus, the higher standard of statistical significance will affect both the plaintiff and the 
defendant. The relative impact will depend on the facts; the defendant’s opportunity to disprove 
loss causation depends on the presence of other events in the relevant period that may have 
                                                 
 280. Again, there are no strong reasons to believe that lowering the standard, with the consequent increase in 
Type I errors, will increase social welfare. 
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affected the issuer’s price. However, the limits on the capacity of event studies to separate the 
effects of multiple factors make section 11’s shift in the burden of proof to the defendant on this 
issue significant. 
C. Judicial Deference to Board Rejections of Premium Acquisition Offers and Substantive 
Coercion 
To this point, our discussion of the legal implications of the pattern of, and alternative 
explanations for, crisis-induced spikes in idiosyncratic risk has focused on issues related to the 
content and their private and public enforcement of the federal securities laws. We turn now to 
corporate law and in particular to the legal implications of our findings for what has been the 
most disputed element in state corporate law over the last thirty years: the extent of judicial 
deference to a board of directors’ decision to defend against a hostile takeover.281 Over this 
period, Delaware law evolved to give the board wide discretion when it determines there is a risk 
of “substantive coercion”—a risk that the shareholders may mistakenly accept a tender offer that 
the board believes undervalues the corporation. As we will show in this section, the concept of 
substantive coercion as developed by the Delaware Supreme Court makes little sense in normal 
times. Here we consider whether there is a circumstance in which the concept might make sense: 
Can crisis-induced spikes in idiosyncratic risk of the sort discussed in Parts I and II make a 
substantive coercion claim plausible where it would not be credible in normal times? In 
                                                 
 281. See Jack B. Jacobs, Fifty Years of Corporate Law Evolution: A Delaware Judge’s Retrospective, 5 Harv. 
Bus. L. Rev. 141, 154–55 (2015) (arguing rise of hostile takeover litigation contributed to changing legal standards 
for corporate boards). Justice Jack Jacobs, a recently retired Delaware Supreme Court Justice who sat on the 
Chancery Court during this period, described the matter as follows: 
[The Delaware courts] created an entirely new . . . set of standards [for reviewing boards of director’s 
actions] in the landmark cases of Unocal, Revlon, and Blasius . . . [which] were needed to address new 
realities and issues arising out of novel legal and financial technologies, in order to solve the problem of 
whether and how boards should respond to hostile corporate takeovers. That evolution was game-changing. 
It reshaped the governance of boards and the conduct of all players, including legal and financial advisors, 
in the area of mergers and acquisitions. 
Id. 
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particular, we examine two takeover cases where an economic crisis figured centrally in both the 
bidder’s decision to make the offer and the target board’s decision to oppose it: Air Products and 
Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc.282 and Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics, Inc.283 
1. A Brief Review of the Evolution of Delaware Takeover Law. — The emergence of the 
hostile takeover boom in the 1980s subjected traditional corporate law to the equivalent of a 
stress test. The largest and most tendentious corporate transactions in history created serious 
doctrinal cracks, the most important of which was allocating, in the face of a hostile tender offer, 
final decision rights among directors, shareholders, and courts.284 As the law developed, the 
breadth of the board’s discretion to constrain shareholders from approving a hostile offer came to 
depend upon the court’s assessment of the board’s professed belief that the offer presented a 
“threat” to corporate policy.285 An important element of the potential threat was whether 
shareholders, even with full information, would mistakenly (in the board’s view) tender their 
shares to a hostile bidder. The threat that fully informed shareholders would make this mistake is 
termed, awkwardly, “substantive coercion.”286 
Framing the concept most generously, tolerance of board decisions to block a hostile 
takeover depends in part on how accurately share prices predict the value of the company in the 
incumbent management’s hands. If these prices are thought to be relatively accurate, it is harder 
for the target board to justify preventing its shareholders from deciding themselves whether to 
                                                 
 282. 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
 283. 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998). 
 284. Ronald J. Gilson, The Fine Art of Judging: William T. Allen, 22 Del. J. Corp. L. 914, 914 (1997). 
 285. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985) (“[D]irectors must show 
that they had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed because of 
another person’s stock ownership.”). 
 286. As will become apparent, one of the authors bears at least half the responsibility for this very poorly turned 
phrase. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1384 (Del. 1995) (citing Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier 
Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 
44 Bus. Law. 247, 267 (1989) [hereinafter Gilson & Kraakman, Intermediate Standard], as origin of term 
“substantive coercion”). 
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accept a hostile offer made at a premium over that price. The increase that we have documented 
in idiosyncratic risk during times of economic distress provides, for the first time, a potentially 
coherent core to the concept of substantive coercion, a term that has become progressively both 
more important to Delaware takeover law and more empty of analytic content. Understanding 
this point, however, requires a short detour along a very long road: the development of 
Delaware’s takeover law. 
The modern law of takeovers began with the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Unocal 
v. Mesa Petroleum.287 There the court resolved the conflict between two contending positions 
over who could decide whether a hostile takeover would succeed: Should the board be prevented 
from interfering with the offer so that shareholders decide whether to accept a hostile bid or 
should the board have the power to prevent shareholders from making that choice?288 The 
Unocal court rejected both contending positions in favor of creating for itself what appeared to 
be a regulatory role: The court would decide whether the hostile offer presented a threat and and 
if so, whether the board’s response was proportional to the threat identified.289 
Following Unocal, a law review article appeared that influenced the further evolution of 
Delaware takeover law: Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman’s Delaware’s Intermediate 
Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?.290 Anticipating 
the possibility that the Delaware Supreme Court might be too sympathetic to a board’s claim that 
                                                 
 287. 493 A.2d 946. 
 288. Compare Gilson & Kraakman, Intermediate Standard, supra note 286, at 821, 831–48 (arguing conflict of 
interest inherent in management defensive tactics “exposes the invalidity of defensive tactics in tender offers and 
delineates a general principle governing management’s appropriate role in the tender offer process”), with Martin 
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 Bus. Law. 101, 115–16 (1979) (“There is no reason to remove 
the decision on a takeover from the reasonable business judgment of the directors.”). 
 289. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (“If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business judgment 
rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”). 
 290. Gilson & Kraakman, Intermediate Standard, supra note 286. Chancellor Chandler assesses the article’s 
impact on Delaware takeover law in Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 96–98 (Del. Ch. 2011) 
(citing article and noting adoption of its proposed test into Delaware case law). 
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it knew better than the shareholders, the authors sought to provide the court with a framework for 
responding to such claims in a way that would cabin what would meet the test. From this effort 
came the awful term “substantive coercion”: the risk that even in the face of full disclosure, 
target shareholders still might mistakenly accept a hostile bid that is lower than the company’s 
fundamental value.291 To make a claim of substantive coercion credible, the authors would have 
required a good deal more than just management’s predictable claim that the market price 
undervalued the company’s shares. The board also would have to state clearly the source of the 
mispricing and management’s plans for correcting it.292 At the least, the discipline imposed by re-
                                                 
 291. Gilson & Kraakman, Intermediate Standard, supra note 286, at 267. 
 292. Id. at 268 (arguing substantive coercion allegation “requires a coherent statement of management’s 
expectations about the future value of the company” and “showing of how—and when—management expects a 
target’s shareholders to do better”). Then–Vice Chancellor (now Chief Justice) Strine highlighted the problem that 
an unconstrained claim of substantive coercion would present: 
As a starting point, it is important to recognize that substantive coercion can be invoked by a corporate 
board in almost every situation. There is virtually no CEO in America who does not believe that the market 
is not valuing her company properly. Moreover, one hopes that directors and officers can always say that 
they know more about the company than the company’s stockholders—after all, they are paid to know 
more. Thus, the threat that stockholders will be confused or wrongly eschew management’s advice is 
omnipresent. 
 
   . . . . 
 
 . . . Professors Gilson and Kraakman—from whom our courts adopted the term substantive coercion—
emphasized the need for close judicial scrutiny of defensive measures supposedly adopted to address that 
threat[.] 
Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 327, 329 (Del. Ch. 2000). Vice Chancellor Strine then quotes Professors 
Gilson and Kraakman to show what “close judicial scrutiny” would entail: 
To support an allegation of substantive coercion, a meaningful proportionality test requires a coherent 
statement of management’s expectations about the future value of the company. From the perspective of 
shareholders, substantive coercion is possible only if management plausibly expects to better the terms of a 
hostile offer—whether by bargaining with the offeror, by securing a competitive bid, or by managing the 
company better than the market expects. To make such a claim requires more than the standard statement 
that a target’s board and its advisers believe the hostile offer to be ‘grossly inadequate.’ In particular, 
demonstrating the existence of a threat of substantive coercion requires a showing of how—and when—
management expects a target’s shareholders to do better. 
 
   . . . . 
 
The discipline imposed by requiring management to state clearly just how it intends to cause the price 
of the company’s shares to increase is a critical check on knee-jerk resort to assertions that a hostile offer’s 
price is inadequate. For example, if management believes that the price of a hostile offer is inadequate 
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quiring this showing would force management to specify the metric by which their performance 
going forward should be measured if the offer were defeated. 
In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,293 the Delaware “Supreme 
Court . . . addressed the concept of substantive coercion head on . . . .”294 As that court put it in a 
subsequent case, the “board of directors had reasonably determined that inadequate value was 
not the only threat that Paramount’s all cash for all shares offer presented, but was also 
reasonably concerned that the Time stockholders might tender to Paramount in ignorance or 
based upon a mistaken belief, i.e., yield to substantive coercion.”295 
The result, it is fair to say, greatly diminished Unocal as a serious restriction on a board’s 
authority to block a hostile takeover by turning substantive coercion into an assumption rather 
than a standard of proof. Possibly, the Delaware Supreme Court so sharply diluted the restrictions 
on proving the presence of substantive coercion because neither the court nor advocates of 
management discretion could articulate a compelling circumstance when fully informed 
shareholders reasonably could be expected to make a mistake in accepting a hostile offer. If so, 
Gilson and Kraakman were too clever by half. In their effort to set the standard of proof high, 
they created a situation where the Delaware Supreme Court, to give the concept broad 
application, watered down what had to be proved to essentially nothing.296 
                                                                                                                                                             
because the market undervalues the company[ ] . . . an acceptable statement of the threat to shareholders 
would require management to describe the steps that it planned to correct the market’s valuation. 
Id. at 329–30 (Del. Ch. 2000) (quoting Gilson & Kraakman, Defensive Tactics, supra note 290, at 268–69, 274). 
 293. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). 
 294. Airgas, 16 A.3d at 98 (summarizing Delaware Supreme Court’s movement away from Unocal in 
Paramount). 
 295. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1384 (Del. 1995). 
 296. Chancellor Chandler reached just this conclusion in Airgas: 
Inadequate price has become a form of ‘substantive coercion’ as that concept has been developed by the 
Delaware Supreme Court in its takeover jurisprudence. That is, the idea that Airgas’s stockholders will 
disbelieve the board’s views on value (or in the case of merger arbitrageurs who may have short-term profit 
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2. Substantive Coercion and Crisis-Induced Spikes in Idiosyncratic Risk. — This is where 
the impact of crisis-induced spikes in idiosyncratic risk comes in. The occurrence of such a spike 
may present a realistic situation where substantive coercion could occur. In particular, recall our 
analysis of the potential that the incidence of insider trading would go up as a result of a crisis: 
The importance of new information about both the company and about its management go up, 
which may increase the amount and value of insiders’ private information compared to that 
available to the market.297 This crisis-induced gap between management’s information and that 
available to the market may be difficult to communicate because of the crisis even if, unlike the 
insider trading situation, management is inclined to close the gap through disclosure. In a period 
when the continued validity of the market’s precrisis valuation model of the company is in 
question and the range of relevant new information expands precisely because of new competing 
models, simple disclosure of management’s information may not solve the problem. In this 
circumstance, the information gap may be a measure of substantive coercion: For a period of 
time, management’s knowledge advantage over shareholders concerning facts important for 
valuing the company is significantly increased. Thus, in a period of crisis when an increase in 
management’s knowledge advantage is signaled by a spike in idiosyncratic risk, there is, in the 
name of substantive coercion, a case for temporarily giving the board more discretion to impede 
a takeover. 
                                                                                                                                                             
goals in mind, they may simply ignore the board’s recommendations), and so they may mistakenly tender 
into an inadequately priced offer. Substantive coercion has been clearly recognized by our Supreme Court 
as a valid threat. 
Airgas, 16 A.3d at 57. 
 297. See supra section IV.B.1 (arguing kinds of information typically held by insiders are more important in 
crisis times than in normal times). 
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In this regard, consider the facts of two well-known takeover cases: Quickturn Design 
Systems, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,298 and Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, 
Inc.299 Each case took place following a financial crisis. Each involved a sharp decline in the 
target’s share price, which appears to have both prompted the bidder to initiate the hostile offer 
and provided the target a rationale for resistance. As it turns out, however, in each case, the 
timing of the crisis-induced increases in idiosyncratic risk do not support an application of the 
theory of substantive coercion articulated above. This is because the crisis-induced spike in 
idiosyncratic volatility had already dissipated by the time of the hostile offer. 
Quickturn was a technology company with whom Mentor Graphics competed.300 Patent 
litigation brought by Quickturn had, by 1997, resulted in an injunction barring Mentor Graphics 
from selling certain products in the United States.301 There was an associated damages claim by 
Quickturn that it said could reach $225 million.302 These developments led Mentor Graphics to 
consider a hostile acquisition of Quickturn, motivated in large part by a desire to resolve the 
dispute by extinguishing the claim through an acquisition of the company holding the patent.303 
There was, however, a problem over price. Although Mentor Graphics’s investment banker 
supported the concept of the acquisition, its view was that Quickturn’s stock price, which 
reached $15.75 during the first quarter of 1998, was too high to make the acquisition worthwhile. 
                                                 
 298. 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998), aff’g 728 A.2d 25 (Del. Ch. 1998). 
 299. 16 A.3d 48. 
 300. See Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1283 (describing Mentor and Quickturn as publicly traded companies on 
NASDAQ market specializing in electronic design technology and emulation technology, respectively). 
 301. See id. at 1284–85 (“In December 1997, the [International Trade Commission] issued a Permanent 
Exclusion Order prohibiting Mentor from importing, selling, marketing, advertising, or soliciting in the United 
States . . . any of the emulation products manufactured by [Mentor-acquisition] Meta outside the United States.”). 
 302. See id. at 1285 (“Quickturn is asserting a patent infringement damage claim that, Quickturn contends, is 
worth approximately $225 million.”). 
 303. Id. (“If Mentor owned Quickturn, it would also own the patents, and would be in a position to ‘unenforce’ 
them by seeking to vacate Quickturn’s injunctive orders against Mentor in the patent litigation.”). 
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Things changed abruptly as a result of the Asian financial crisis. By summer 1998 (the 
second quarter), Quickturn’s stock price had dropped to $6.304 Mentor Graphics’s chairman then 
concluded that “the market outlook being very weak due to the Asian crisis made [the Quickturn 
acquisition] a good opportunity.”305 Mentor Graphics then commenced a tender offer at an 
approximately 50% premium to Quickturn’s crisis-affected market price, but at more than a 20% 
discount to the precrisis price. In response, and after the requisite investment banking and legal 
counsel opinions and board meeting discussion, Quickturn took a set of defensive actions, 
including a delay in holding a shareholder-requested meeting, an action the Chancery Court 
ultimately upheld. Quickturn also adopted a “dead hand” poison pill306 that it withdrew after 
similar devices were invalidated in cases involving other litigants and then a “slow hand” poison 
pill that the Delaware Supreme Court ultimately held violated Delaware law.307 
At least superficially, this case presents a circumstance where a claim of substantive 
coercion is plausible under the framework developed here. If a crisis-induced spike in 
idiosyncratic risk is in fact occurring at the time of the hostile offer, the spike would indicate that 
the private information possessed by target management is likely of greater significance than it is 
in normal times. The market price of the target’s shares, which did not reflect this private 
information, thus could more significantly diverge from a fully informed price—just the 
                                                 
 304. Id. at 1284 n.5. 
 305. Id. at 1285 (quoting Mentor Graphics Executive Vice President Gregory Hinckley). 
 306. A dead-hand poison pill is one that can be redeemed only by the directors who adopted it or by successor 
directors nominated by directors who adopted it. See, e.g., id. at 1289 (describing “continuing director” provision in 
which only those directors could redeem rights). If the adopting board is replaced, the pill will remain in place for its 
full, typically ten-year term regardless of if the bidder wins a subsequent proxy contest. 
 307. See id. at 1289, 1292–93 (invalidating Quickturn’s “Delayed Redemption Provision,” which prevented 
newly elected board members from redeeming rights within six months if purpose of redemption was to transact 
with specified “interested persons”). A slow hand pill imposes a period following a change in a majority of the board 
during which the board cannot redeem the pill. The same device is sometimes referred to as a “no-hand” pill. See 
Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 728 A.2d 25, 27 & n.2 (Del. Ch. 1998) (“This case 
involves . . . a ‘no hand’ poison pill of limited duration and scope . . . . Some practitioners of the art have described 
this iteration as a ‘slow hand’ poison pill.”), afford 721 A.2d 1281. 
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circumstance contemplated by substantive coercion. Target shareholders who compare this 
market price with the hostile bid could be misled into believing that the bid presented an 
attractive premium when, judged against management’s difficult-to-communicate belief 
concerning the true value of the shares, it did not. Thus, a spike in idiosyncratic risk could 
provide evidence of the existence of the kind of situation that Gilson and Kraakman 
contemplated: one where shareholders could be misled and one where subsequent events—
whether share price recovered—could prove whether shareholders were in fact misled.308 
The problem with this nice story is that the facts do not support it. Recall from Figure 5 that 
for the typical issuer during the financial crisis, the pattern of idiosyncratic volatility over time in 
fact had a spike shape: a rapidly increasing level of idiosyncratic risk followed in approximately 
one year by a rapid return to precrisis volatility levels. As shown in Figure 14, this is exactly 
what happened to Quickturn. The company’s daily idiosyncratic risk did rise abruptly during the 
summer of 1997, when the Asian financial crisis surfaced. Although increasingly volatile, its 
stock price continued a general rise until a peak in the first quarter of 1998, only to collapse 
following its disappointing second quarter 1998 earnings release.309 Mentor’s offer followed this 
collapse in price. By this time, however, Quickturn’s idiosyncratic risk had returned to precrisis 
levels. Thus, there is no simple link between a crisis-induced spike in idiosyncratic risk and a 
story that Quickturn’s management had a particularly large, difficult-to-communicate, knowledge 
advantage at the time the offer was made. 
  
                                                 
 308. Gilson & Kraakman, Defensive Tactics, supra note 290, at 271. 
 309. This release reported an 11% drop in revenue from the year-earlier quarter and a quarterly loss of between 
$0.12 and $0.14 per share, compared with a profit of $0.04 a year earlier. 
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Figure 14: Quickturn Idiosyncratic Risk 
 
Airgas presents a similar fact pattern, albeit in the context of a different crisis. Prior to the 
2008 to 2009 financial crisis, Airgas stock traded in the $40s and $50s with some periods in the 
$60s. With the onset of the financial crisis, the stock dropped—in March 2009 as low as $27—
but recovered to the low $40s by the time of Air Products’s hostile offer. Just as with Quickturn, 
Air Products had considered a hostile tender offer prior to the crisis, “but did not pursue a 
transaction at that time because Airgas’s stock price was too high. Then the global recession hit, 
and in the spring or summer of 2009, Air Products’ interest in Airgas was reignited.”310 
Following unsuccessful discussions between the two companies, Air Products then made a 
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hostile offer at $62, at a time when the Airgas share price was still well below its precrisis 
level.311 
There followed a series of improvements in the price of the Air Products offer, culminating 
in a final offer of $70. A proxy fight led to three Air Product nominees being elected minority 
Airgas directors, but surprisingly, the Air Products nominees then concluded that the $70 offer 
proffered by their nominator was inadequate. In a related case, the Delaware Supreme Court 
prevented Air Products from accelerating an election that likely would have resulted in Air 
Products nominees constituting a majority of the Airgas board. The case then came back to the 
Chancery Court with the central issue being whether the Airgas board could decline to redeem its 
poison pill, in light of the fact that the pill had “given Airgas more time than any litigated poison 
pill in Delaware history—enough time to show stockholders four quarters of improving financial 
results, demonstrating that Airgas is on track to meet its projected goals.”312 
Chancellor Chandler made quite clear that in his view substantive coercion should not, as a 
policy matter, be treated as a valid rationale for declining to redeem the pill when the hostile 
offer had already been delayed for over a year and there was no serious claim that the 
shareholders lacked any necessary information. Nonetheless, he felt constrained by Delaware 
Supreme Court precedent and concluded that Airgas had met the Supreme Court’s empty 
standard for substantive coercion. 
                                                 
 311. The court quotes the CEO of Air Products as stating: 
[N]ow is the time to acquire Flashback [the code name for Airgas]—their business has yet to recover, the 
pricing window is favorable, and our ability (should we so choose) to offer an all-cash deal would be 
viewed very favorably in this market. To take advantage of the situation, we believe we will have to go 
public with our intentions. 
Id. at 68. 
 312. Id. at 57. 
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Like Quickturn, the timing in Airgas makes it difficult to link a crisis-related spike in 
idiosyncratic volatility to the potential for real substantive coercion. In this respect, the data 
falsifies the claim that a crisis-induced increase in idiosyncratic volatility might cause 
shareholders to err in whether to accept the hostile bid because the board possessed an unusually 
great knowledge advantage over the market. As in Quickturn, Figure 15 shows that the increase 
in Airgas’s idiosyncratic risk preceded the Air Products offer, by which time risk levels had 
returned to normal levels.313 This drop in idiosyncratic risk before the Air Products offer and the 
further delay in the offer as a result of the litigation, suggests that whatever potential there would 
have been for a successful substantive coercion claim if the offer had been made earlier, 
Chancellor Chandler’s instincts were right. Such a claim was no longer appropriate by the time 
of the Air Products offer and certainly not by the time the court issued its opinion. 
                                                 
 313. Airgas’s idiosyncratic risk increased again after Air Products made its offer. This presumably represents 
uncertainty for a considerable period of time concerning how high Air Products was willing to go and concerning 
the legal wrangling related to the offer. 
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Figure 15: Airgas Idiosyncratic Risk 
 
CONCLUSION 
Financial economics and associated econometric techniques have come to play a central role 
in corporate and securities law. This is hardly surprising since at its core, financial economics is 
concerned with the valuation of financial assets and at their core, corporate and securities law are 
concerned with establishing rules that facilitate value maximization. Both corporate law and 
securities law, in turn, depend on the relationship between market prices and value in formulating 
causes of action. In this chapter, we for the first time document and seek to explain a pattern that 
existing theory does not predict and existing empirical studies do not reveal: A spike in 
companies’ unsystematic risk has followed every economic crisis from the 1929 stock market 
crash to the 2008 to 2009 Great Recession. We consider the implications of this pattern for 
















































































































































































Air Products offer becomes public 
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for securities fraud and insider trading claims and for a central corporate law issue—the extent to 
which a target board of directors can prevent shareholders from accepting a hostile takeover. 
More generally we show the workings of what is not widely recognized as a tautology: Law and 
finance cannot operate independently since one seeks to explain the factors that dictate the value 
of financial assets and the other seeks to establish rules and institutions that facilitate creating 
that value. 
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Chapter 4 Does Capital Bear the Corporate Tax After All? New Evidence from U.S. 
Corporate Tax Returns  
 
I. Introduction 
 “We’ll cut business taxes massively. They’re going to start hiring people.”  
President Trump during the third 2016 presidential debate.  
 
In both academic and political discussions, the question of who bears the corporate tax 
remains stubbornly controversial. It is a matter of Republican orthodoxy that the corporate tax 
falls largely on working Americans by reducing investment at home, leading to fewer jobs and 
lower wages.
314
  The current administration and Congress seem likely to substantially cut the 
corporate tax with this as the stated reason.  Democrats have been more equivocal, but both 
major Democratic candidates in 2016 proposed raising additional revenue through the corporate 
tax.  Hillary Clinton proposed raising $275 billion through “business tax reform” to pay for 
infrastructure programs, ATLANTIC (Dec. 1, 2015), while Bernie Sanders wanted to raise 
corporate tax revenue substantially as part of making capital owners pay their “fair share.”315   
The academic debate too rages on more than fifty years after Arnold Harberger (1962) 
wrote his seminal article “The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax.”  Harberger showed 
that under certain assumptions in a closed economy with competitive markets, all capital owners 
bear the corporate tax burden in the long run.  More recent work on open economies, however, 
                                                 
314
 For example, all of the major Republican candidates in 2016 proposed reducing the corporate rate.  See Tax 
Foundation (2016); The same was true in 2012. See Tax Foundation (2012).  
315
 In 2012, the Democratic platform called for revenue-neutral corporate tax reform with a reduction in tax 
preferences paying for a lower statutory rate. See Democratic Platform (2012). 
  155 
offers very different predictions.  This research shows that in a small, open economy with 
perfectly mobile capital and competitive markets, workers must eventually bear the full burden 
of the corporate tax (see Gordon & Hines (2002)). This is because, unlike capital, workers cannot 
easily move across countries to escape the tax. Even adjusting for real world imperfections in 
capital mobility, scholars working in this line have estimated that American workers bear as 
much as 70% of the corporate tax.  The question of the burden of the corporate tax is particularly 
salient in the United States because the statutory corporate tax rate has remained at the same 
level for the last 30 years, while tax competition and other factors have caused most other 
developed countries to significantly cut their corporate tax rates (see Avi-Yonah (2000) on tax 
competition).   
The Treasury Department, which is the principal agency responsible for helping 
policymakers understand whether tax burdens are distributed fairly,
316
 has also used different 
models over time.  Prior to 2008, the Treasury assigned the entire corporate tax burden to capital 
owners as a whole.  The Treasury tacked in 2008, assigning part of the burden of the tax to labor 
to reflect changes in recent academic work.  The Treasury noted, however, that the tax could 
have very different effects depending on the source of taxable corporate income.  Some 
corporate income represents the “normal return to capital,” i.e., the return to savers just for the 
use of their money for a period of time.  Taxes on such income may be substantially passed on to 
American labor as capital flows out of the country to escape the tax.  By contrast, under a simple 
economic model, if a corporation earns “supernormal” returns through monopoly power or some 
                                                 
316
 The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) which also analyzes tax burdens for policymakers has largely 
thrown up its hands with respect to the corporate tax.  In one study in 1993 the JCT assigned the burden of the 
corporate tax to owners of corporate capital, but otherwise has generally refused to allocated the corporate tax 
burden due to uncertainty about on whom it falls.  This has created odd results, including that the JCT scored the 
revenue neutral 1986 Tax Reform Act—which decreased personal taxes and increased corporate taxes—as lowering 
taxes on all income groups (see Auerbach (2005)). 
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other non-reproducible advantage, taxes on this income are less likely to be passed on to labor.  
This is because these economic rents are so profitable that investors will not respond to tax 
increases on this income by shifting capital elsewhere.  Even after taxes, these economic rents 
constitute the investment with the highest return.  The Treasury, therefore, adopted a model 
which assigned 50% of taxes on the normal return to capital on to labor, but left 100% of taxes 
on supernormal income with the capital owners. (Cronin et al. 2013).
317
    
 This Article presents new empirical evidence from aggregate U.S. corporate tax return 
data from 1995-2013 on the composition of corporate taxable income between the normal return 
to capital and supernormal returns.  I show that the corporate tax raised only 4% more money 
than a hypothetical “R-base” cash flow tax with the same statutory rate. Under this tax, all 
business expenses can be immediately written off, including long lived assets like buildings and 
equipment.  In addition, all financial transactions are ignored: interest and dividends are not 
included in revenue, nor is interest deductible as an expense.  The 4% figure uses the same 
assumptions as a number of papers in the literature, but more conservative choices yield an 
average of about 21% of revenue generated from the normal return.   
I then explore the reasons why the tax appears to raise so little revenue from the normal 
return.  Almost certainly part of the explanation is the low risk-free rate, as proxied by the rate on 
Treasury bonds, during the second half of this period.  Nevertheless, even during the mid-1990’s 
when the risk-free rate was relatively high, only 20-30% of the tax was raised from the normal 
return, less than one might have otherwise predicted.
318
 Another factor driving down the tax 
                                                 
317
 As discussed below, the Treasury’s assumption that corporate taxes raised from economic rents falls entirely 
on the owners of corporate capital is likely too extreme.  Nevertheless, I employ this assumption in my analysis 
below, and one limitation of this chapter is that I reserve for further research the important question of empirically 
testing the Treasury’s assumption.    
318
 During this period, a tax at the statutory rate (35%) on the nominal risk-free normal return—as proxied by a 
10-year Treasury—to the book value of equity in C-corporations would have yielded revenue equal to 70-80% of 
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raised from the normal return is corporations’ increasing investment in intangible capital.  This 
kind of investment is largely given cash flow treatment under the corporate tax.  Thus, the tax 
exempts the normal return on an increasing fraction of corporate investment.  Using hand 
collected tax return data going back to 1957, I find that both decreases the risk-free rate and 
increases in investment in intangible capital are associated with declines in the portion of the 
corporate tax estimated to be raised from the normal return.   
The similarity of the hypothetical cash flow tax and the existing tax since 1995 has two 
important implications.  First, in aggregate, the corporate tax largely exempts the normal return 
to capital, and the burden instead initially falls on supernormal returns. The primary difference 
between a cash flow tax and the corporate income tax, is that an income tax is supposed to tax 
the normal, risk-free, return to capital.
 319
  The similarity of the revenue raised by the current tax 
and the cash flow tax shows that only a small percentage of the current tax is raised from the 
normal return to capital.  Therefore, using the Treasury’s model, capital owners bear nearly all 
the tax. This result differs from previous analyses done using the Treasury model which assign 
18-24% of the tax to labor.  Thus, while cutting the corporate tax may improve the performance 
of new and existing corporate equity, if the Treasury model is correct, it is unlikely to 
substantially increase wages or create jobs.  
Second, these results suggest that the U.S. could transition the corporate tax to a cash 
flow tax and enjoy a simpler and somewhat more efficient tax system without having to 
substantially raise the statutory rate in order to be revenue neutral. A rents tax would equalize the 
                                                                                                                                                             
actual corporate tax collections.  Likewise, a tax on the real risk-free normal rate of return would have raised about 
50% of actual corporate tax revenue.  
319
 I put aside the issue for now of whether the cash flow tax would also fall, in part, on the return to risk.  To 
the extent it does, it would do so in the same manner as the current tax.   Under the Treasury’s model taxes on the 
return to risk are also borne by capital owners (Cronin et al. 2013).  I return to this question in greater detail in Part 
VII, infra. 
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treatment of debt and equity.  This would reduce the use of debt financing and make the 
economic system more resilient and less prone to financial crises (Schularick & Taylor (2012). 
In addition, the average portion of tax raised from the normal return disguises significant 
differences across industries.  For industries which use primarily fixed, physical capital (e.g., 
mining or utilities), the portion of the corporate tax raised from the normal return can still be 
significant.  By contrast, in industries which use tax-preferred intangible assets, very little tax is 
raised from the normal return.  This leads to tax-favored firms investing in projects with lower 
pre-tax rates of return than projects rejected by tax-disfavored firms.  Correcting these 
inefficiencies by adopting a tax which uniformly exempts the normal rate of return would 
improve economic performance and likely raise wages.
320
 
Nevertheless, the relatively small difference in revenue raised by the hypothetical cash 
flow tax buttresses contentions that administrative complexity should be a first-order priority 
when deciding whether to switch to cash flow taxation (Weisbach 2004).  For example, a cash 
flow tax would eliminate the need to track and tabulate depreciation deductions which the 
Treasury estimates imply costs businesses on the order of $20 billion annually (Treasury 
2011).
321
   Yet the difficulty of taxing financial services firms under an R-base tax and of 
distinguishing real transactions from financial transactions suggests that the administrative gains 
should not be oversold.  
Two limitations of this study should be noted.  First, it is not clear Treasury’s assumption 
that 100% of taxes on supernormal returns stay with capital owners is justified.  In fact, it is 
likely some of these rents taxes will be shifted in the long run in an open economy (see Devereux 
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 Cutting the corporate tax rate reduces the size of the excess burden and therefore might increase wages, but 
the lost revenue must eventually be replaced with other distortionary taxes, and therefore the effect on after-tax 
wages is ambiguous.   
321
 Treasury estimates that Form 4562 requires 448 million hours annually to comply with.  
  159 
& Griffith 2003), although less than taxes on the normal rate of return.
322
  Because I nevertheless 
use the Treasury’s model, this pushes my results toward the tax falling on capital owners. 
Second, like past papers, my primary results do not adjust for problems with “loss offsets,” 
which firm receive when they lose money (IRC § 172). These offsets are worth significantly less 
than their face value because some firms do not generate enough profits to use the offsets to 
reduce their current and future taxes, and the offsets are neither indexed for inflation nor interest. 
The insufficiency of loss offsets will make some of the existing tax and a cash flow tax fall on 
the return to risk, and can make a cash flow tax actually fall partly on the normal return.  As a 
robustness check, I find that my methodology underestimates the percent of the current tax raised 
from the normal return by up to 10% due to the asymmetry of the tax code.   
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Part II gives an introduction to 
corporate tax incidence analysis and modifications of the traditional models to analyze open 
economies and imperfect competition; Part III explains why a cash flow tax exempts the normal 
return, while an income tax does not; Part IV discusses two approximate measures of how much 
tax is raised from the normal return; Part V describes how the hypothetical rents tax is 
constructed by replacing depreciation and amortization deductions with an immediate deduction 
for all new fixed investment and inventory, and by removing net-financial income from the tax 
base; Part VI presents the primary results showing that the rents tax would have raised only 4% 
less income than the current tax from 1995 to 2013; Part VII explores some of the implications 
of the results, and examines the reasons why the cash flow tax and the existing tax raise similar 
amounts of revenue; Part VIII concludes. 
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 The “incidence” estimated here, as in the Treasury model, is limited to estimating the distribution of the 
burden of taxes actually levied, and does not include an estimate of the size or distribution of the excess burden 
created by the corporate tax.  Note, however, that the estimates suggest most of the tax is raised from infra-marginal 
returns/economic rents or the return to risk.  As discussed below, taxes raised from these sources should have 
relatively low excess burden.   
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II.  LITERATURE  
Harberger Models  
The simplest model of corporate tax incidence concludes that the tax stays where it lands 
initially: on corporate shareholders in proportion to their ownership.
323
  Taxes frequently induce 
changes in behavior which shift the tax burden, however, and a more satisfying general 
equilibrium approach was proposed by Arnold Harberger in 1962.  Harberger analyzed a closed 
economy, with perfectly competitive corporate and non-corporate sectors each producing a 
different good, and fixed economy-wide amounts of labor and capital which could move freely 
across sectors.  Because there is perfect competition and constant returns to scale, Harberger 
precludes economic rents: all capital income is the normal return.
324
  Intuitively, the tax has two 
effects in this model.  First, corporations switch from using capital to using labor, reducing 
demand for capital.  This places a burden on capital owners by lowering the return to capital.  
Second, the cost of the good produced by corporations will rise, lowering demand, and shifting 
capital and labor out of the corporate sector.  This shift can also change who bears the tax 
burden, and its impact depends on a number of parameters.
325
  Using reasonable estimates of 
these parameters, Harberger concluded that capital in fact bore the entire tax in the U.S. over the 
long term.
326
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 As Auerbach (2005) observed, the direct ownership analysis is still useful because changes in the corporate 
tax often burden the owners of existing corporate capital in ways that cannot be shifted.  
324
 In this model, a tax on corporate capital’s economic income will cause capital to flow out of corporations 
into the non-corporate sector.  This in turn drives down the return to capital in the non-corporate sector until it is 
equal to the after-tax return in the corporate sector.  Thus, in the long run, the burden on corporate capital owners—
if there is any—must be the same as for owners of non-corporate capital since each will earn the same amount after 
taxes.    
325
 Namely the second effect depends on the relative capital-intensity of the corporate and non-corporate sector, 
the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in each sector, and the elasticity of demand for the goods 
produced by the sectors.  
326
 The Treasury model is confined to long-term incidence and so I also put aside questions about the tax burden 
during the transition to the long-run outcome.  Readers should note, however, that the transition period can be quite 
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Countless modifications to Harberger’s approach have been made, but the most relevant 
here are relaxing the assumption of a closed economy and perfect competition.  The importance 
of modeling international trade and capital flows has grown significantly during recent years.
327
  
If the assumption of no economic rents is retained, a Harberger-style model gives very different 
predictions when it is extended to a small open economy with perfectly mobile capital.  As 
Roger Gordon and Jim Hines (2002) summarize:  
In a small open economy a tax on the return to domestic capital has no effect on the rate 
of return available to domestic savers since the domestic interest rate is determined by the 
world capital market. Domestic investment falls in response to higher tax rates. For firms 
to continue to break even, in spite of the added tax, either output prices must rise or other 
costs must fall by enough to offset the tax. When output prices are fixed by competition 
with imports, the tax simply causes the market-clearing wage rate to fall. As a result, the 
burden of the tax is borne entirely by labor or other fixed domestic factors. 
Of course, actual conditions differ quite a bit from this model.  The U.S. is not a small economy 
whose policies will only negligibly affect world interest rates and goods prices. Moreover, 
capital is not perfectly mobile and the goods produced in the U.S. are not perfectly substitutable 
for those produced abroad.   
Scholars have reached quite different conclusions on who bears the burden of a corporate 
tax on the normal return to capital depending on how they account for these latter complications. 
For example, Jennifer Gravelle (2013) summarizes four of these studies, with one finding as 
much as 70% of this tax is borne by labor.  She observes that the studies with the largest 
estimates of labor’s burden do not account for at least one of the complexities discussed above.  
She argues that using the best estimates of limits on capital mobility, international product 
substitution, and the traditional parameters involved in the Harberger model, all of the studies 
                                                                                                                                                             
important.   
327
 For example, from 1987 to 2003 the value (at current cost) of private fixed capital in the U.S. grew at 5.3% 
per year from $10.7 trillion to $24.8 trillion, while U.S. owned assets abroad grew at 11% per year from $1.4 trillion 
to $7.4 trillion and likewise foreign owned U.S. assets grew by 11.5% per year from $1.4 trillion to $8.2 trillion 
(Auerbach (2005)). 
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would yield roughly that 40% of the U.S. corporate tax is borne by labor and 60% by capital.
 328
  
Citing Gravelle’s study and others like it, the Treasury model assumes that 50% of the tax on the 
normal return is borne by American labor.
 
(Cronin et al. 2013).     
Taxing Economic Rents  
Like adding the effect of international trade, relaxing the assumption of no economic 
rents appears to be increasingly important in analyzing the U.S. corporate tax burden.  In a 
closed economy, with neoclassical production functions and savings behavior, a tax on these 
rents is non-distortionary and has traditionally been found to be borne by the owners of corporate 
capital.
329
  Intuitively, investors will still invest in rent earning assets, which even after taxes, 
earn more than the normal return.  Therefore, the amount of capital invested and the allocation of 
that capital will not change if a tax on rents is introduced or increased.  Taxing these rents 
imposes no excess burden whether they result from declining returns to scale in a competitive 
market, or from market power held by firms with non-reproducible advantages like brand-names, 
know-how, or other intellectual property. Following these studies, the Treasury model assumes 
that 100% of taxes falling on economic rents stick with capital owners.
330
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 Other international studies have found similar tax burdens or higher burdens on labor, see, e.g., Desai, Foley, 
and Hines (2007); but see Suarez-Serrato & Zidar (2016) in the domestic setting.   
329
 Fane (1984), in response to Feldstein (1977), points out that for a tax on rents to be borne entirely by the 
rentiers, it must be analyzed “follow[ing] ‘the traditional practice in incidence analysis’ of considering compensated 
taxes.”  The Treasury model implicitly employs this assumption and I follow it here.   
In reality, of course, it is likely that this assumption does not hold, making a tax on rents accruing to the owners 
of corporate capital, equivalent to a compensated tax along with a lump sum transfer away from those owners.  This 
transfer can affect relative prices, in turn affecting the ultimate incidence of the tax.  Fane observes, however, that in 
many models “lump-sum redistributions of income do not affect relative prices. Even when they do, the incidence 
effect is often small relative to the size of the redistribution.”  Nevertheless, an additional avenue for further research 
would be to calibrate a model with representative agents to help us understand whether less (or indeed more) than 
100% of an uncompensated tax on rents accruing to the owners of corporate capital is borne by those owners.   
330
 Even in a closed economy, more complex models sometimes shift the burden of compensated rents taxes off 
the owner of the rent producing asset or find that a rents tax could be somewhat distortive.  For example, “where 
investors must either commit a large chunk of capital or none at all . . . taxes on pure rents may affect both the 
composition and level of investment” (Griffith, Hines, and Sørensen (2008)).  In addition, in more complicated 
models of imperfect competition, taxes on rents may also affect the size of the rents extracted (Davidson and Martin 
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 Moving to an open economy complicates the question of who bears taxes on rents.  Some 
economic rents earned by U.S. corporations are closely tied to the U.S. either because of natural 
resources or other immobile productive factors (e.g., key employees who will not move or 
agglomeration economies like Silicon Valley).  The effect of taxing these rents is covered by the 
traditional analysis described above.  Other rents, however, are firm-specific, like brand names, 
and may allow the firm to earn supernormal returns wherever it chooses to produce.  Taxing 
these rents may reduce domestic investment as firms move production abroad to escape the rents 
tax.
331
 This will lead to American labor bearing some of the tax on these rents, for the same 
reason as with taxes on the normal return in the open-economy Harberger-style models discussed 
above.    
Estimating the Portion of Corporate Taxes Raised from the Normal Return 
 There is a small body of literature which estimates how much of the corporate tax is 
raised from the normal return and how much from supernormal returns.  Roger Gordon and Joel 
Slemrod (1988) analyzed data from 1983 and concluded that a cash flow tax that exempted the 
normal rate of return would actually have raised more money than the existing tax, and thus that 
no money was raised that year from the normal return by the corporate tax. Gordon, Laura 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1985); Liu and Altshuler (2013)).  
 In addition, there may be “rent sharing” which allows labor to capture some economic rents which might 
otherwise flow to capital owners.  For example, high union wages in the auto industry from roughly 1950 to 1980 
are usually interpreted as rent sharing. See Alder et al. (2017).  In these cases, corporate taxes on economic rents 
may reduce the rents shared with labor and thus such taxes would fall in part on employees of the firm.  This may be 
true at the very high-end of the wage scale as well, because CEO compensation is likely partly rent-sharing. See 
Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva  (2014).       
331
 Although the U.S. has a world-wide system of taxation, it allows companies to defer taxation on the profit of 
foreign subsidiaries until they are repatriated, effectively lowering the rate on income earned by U.S. corporations in 
lower tax jurisdictions. 
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Kalambokidis, and Slemrod (2004a) (“GKS”) performed a similar calculation on data from 1995 
and concluded that moving to a cash flow tax would reduce corporate tax revenue by 16%.
332
  
In 2013, Julie-Anne Cronin, Emily Y. Lin, Laura Power, and Michael Cooper of the 
Treasury’s Office of Tax Analysis (OTA)—using somewhat different assumptions from GKS—
and data from 1999-2001, 2004, and 2007 concluded that 37% of the tax fell on the normal 
return.  Since then, Treasury has distributed the corporate tax burden using this analysis, 
assigning 18% (37%∙50%) of the tax to labor. Most recently, Power and Frerick (2016) used the 
Cronin et al. methodology to examine 1991-2013 and find that supernormal returns as a portion 
of taxable income are increasing over the period ranging from 60% at the start of the period to 
75% at the end.  As discussed in detail below, most of the differences between the GKS results 
and those of Cronin et al. are attributable to the assumptions used in calculating the changes to 
the R-base and which summary figure the authors use to approximate the portion of the tax 
raised from the normal return.  
III. CASH FLOW TAXATION AS A TAX ON ECONOMIC RENTS 
In simple models, a textbook cash flow tax on businesses initially falls only on economic 
rents and thus does not distort marginal investments, while a textbook income tax falls both on 
economic rents and the normal risk-free return to capital. Many readers are familiar with these 
results. Those readers should feel free to skim this section.  I briefly review these results below.  
All the models discussed are highly stylized.  They provide a background for 
understanding how constructing a hypothetical cash flow tax can help to separate out how much 
of the current tax is raised from the normal return to capital.  I reserve until later a discussion of 
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 Gordon et al. (2004b) also makes a similar calculation for 2004, but using 2000 data adjusted for changes in 
profits and investment finding switching to an R-Base would have lowered revenue from non-financial C-corps by 
$55 billion. Laura Kalambokidis’ (unpublished 1991) dissertation examines the period from 1975-1986 using 
somewhat different assumptions.   
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how additional complexities, most importantly, risk and the absence of fully refundable tax 
losses, affect my conclusions.     
A firm will invest in any project in which the project’s (properly discounted) income 
stream meets or exceeds its cost.  For the moment, assume that there is no risk and no taxation.  
Let us also assume that a project will end in year T and be worthless at that point, and the project 
costs $1, all paid in period 0, and e1…eT is the stream of income the project produces, and r is the 
risk-free discount rate. The firm (or representative shareholder) will invest if  ∑
𝑒𝑡
(1+𝑟)𝑡
≥ 1𝑇𝑡=1 .  
The lowest value project the firm will be willing to invest in earns ∑
𝑒𝑡
(1+𝑟)𝑡
= 1𝑇𝑡=1 . Such a 
project is worth exactly the value of the opportunity cost of the project, which is lending at the 
risk-free rate, r.  This is the “marginal” project if the firm has many projects to choose from.  
Note that in a perfectly competitive world with constant returns to scale, all the projects a firm 
can invest in will be like the marginal project, in which the return on the project is exactly equal 
to its costs.  This means that there are no economic rents.   
 Moving out of the tax-free world, it has long been understood that under certain 
conditions a tax on real cash flows does not distort marginal investment decisions (Carey Brown 
1948). Such a tax gives an immediate deduction for the full cost of the project in period 0 and no 
depreciation deductions are available later.  Assuming the tax is refundable, or that the firm has 
other income to be offset by the deduction, the firm’s marginal investment decision looks exactly 
as it did in the world where it ignored taxes.  Intuitively, if τ is the tax rate, the government 
becomes a full partner in the project by providing τ percent of the initial capital investment and 
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More formally, earnings in each period are reduced by τ∙et, where τ is the tax rate, but the 




𝜏), while the cost of the project is now (1- τ).  Hence for the marginal project, the firm’s calculus 
is the same after-taxes as without taxes because the after-tax earnings on the marginal project are 
exactly equal to its after-tax cost: ∑
𝑒𝑡
(1+𝑟)𝑡
 (1 − 𝜏)𝑇𝑡=1 = (1 − 𝜏) ↔ ∑
𝑒𝑡
(1+𝑟)𝑡
= 1𝑇𝑡=1  .  Note that 
the government raises no revenue from this tax in real terms on marginal projects, which the 
reader will recall earns, r, the risk-free rate.  The government gives a subsidy of τ and over time 
collects revenue with a present value of τ.
334
  Thus the normal, risk-free return to capital is 




= 1 + 𝑛𝑇𝑡=1 , the government will collect τ∙n, where n > 0 is the value of the economic 
rent.  Government revenue is worth, in present value, τ∙(1+n) and it provides a subsidy of τ. 
Firms will still invest in all such rent earning projects, however, because after taxes the projects 
still have a positive net present value.     
 Unlike a cash flow tax, an income tax requires firms to gradually write off assets which 
last longer than one year.  These long-lived assets include fixed capital goods like equipment and 
structures.  In addition, payments for: training employees, executives engaged in long-term 
strategy, R&D, development of customer relationships, advertising, and other ways of building 
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 This result can also be thought of as involving a “gross up” where the immediate deductibility of investment 
allows a firm to invest τ more than it could originally, and this second investment generates a subsidy of τ2 and so 
on, which, when the infinite stream is summed, equals 
1
(1−𝜏)
.  Such a subsidy is assumed to be put into marginal 
projects since all rent producing projects will have already been fully exploited.   
334
 Recall the present value of the earnings stream for the marginal project is 1.  The government gets τ percent 
of those earnings in each period through the tax. The tax revenue thus has a present value of 1∙ τ.   
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good will benefit the firm over a period of multiple years and would be deducted over time under 
an ideal income tax. Nevertheless, these expenses are immediately deductible in full under the 
existing Code.   
Capitalized assets do eventually stop producing income for the firm and thus decline in 
value over time.  We can represent this yearly depreciation by comparing the change in the value 
of the project in year t relative to its value in the previous year. In symbols: Depreciationt = Vt-
Vt-1, where Vt is the project’s value in period t.
335
  In equilibrium, the value of holding onto the 
project for another period must match the value of selling the project and investing in the safe 
asset.  Thus (1- τ) ∙ (et + Vt-Vt-1) = rVt-1.  Note, here r is now the after tax risk-free rate.  Given 
that VT = 0, this implies (1- τ) ∙ (et +0-VT-1) = rVT-1, which can be rewritten as VT-1 = eT/(1 +
𝑟
(1−𝜏)
).  Repeating this process backward, we can write the value in any period as 0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 as: 












Thus the firm will use 
𝑟
(1−𝜏)
 as its discount rate (or cost of capital) and the marginal project under 
the income tax must earn on average a return of 
𝑟
(1−𝜏)
 because the income tax taxes risk-free rate 
of return.
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.   
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 Note, however, that r, as the after-tax risk-free rate, may be a function of τ as well. If 
𝑟
(1−𝜏)
 is unaffected by 
τ—because r falls exactly as τ rises—then the income tax will not affect investment decisions.  Even in this case, 
however, the government will still raise revenue from the normal return to capital. 
337
 For simplicity, the way I have written (1- τ) ∙ (et + Vt-Vt-1) = rVt-1 assumes that the value of the rent 
producing asset in the firm’s hands rises from 1 to 1+n— where n is the present value of the rent—immediately 
upon purchase and this increase of n is immediately taxed.  Nothing turns on this assumption, however.      
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 In reality, the U.S. corporate tax is a hybrid of an income tax and a cash flow tax because 
it allows companies to expense a portion or all of the purchase price of long-lived assets, rather 
than requiring them to fully capitalize the assets.  As discussed below, R&D, payments to 
executives to engage in long-term planning, advertising and other expenses which build good 
will, and employee training probably exceed 50% of total business investment in long-lived 
assets, yet are immediately expensed under the Code.  In addition, in order to encourage 
investment, Congress has provided for “bonus depreciation” for 11 of the past 15 years.  This has 
allowed firms to immediately expense 30-100% of the purchase price of qualifying equipment, 
depending on the year.  The 2015 PATH Act extended bonus depreciation through 2019 and to 
me “bonus” appears to be the new normal.  Moreover, even without bonus depreciation, the 
Code’s standard depreciation system (MACRS) is designed to allow firms to recover 
depreciation deductions faster than economic depreciation takes place (Margalioth 2007).   




where (1-σ) is the fraction of the project initially expensed, and the firm is allowed to take σ 
percent of the economic depreciation as a deduction thereafter.
338
  This has the effect of roughly 
exempting (1-σ) percent of the normal rate of return from tax.  Intuitively it can be thought of as 
allowing (1-σ) percent of any investment to be taxed under a cash flow regime, while the 
remaining σ percent of the project is taxed using an income tax.  Rents are still taxed at τ since 
both types of taxes raise τ per dollar of economic rents.  As the fraction initially expensed goes to 
1, the tax system converges to the cash flow outcome.   
I turn now to empirically estimating how much of the corporate tax is raised from the 
normal return to capital. 
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 The derivation is more complicated than for a pure income tax and I do not show it here.  A full exposition 
can be found in Auerbach (1983). 
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IV. HOW MUCH OF THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX IS RAISED FROM THE NORMAL RETURN TO 
CAPITAL? TWO APPROXIMATIONS 
 Over the last twenty years both the nominal and real risk-free rate have declined 
substantially, without a matching decrease in corporate income.  Thus, even if the U.S. corporate 
tax was a textbook income tax, the portion of corporate tax revenue raised from the normal 
return to capital would have fallen.  I illustrate this point using two related methodologies.   
 First, following William Gentry and Glenn Hubbard, I approximate the portion of U.S. 
corporate income attributable to the normal return to capital by comparing the return to 10-year 
government bonds with the returns to equity in public companies. Gentry and Hubbard 
calculated that over the 1980s stocks returned 16.5% annually after including dividends and 
capital gains.  They assumed firms paid on average an effective tax rate of 25%, and therefore 
grossed up corporate equity returns by this amount for a total of 22% per year (=16.5%/0.75).  
Over the same period, they found that (approximately) riskless Treasury bonds had returned 
10%.  They therefore concluded that about 45% (10%/22%) of the return to corporate equity was 
attributable to the normal return and the rest to rents or risk and likewise that about 45% of the 
current corporate tax was raised from the normal return to capital.  The Treasury used Gentry 
and Hubbard’s figures when distributing the corporate tax in the years 2008 to 2011 (Cronin et 
al. 2013).  I update these figures below in Table 7: 
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Table 7: 
Corporate Returns Attributable to the Normal Return to Capital 
Using Gentry and Hubbard Method 
 
           
 Period  Annual Nominal Return   Corporate Return  
 Start  End  Stocks
1 
 Risk-Free Rate
2  Attributable to Normal Return   
 1980  1989  23.47%  10.58%  45%  
 1995  2013  13.14%  4.47%  34%  
 1995  2002  14.16%  5.74%  41%  
 2003  2013  12.41%  3.55%  29%  
 1965  2015  13.09%  6.51%  50%  
1 
Using the Center for Research in Security Prices total return index which is the return on a market-cap 
 weighted average of all stocks trading on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX, including dividends. The  
 return is then grossed up by 25% to account for corporate taxes paid as in Gentry and Hubbard.  
2 
Defined as based on the 10-year T-bill rate.  For each year, the risk-free return is based on the average  
 10-year T-bill rate during that year.  Data are from the St. Louis Federal Reserve (FRED).  
From 1995 to 2013, the period covered by this Article, the risk-free rate made up 34% of 
the rate of return on public corporate equities.  This is noticeably less than the 45% seen during 
the 1980s, which in turn was close to the 50% average figure for the last 50 years.  In addition, 
the real return, rather than the nominal return, is arguably the more relevant figure.
339
  During 
1995-2013, the real normal return was only 22.5% of real corporate equity returns, compared 
with 35% from 1980-1989 and 34% from 1965 to 2015.   
Although Gentry and Hubbard’s technique provides a convenient way to approximate the 
portion of corporate income accounted for by the normal return to capital, I prefer not to interpret 
it as the percent of corporate taxes raised from the normal return.  This is because it does not 
account for how the corporate tax differs from a textbook income tax with full capitalization of 
all long-lived assets and no accelerated depreciation.
340
   
                                                 
339
 An ideal income tax would tax only real income, not nominal income. The corporate tax does, however, tax 
some nominal gains resulting from inflation by not indexing tax basis for inflation, although this effect is partially 
offset by the deductibility of nominal interest.  See Auerbach (1983).    
340
 Moreover, this technique is quite sensitive to stock market booms and busts.  For example, ending the period 
of study at the end of 2008 during the financial crisis yields the normal return making up 54% of total corporate 
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Second, I examine how much an ideal income tax would raise from the normal riskless 
rate of return for non-financial C-corporations and compare this with actual corporate tax 
revenue from these firms from 1994 to 2013.  I do so by calculating the book value of these C-
corporations reported to the IRS and multiplying it by the nominal risk-free rate.
341
  I apply the 
statutory 35% rate of the current corporate tax. The results are presented in Figure 16: 
Figure 16: Corporate Taxes on Non-Financial C-Corps   
vs. Tax on Normal Rate of Return 
 
 During the first half of the period (1994-2003), a 35% tax on the nominal normal return 
would have made up on average 79% of the actual corporate tax raised.  During the second half, 
it would have composed 48%.  The average over the full period was 64%.  The decline in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
returns —far more, rather than far less—than the 1980s figure.   
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importance of the normal rate of return is even more apparent using the real, instead of the 
nominal, return.  The relevant figures are 46% for the first half and 15% for the second.   
Although these are approximate calculations, they give us a sense of the upper bound for how 
much less a cash flow tax might raise than the existing tax, as well helping us to see how the 
importance of the normal return has declined over the last twenty years.   
V. R-BASE CASH FLOW TAX—METHODOLOGY 
One way to implement a cash flow tax is to levy a tax on the firm’s cash flow in real 
transactions, while ignoring financial transactions for tax purposes.  This is an “R-base” tax as 
outlined in the Meade Report of 1978. Under such a tax businesses can immediately deduct all 
real expenses, but cannot deduct interest or dividends paid.  On the other hand, firms do not 
include interest or dividends received in gross income.  All of the most recent attempts to 
measure how much the corporate tax raises from the normal return to capital (Gordon et al., 
Cronin et al., Power and Frerick) construct an R-base and I do the same.   Moreover, the current 
administration proposal for changes to the corporate tax is an R-base variant with immediate 
expensing of physical capital for five years and limits on interest deductibility. While an R-base 
tax has the advantage of simplicity, it provides no easy way to tax financial intermediaries, 
because most of the revenue that these firms collect for their services is embedded in financial 
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flows.
342
  Therefore, like GKS and Cronin et al., I confine my attention to non-financial 
corporations.
343
   
I start by applying the same assumptions GKS used, but extending their analysis over the 
1995-2013 period using aggregate tax data.
344
  Although I use the GKS assumptions, I do not use 
the same summary measure of the portion of the tax raised from the normal return.  Instead I use 
the measure from Cronin et al. to make my results comparable to those used in the Treasury 
model. This figure measures the change in revenue associated with expensing productive capital 
(except land) divided by the total taxable income generated by real activities:   
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑡 + 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑡 – 𝑁𝑒𝑤 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑠𝑡𝑡– Δ𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑡−1,𝑡 
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡 − 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐹𝑖𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑡
 
This proxy is adapted from Toder and Reuben (2007), and is designed to roughly account for 
both debt and equity funded corporate projects, without having to explicitly examine how 
interest paid by corporations to individuals or partnerships (or financial corporations) is taxed.  It 
can be thought of as an estimate of the portion of the current tax which would be raised from the 
normal return if all corporate projects were entirely equity funded and corporations had no net 
                                                 
342
 Additional problems are raised by the difficulty in separating the embedded interest component in leases, 
seller-financed transactions, or royalty arrangements.  Countries using Value Added Taxes (VATs) face these 
problems as well and the treatment of leases appears to vary depending on the property in question (equipment, 
fixed residential property, fixed commercial property, or services/intangibles) and the lease terms (whether the lease 
is an “operating lease” in which the lessee returns the property to the lessor at the end of the term, or a  “finance 
lease” in which the property will be sold at the end of the term with the proceeds largely going to the lessee).  It is 
not feasible to separate interest embedded in lease and royalty payments in the corporate tax data provided in the 
Statistics of Income used in this study.   
343
 One way to deal with the problems raised by financial firms under an R-base tax is to tax all businesses on 
real and financial cash flows, known as a R+F base in the terminology of the Meade Report (see AUERBACH, A 
MODERN CORPORATE TAX (2010) for a proposal to use an R+F base for all businesses).  Or, as with the proposed 
“Growth and Investment Tax Plan,” one could imagine a system where only financial firms would could be required 
to use R+F accounting.  See Cunningham and Engler (2012).  I do not believe, however, the effect of moving to 
such a tax can be calculated from public tax data. 
In the Appendix Table 3A-2 I include a rough calculation comparing an income tax to an R+F tax by 
looking at how NIPA R+F cash flows compare with NIPA book profits for non-financial corporations. I find that on 
average from 1945-2015 an R+F base has been about 20% smaller than book profits, but that relationship is reversed 
over the last decade with the R+F base being about 20% larger.  
344
 Both GKS and Cronin et al. methods require that capital grows at the real rate of interest to be accurate.   
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financial income.
 345
 The downside of using this figure is that the “base” it uses in the 
denominator may be quite different from the actual tax base.  For example, the corporate tax 
places little or no burden on debt funded projects with individual lenders, but these projects are 
given equal weight with equity funded projects in this proxy.  In Appendix Table 3A-3, 
therefore, I also present figures based on the estimate of the change in revenue from shifting to 
the R-base tax divided by the current amount of tax revenue raised, which is the summary figure 
used in GKS.      
To calculate the numerator, I replace depreciation, amortization, and depletion deductions—
the corporate tax code’s mechanisms for the gradual cost recovery for capitalized assets—with 
immediate expensing of all new fixed investment.
346
 In addition, I allow firms to immediately 
expense the cost of producing inventory.  Under existing law, inventory is capitalized until sold.  
In adding these new deductions for immediate expensing and eliminating deductions 
associated with gradual cost recovery, the methodology makes no distinction between firms with 
positive net income and “deficit firms” (i.e. those with losses).  In other words, giving a deficit 
firm a new deduction is treated the same way as giving a new deduction of the same size to a 
firm with net income, and vice-versa for removing existing deductions for gradual cost recovery.  
                                                 
345
 Holding fixed behavior, GKS look at both the change in revenue of implementing an R-base corporate tax 
and from shifting individual income taxation to a consumption tax.  Because GKS examine both the corporate and 
the individual side, they can control for the net effect of not taxing the normal return at either the corporate or 
individual level.  Using the GKS measure, but looking at only the corporate tax will miss tax placed on the normal 
return to corporate projects through taxing interest paid by corporations to individuals and partnerships.    
 
346
 I measure new fixed investment using BEA Table 4.7, which gives estimates for investment in structures and 
equipment for non-financial corporations.  I then adjust this figure to account for the fact that the BEA includes S-
Corps in this figure, by multiplying by the ratio of non-financial C-corp depreciation deductions to total depreciation 
deductions of non-financial C and S-Corps.  
I also adjust for differences in coverage between the BEA’s definition of fixed investment and what is 
depreciable under the Tax Code by using BEA Table 7.13 (e.g. treatment of foreign branches etc.).  My measure of 
investment differs slightly from Gordon et al., who use the Commerce Department’s “Annual Capital Expenditures” 
survey.  BEA Table 4.7 uses data from that survey but also uses other sources.   
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This can cause the methodology to over or understate the effect switching to expensing would 
have, holding fixed behavior, on actual tax revenues in a world without full refundability.
347
     
To calculate the denominator, I remove from the existing tax base net financial flows: by (1) 
removing taxable interest received from the base,
348
 (2) adding interest deductions back to the 
base, and (3) removing domestic dividends (net of the dividends received deduction).
349
  
Following Cronin et al., I also remove all foreign dividends, including constructive dividends 
from controlled foreign corporations from the tax base.
350
  Finally, I remove all capital gains and 
losses as well as other gains and losses.
351
   
One potential complication—as observed in Slemrod (2007)—is that the method of 
comparing the actual tax to a hypothetical R-base tax to understand the tax placed on the normal 
                                                 
347
 If, on net, new deductions are disproportionately concentrated in deficit firms, then my methodology will 
likely overstate the cost of switching to expensing in terms of tax revenue.  In fact, deficit firms do appear to receive 
a slightly disproportionate share of new expensing deductions.  For example, depreciation makes up 2.6% of 
deductions of firms with net income, but 3.5% of deductions in deficit firms in 2013.   On the other hand, as 
discussed below, deficit firms present a problem for expensing because imperfect loss offsets can cause even a cash 
flow tax to fall partially on the normal return to capital.   
348
 I exclude interest from state and local bonds since that interest is not taxed. See IRC § 103. 
349
 For domestic dividends, the amount “removed” from the base is smaller than the gross size of domestic 
dividends, because I adjust for the “dividends received deduction.” See IRC § 243.  Companies owning less than 
20% of the dividend paying company receive a 70% deduction, those owning more than 20% but less than 80% 
receive an 80% deduction, and those owning more than 80% of the dividend paying firm receive a 100% deduction.  
On average over the period this meant that almost exactly 80% of gross domestic dividends were deductible. See 
SOI Table 20 for years 1995-2013.   
350
 Only a relatively small tax is collected on repatriated foreign dividends as a result of the accompanying 
foreign tax credits.  However, if the tax base is measured starting from “Income Subject to Tax” as reported in the 
Statistics of Income, this figure includes the gross amount of foreign dividends without any adjustment for 
accompanying foreign tax credits. Thus, to reach an estimate of domestic C-corp taxable income attributable to real 
activities, the gross foreign dividends should arguably be removed from “Income Subject to Tax.” 
I say arguably only because the “Income Subject to Tax” is understated compared to actual income from 
real domestic activities because of profit shifting by multinational corporations.  The empirical importance of profit 
shifting out of the U.S. is hotly contested, see Dharmapala (2015), but taking a semi-elasticity of 0.8 with respect to 
tax rate differentials, profit shifting will have a significant effect on the measured “Income Subject to Tax” net of 
financial income.  See Power and Frerick (2016).   
351
 Under a cash flow tax, the sale of used assets is immediately taxable in full to the seller, but the buyer gets an 
immediate deduction, with exactly offsetting consequences if both firms are taxable corporations with net income.  
Thus, expensing all new investment and eliminating all capital and non-capital gains should lead to the same 
outcome as expensing both new and used assets and including the sale of used assets in the seller’s taxable income.  
I use the first strategy.  Note, however, that this can create problems for sales of used assets into and out of the 
corporate sector.   
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return to capital relies on the corporate capital stock growing at the rate of interest.  If capital 
grows slower than the rate of interest, the method will understate the portion of the tax raised 
from the normal return and vice-versa if corporate capital is growing more quickly than the risk 
free interest rate.  Putting aside operating deductions, recall that deductions under a textbook 
income tax will be δtKt-1 where δt is the average economic depreciation of corporate capital in 
period t, and Kt-1 is corporate capital in t-1.  Under the cash flow tax, the relevant deductions are 
equal to new capital purchased in period t, which is equal to (δt + αt)Kt-1 where αt is the growth 
rate of corporate capital in period t.  For the difference between the cash flow and income taxes 
to be the tax on the normal return to capital, αt must equal rt, where rt is the normal risk-free 
return.  
In the extreme, we can see the potential for understatement by imagining a text-book 
corporate income tax in a risk-free world, in which all corporate projects are equity funded, earn 
the normal return, r, and Kt depreciates at rate δ, but αt =0 and thus Kt = Kt-1 because It = δKt-1.  
In this world, the textbook corporate income tax imposed in period t will raise τ∙r∙K and 100% of 
the tax is raised from the normal return.  Applying the GKS method outlined above, however, to 
period t will yield that 0% of the tax comes from the normal return, because new investment It 
exactly equals economic depreciation allowed by the income tax (δ Kt-1), and hence the cash 
flow tax would raise exactly the same amount as the income tax or τ∙r∙K. 352   
One way to deal with this problem is to adjust for the difference between the rate of capital 
growth based on new capital purchases (net of depreciation) and the risk free rate.  In the two-
period example, in period t, It =  δKt-1 and thus α =0, and the additional deduction under the 
                                                 
352
 Under a hybrid income tax, where certain types of capital (e.g., intangible capital) K1 can be immediately 
expensed, while other types of capital, K2, still require capitalization, it is the growth rate of K2 which must match 
the interest rate for the GKS method to be accurate.  The relevant correction if α2 does not equal r, is (r- α2)K2,t-1.
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modified cash flow tax would be (r – α)Kt-1 = r Kt-1 = rK.
353
  Thus the adjusted cash flow tax 
would raise 0, as it should.  The difficulty here is in the measurement.  Small changes in how 
either capital growth or the interest rate are measured can lead to very large adjustments once the 
figure is multiplied by the entire capital stock, indeed enough to swamp the other factors.  I 
present one set of estimates below, but emphasize that it is highly sensitive to the assumptions 
used.  If we are prepared to deal with a reduced sample, another way to deal with this problem is 
simply to focus on years in which capital growth closely matches the risk-free interest rate.  
  
                                                 
353
 An equivalent method is suggested in Kalambokidis (1991) in which a corporation prior to the first period of 
analysis is given full expensing for a deemed “purchase” of all of its capital, and at the end of the last period is taxed 
on a deemed sale of its capital. In the two-period example above, the cash flow tax will provide full deductions for 
the capital stock at the end of period t-1, at a cost to the Treasury of τ∙(1+r)∙K in terms of period t dollars, it will then 
collect τ∙r∙K on cash flows in period t, and τ K on the deemed sale of capital at the end of period t. In total the 
adjusted cash flow tax now correctly raises $0 in real terms.     
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VI. RESULTS 
Figure 17: Portion of Corporate Tax Lost Switching to Cash Flow Taxation 
1995-2013 
 
Figure 17 displays the main results.  Using the GKS assumptions (the blue solid line with square 
markers), the average portion of the corporate tax raised from the normal return is 4% over the 
1995-2013 period.  The periods during which the line is positive indicates that the estimated cash 
flow tax would raise more money than the existing tax.  This can happen during poor economic 
times when businesses run down inventory (generating larger inventory deductions than 
immediate expensing of inventory) and bonus depreciation reduces or eliminates the difference 
between cash flow and actual tax treatment of new equipment investment.
354
  The other two lines 
                                                 
354
 I use a five-year running average to make the patterns on the graph easier to view, but this decision makes 



























GKS Assumptions Adj 1: Leave Amort and Depletion
Adj 2: Remove Effects of Bonus Depr.
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represent cumulative steps in moving toward the Cronin et al. assumptions.   Each line further 
down the chart includes the previous adjustments.      
Adjustment 1, (the dotted light blue line) does not remove depletion and amortization 
deductions in moving to the R-base.  The average portion of the tax raised from the normal 
return under this assumption is 21%.  This roughly follows what Cronin et al. do: they retain 
depletion for taxing natural resource extraction and make only small changes for expensing what 
are now amortizable assets.
355
 GKS by contrast assume that no additional adjustment must be 
made to the investment figures to accurately proxy investment in new depletable or amortizable 
assets.  There are advantages to each approach.   
Intangible assets typically need only be capitalized and recovered through amortization 
when they are purchased from third parties (Kahng 2014).  Thus, these assets can be thought of 
like sales of “used” physical capital assets as discussed above in note 351, and dealt with by 
eliminating all capital gains.  In addition, amortization includes some physical assets —e.g., IRC 
§ 169 (pollution control devices), § 1400I (structures in revitalization neighborhoods)—which 
are covered in the investment data.  In these cases, eliminating the associated amortization 
deductions is the appropriate treatment.  Likewise, for depletion, depletable exploration costs are 
already covered in the investment data.  Moreover, firms which use percentage depletion may 
take a deduction which exceeds their basis in the property and thus can be more favorable than 
expensing.
356
  These arguments favor removing amortization and depletion in calculating the 
shift to the R-base as GKS do.  On the other hand, the Cronin approach is more conservative, 
                                                 
355
 Cronin et al. expense assets amortizable under § 197 (acquired intangibles) and software. 
356
 The Treasury estimates that “excessive” percentage depletion was a roughly $1.6 billion tax expenditure for 
corporations in 2013 (Treasury 2013) out of a total of $8.9 billion of would-be tax revenue which is shielded by 
depletion deductions ($25.4 billion of deductions * .35).  This suggests that depletion is more favorable than 
expensing if 5% is the interest rate and the average resource is fully depleted within 8 years.  
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largely leaving amortization and depletion in place where the initial investment associated with 
those deductions cannot be calculated reliably enough from the tax data.      
Second, Cronin et al. strip out the effect of “bonus depreciation.”  I have roughly made 
this calculation in Adjustment 2 (the dashed orange line with circular markers).
357
 Reasonable 
minds can differ here, but I believe not trying to remove the effects of bonus depreciation is the 
better choice. By allowing the immediate expensing of a large portion of the purchase price of 
many long-lived physical assets, bonus depreciation makes the current tax much closer to a cash 
flow tax.  Moreover, it has been in place for 11 of the last 15 years and therefore it appears to me 
to be something more like a permanent feature of the Tax Code that we must account for.   
Figure 18 presents an analysis adjusting for differences between the rate of growth of 
physical capital (investment in structures, equipment, and inventories net of depreciation) 
compared to the risk-free rate proxied by the 5-year constant maturity Treasury rate.   
  
                                                 
357
 I assume that the average MACRS depreciation length for all bonus depreciation eligible equipment is 7 
years as in Cronin et al. 2013.   
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Figure 18: Portion of Corporate Tax Lost Switching to Cash Flow Taxation 
1992-2013 
 
When measured using these assumptions, adjusting for capital growth increases the portion of 
the tax raised from the normal return, particularly in the earlier part of the analysis.  Again, I 
emphasize, however, that this pattern is partly dependent on which measures are chosen.  Using 
the theoretically equivalent method outlined in note 353, the portion of the tax raised from the 
normal return is reduced in nearly all periods and is negative (the adjusted cash flow tax raises 
more revenue than the existing tax) for most of the 2000s. Likewise, if shorter maturity Treasury 
notes should be used to approximate the risk free rate—since 5-year notes will likely build in 
some inflation risk—adjusting for capital growth reduces the portion of the tax raised from the 



























Adj 1: Leave Amort and Depletion
Adj 2a: Adjusting for Capital Growth Rate (but not bonus deprec)
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VII. EXPLANATION AND COMMENTARY 
 In this section I briefly explain again the two important conclusions that can be drawn 
from my analysis: (1) that under the Treasury’s model, the whole corporate tax burden falls on 
capital owners, and (2) that the U.S. could transition to a simpler, more efficient, cash flow tax 
without sacrificing revenue.  I then discuss whether risk premiums and imperfect loss offsets 
could drive the similarity of the revenue of the cash flow tax and the current tax. I argue that this 
is unlikely for risk. Controlling for imperfect loss offsets does make a noticeable difference. I 
believe, however, that the primary explanation for the similarity of the two taxes comes from a 
low real normal return combined with the fact that the Tax Code allows many long-lived 
expenses like R&D, employee training, advertising, etc. to be immediately written off.   
Although corporate taxes make up a relatively small share of the federal budget (11% in 
2015), changes to the corporate tax often make up an important part of revenue legislation, as 
with the Tax Reform Act of 1986, among others (Auerbach 2005).  The results above show that 
under the Treasury’s model, the full corporate tax over the last 20 years should be assigned to 
capital owners.  Even under more conservative assumptions (Adjustment 2), only 10% of the tax 
should be assigned to labor.  This differs from previous analyses used by the Treasury and is 
important for evaluating the distributional effects of cutting the corporate tax which seems likely 
to occur in the next year.  As noted in the introduction, if the Treasury’s model is right this cut 
may increase the performance of new and existing corporate equities, but it will not spark a 
substantial uptick in domestic hiring or wages.    
The evidence also suggests that we could move to a cash flow tax focused on economic 
rents without having to significantly increase statutory rates or give up revenue.   It has generally 
been assumed that a cash flow tax would raise less money and therefore require higher tax rates 
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to be revenue neutral (see Auerbach 2010).  Raising rates is politically unpopular because it is 
difficult to explain to the public that the higher rate is balanced by a narrower base.  Moreover, 
as discussed above, some economic rents are firm-specific and taxing these rents at a high rate 
will drive investment out of the U.S.
358
  Thus, it is important that the benefits of cash flow 
taxation are available without needing to raise the statutory rate or even to eliminate various 
politically thorny corporate tax expenditures like the domestic production activities deduction.  
Switching to a cash flow tax would eliminate significant “excess burdens” imposed by 
the current tax.  First, different industrial sectors are taxed unevenly depending on the mix of 
assets they use in production.  Indeed, sectors which use relatively little fixed capital (structures 
and equipment) and instead rely on human capital and intellectual property may actually find 
debt financed investment subsidized by the Tax Code on the margin.
359
 These problems would 
be eliminated under an R-base cash flow tax. Moreover, an R-base cash flow tax would eliminate 
the Tax Code’s preference for debt over equity.  This would lead to less leverage in the economy 
which would make it more resilient to financial crises.  Last, cash flow taxes are widely regarded 
as simpler because they do not require complex depreciation schedules and the concomitant 
accounting by corporations.  As noted in the introduction the Treasury estimates that businesses 
spend over 450 million hours tracking and calculating depreciation.   
                                                 
358
 Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter, taxing such rents using a destination basis rather than 
keeping the traditional source basis for the cash flow tax would likely alleviate this problem. See, for example, the 
2016 House Republican plan for international tax reform, which was subsequently abandoned.  Switching to a 
destination basis, however, comes with its own set of concerns: it is untested anywhere in the world, there are 
questions about its WTO compliance, and it will create large swings in the U.S. dollar (see Cunningham and Engler 
(2012)). 
359
 These businesses get essentially both the immediate expensing of long lived assets and deductibility of 
interest.  For projects earning the normal return, in order to recover the original investment subsidy provided by 
immediate expensing, the government must collect τ% of future income from the project.  By allowing for interest 
deductibility on top of immediate expensing the government will collect less than τ% of the earnings. We should 
note, however, that the government should recover something like the missing interest deduction by the inclusion of 
interest income by the lender.   
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The administrative case for an R-base cash flow tax is not so straightforward, however.  
Complex as the current code is, it is a devil we know.  Implementing a variant of an R-base tax 
along the lines of the administration plan would require Congress and the Treasury to face a new 
set of problems.  Many common transactions like leases involve both a real and an implicit 
financial component and separating them would not be easy.  Moreover, it can be quite difficult 
to tell “real” and “financial” transactions apart where the taxpayers find it advantageous to 
disguise one as the other.  Trade credit for example can be embedded in the sale price, making it 
deductible under an R-base absent clear legislation or regulations. Likewise, a loan could be 
disguised as a sale of (actually worthless) intangible property combined with a set of royalty 
payments back to the purported seller (actually the lender).  Thus, the importance of 
administrative considerations in light of the small revenue differences can cut both ways for 
whether we adopt a cash flow tax.   
I move on now to discussing why the cash flow tax raises almost as much as the existing 
tax:   
A. Risk. I have held off until this point discussing the breakdown of what the Treasury 
defines as “supernormal” returns between the return to risk and economic rents.  In a practical 
sense, it does not matter much to distributing the corporate tax under the Treasury model: taxes 
on both risk and economic rents are both assigned to capital owners.
360
  Moreover, taxes on risk 
premia may raise money in expected value terms, but they likely impose relatively little burden 
(Gordon 1985).  This is because taxes act like insurance by reducing the riskiness of investments.  
Through taxes the investor gives up a portion of his risk premium and in return he gets a lower 
                                                 
360
 The assignment of the tax burden is to different capital owners, however.  Taxes on rents are assumed to be 
borne by owners of corporate equities, while taxes on risk are assumed to be borne by all capital owners. Regardless, 
the distributional consequences of this distinction are small.   
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after-tax risk.  Giving up part of the risk premium and getting lower risk is basically an even 
tradeoff for him.
361
  Thus these additional revenues, “have positive expected value but have little 
market value to the investors who forgo them because of their risk.” (Auerbach, 2005).  Indeed, 
in simple models with perfect loss offsets, income and cash flow taxes impose no burden at all 
on the returns to risk at all because the investor can “undo” the tax by just investing increasing 
his investment in risky assets until his after-tax portfolio matches his pre-tax portfolio. (Domar & 
Musgrave 1944).
362
   
There are at least two ways we might think about estimating how much role taxes on risk 
play in the corporate tax base.  The first is to use a representative agent with average risk 
aversion, and ask how much this agent would value stream of revenue produced by the corporate 
tax?  I calculate that the certainty equivalent value of corporate tax receipts from 1995-2013 
assuming all the agents in the economy have the same, constant relative risk aversion coefficient 
of 3.  On average the corporate tax raised $185 billion in 2013 dollars, with a standard deviation 
of $39 billion.
 363
  Risk averse agents would value this income stream the same as a certain 
                                                 
361
 To make this more concrete imagine a cash flow tax with τ = 50%.  Assume an investor has a normal level of 
risk aversion and is indifferent between a safe return of 1% or a risky return with an expected return of 3%, where 
half the time the asset loses 1% and half the time it gains 7% and the investor has $100.  Assume also the investor 
uses the investment subsidy of $100 to invest more in the asset he purchased originally.   
If he chooses the safe asset he will invest $200 in the safe asset in period 1, he will get $202 in period 2 and 
pay a tax of $101, leaving him with a 1% return.  Likewise, the government’s portfolio is safe: it’s going to get $101 
in period 2 no matter what.  
 If he invests $200 in the risky asset, he has a 50% chance of getting $214 and a 50% chance of having $198 
in period 2 before taxes.  After taxes the investor has a 50% chance of having $99 and 50% chance of having $107, 
The government likewise has a 50% chance of collecting $99 and a 50% chance of collecting $107, or in 
expectation $103.  So the government will collect more money in expectation if the investor chooses the risky asset, 
but these extra revenues have no market value because they come with risks that exactly counterbalance their higher 
expected value.   
362
 While investors facing such a tax can “undo” the effect of tax on the risk premium simply by increasing their 
investment in risky assets, under an income tax they cannot avoid a tax on risk free return of their entire portfolio. 
(see Warren (1996)).   
363
 This analysis assumes that all agents have a utility function which obeys constant relative risk aversion with 
a coefficient of 3—the most accepted estimates of this coefficient are between 1 and 3 (Gandelman & Rubén 
Hernández-Murillo (2015)).  
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payment of $170 billion, only 8% less, suggesting risk is not driving the large overlap between 
the actual corporate tax base and the calculated hypothetical cash flow base.  
By contrast, taxes on the returns to risk explain much more of the corporate tax base if we 
extrapolate from the market risk premium.  Over time, the equity premium in the U.S. has been 
about 4.15% (Ayres and Nalebuff (2013)).  Under a cash flow tax, the government in essence 
becomes an equity partner and the tax base will have the same riskiness as the cash flows of the 
average (public) company.
364
  From 1995-2001, the average nominal risk free rate, as proxied by 
5 year Treasury notes, was about 6% and the real rate was 3.5%, close to the estimated risk 
premium.  Thus, taxes on the returns to risk over this period should have about equaled the tax 
on the normal return, estimated above at about 20-30% of corporate tax revenue.  Moreover 
since 2002, taxes on risk should have made up a significantly larger part of the corporate tax base 
(assuming the equity premium is time-invariant).    
These very different figures depending on which method we use to think about risk are 
partly a result of incomplete loss offsets, discussed below, which make the actual tax base less 
risky than the hypothetical cash flow base.  In addition, much of the difference is driven by the 
fact that the historical equity premium in the United States cannot be explained by ordinary 
levels of risk aversion.  Mehra and Prescott (1985).       
B. Loss Offsets. Incomplete loss offsets are another potential explanation for the 
similarity of the cash flow tax to the current tax.  If the government does not fully refund tax 
losses, then even a cash flow tax can fall on the normal return.  Therefore, my estimate of the 
revenue raised by the R-base cash flow tax may include some tax on the normal return which I 
do not account for above.  Recall that under the cash flow tax the government is supposed to 
                                                 
364
 Public companies still dominate the corporate tax base after weighting by size (Auerbach 2005). 
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provide τ % of the initial capital, and collect τ % of the income from the project.  When firms 
with tax losses for a period invest in new projects they do not receive τ % of the initial capital 
from the government, but rather additional loss offsets with a face value of τ %.  Economists at 
the Treasury have estimated that firms collect only about 50% of the face value of these loss 
offsets (Cooper and Knittel 2010).  As a sensitivity check, I therefore scale up actual loss offsets, 
which were used in a given year by 100%.  Doing so should roughly approximate the effect of 
having perfect loss offsets.  I estimate that the R-base cash flow tax with perfect loss offsets 
would raise 10% less than the other estimates with imperfect loss offsets.
365
 This means that up 
to 10% of the existing tax may fall on the normal return but not be picked up as falling on the 
normal return under the GKS and Cronin et al. methods.   
C. Low Normal Rates of Return and Expensing of Long Lived Assets.  
In some ways the finding that we are currently raising relatively little tax from the normal 
rate of return is obvious.  One can lose sight of the fact that the difference between a cash flow 
tax and an income tax is just a question of timing: when do you recover your basis.  In a low 
interest rate and low inflation environment, the timing does not matter all that much (see Listokin 
(2016)).  For an asset with a 7-year life span, if inflation is 2% and the real interest rate is 2%, 
then even under straight line depreciation, the difference between expensing and an income tax is 
10% of the value of the asset.  This is an important wedge, but much smaller than if inflation is 
5% and real interest rates are 5%—there the wedge would be 25% of the value of the asset.   Yet 
even during the period during the 1990s when the real risk free rate was 4%, only 20-30% of the 
tax was raised from the normal return.  As noted in the introduction, a tax on the nominal normal 
                                                 
365
 This is a large change but even here my baseline result would be that labor bears less than 10% of the tax 
under the Treasury model.  Moreover, previous analyses have not adjusted for imperfect loss offsets and would also 
find a higher percent of the tax was raised from the normal return if they did so.   
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rate of return on the book value of C-corps would have raised more than double what the actual 
tax raised from the normal return.   
I believe a substantial factor explaining why corporate tax raised a small percentage of its 
revenue from the normal return is the tax system’s failure to keep up with the rise of intangible 
property.  Corrado and Hulten (2010) estimate that intangible investment broadly construed to 
include 1) software, 2) innovative property (scientific and non-scientific R&D), and 3) brand 
investments and organizational investments (e.g., advertising, training of employees, strategic 
planning by executives) already by the 1990s formed a majority of business investment.   
  189 
Figure 19: 
Gross Fixed Business Inves tment 
 
Source: Corrado and Hulten (2010).   
 
Yet the vast majority of these investments can be immediately expensed as self-developed 
intangibles.  Having given cash flow treatment to more than 50% of investment, we should not 
be surprised that we collect relatively little from the normal return even when the normal return 
is high.  
 I begin to test the importance of changes in the risk-free rate of return, as measured by 
Treasury notes, and increases in the importance of intangible investment by extending my GKS-
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style comparison of the actual corporate tax and a hypothetical R-base tax back to 1957.  The 
collected data are presented in the Appendix in Table 3A-3.  Confining my analysis to years in 
which the growth rate of physical capital is within 200 basis points of the risk-free, rate as 
proxied by the 5-year constant Treasury rate, I find that decreases in the risk-free rate and 
increases in intangible capital (as a percent of total capital) are associated with the corporate tax 
raising a smaller portion from the normal return: 
  
Table 8: 
Association between Portion of the Corporate Tax Raised from Normal Return  
and Risk-Free Rate, Intangible Capital 
 Estimated % of Tax Raised 
from Normal Return 
Intangible Assets as a Percent of Total Capital -0.5221 
 (0.2526)* 






* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
These results are merely suggestive, but given the strength of the theoretical relationship between 
these variables and the portion of the corporate tax raised from the normal return, it is quite 
likely that both factors have played an important role in the decrease in the tax raised from the 
normal return over time.  If these estimates were accurate, the increase in intangible assets from 
15% of total fixed assets in 1957 to 37% in 2013 would be associated with a decline of about 10 
percentage points in the portion of the tax raised from the normal return.  Likewise, the decrease 
in the nominal risk-free rate from 6% in the mid-1990s to about 1.5% from 2009 to 2013 would 
have been associated with a decline of about 7.5 percentage points in the portion of the tax raised 
from the normal return.  
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
 I present new empirical evidence from U.S. corporate tax returns which shows that the 
corporate tax raised very little revenue from the normal return to capital from 1995 to 2013.  This 
means that under the Treasury’s model, the full corporate tax burden should be assigned to 
capital owners, again assuming that taxes on supernormal returns stick fully with capital owners.  
The results also imply that it would be less costly than commonly thought to move to a simpler 
and modestly more efficient cash flow tax on corporations.   
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Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Appendix to Do Taxes Affect Marriage? 
Figure 1A- 1: 
Taxes Owe d by A Single-Earner Couple with $100,000 in Income 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on historical rates, personal exemptions and standard deduction.  Inflation data 
based on the Consumer Price Index.  The single-earner prior to marriage and the married couple are assumed to take 





















Taxes Owed by A Single-Earner Couple with $100,000 in Income 
Unmarried Married
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Table 1A- 1: 
Additional Results 
 















TX, LA, AL, 
MS, OK, TN, 
and AR Only 
Post’48*High Income -0.40% -0.06% -0.88% 
 (0.38) (0.40) (0.54) 
Post’48*Common Law -0.09% -0.62% -0.67% 
 (0.36) (0.24)** (0.45) 
Post’48*Common Law*High Income 0.76% 0.69% 1.19% 
 (0.41)* (0.45) (0.0081) 
High Mobilization*Post’48    
    
R
2 
(excluding fixed effects) 0.03 0.03 0.03 
N 592,944 403,391 103,452 
    
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Estimated year, state-age-income fixed effects and controls for economic conditions not reported, standard errors 
clustered at the state level 
1
 Excluding all persons who have moved across state lines in 1955-1960.  The 1960 census asked respondents 
where they lived 5 years before.   
2
 Excluding all men who did not live in the same state in which they were born in 1960.  
  




Appendix 2: Appendix to Economic Crises and the Integration of Law and Finance 
 (with Merritt Fox and Ronald Gilson) 
 The purpose of this Appendix is to describe in more detail how we arrived at our baseline 
results that idiosyncratic risk spikes during economic crises, and explain additional tests we 
performed to ensure that our results are robust.   
We first walk through the data sources and our main results, and how they compare to 
Campbell et al.’s work.366   Next, we consider whether industry specific trends can explain spikes 
in idiosyncratic risk during crises, and find that they do not.  Then, we examine whether our 
results change if we use Fama and French’s three-factor model and conclude that this has little 
impact.  We also test whether the idiosyncratic volatility spikes could be caused by crises 
revealing incompetent management—i.e., the tide going out to reveal the naked swimmers.  We 
find the data inconsistent with what we would expect if volatility spikes were driven by the tide 
going out.   We then analyze whether our volatility spikes are attributable to increases in 
leverage during crises. We show that increases in leverage explained about 20% of the increase 
in idiosyncratic volatility during the most recent crisis.  Finally, we test whether β instability or 
serial correlation in idiosyncratic volatility are driving our result. Again, we conclude that these 
factors do not drive our results. 
  
                                                 
366
 See John Y. Campbell, Martin Lettau, Burton G. Malkiel & Yexiao Xu, Have Individual Stocks Become 
More Volatile: An Empirical Exploration of Idiosyncratic Risk, 56 J. FIN. 1 (2001). 
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Data 
CRSP 
Unless otherwise noted, we use data on all firms in the CRSP database.  This include all 
securities traded on the NYSE (from 1925), AMEX (from 1962), and NASDAQ (from 1972) and 




For some estimates we use the firms in the S&P 100 as of March 2, 2009. There is 
nothing special about this date; it was the date when the project started.  It does, however, 
introduce a survivorship bias.  The firms that were not removed from the index or were added to 
replace firms that collapsed during the crisis have upwardly biased performances.  Overall the 
firms in the sample had their market caps decline, peak to trough, by about 50%.  The market as 
a whole (as measured by the market cap of all firms in the CRSP database) was down close to 
55% peak to trough.  Thus, the survivorship bias should not be too severe, and we have no 
reason to expect that a positive survivorship bias would upwardly bias idiosyncratic risk.   
Baseline Estimate 
For each firm i in the CRSP data, we ran the “standard” market model regression using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖, 𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑡 + 𝜀                             𝑬𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝟏 
                                                 
367
 In addition to common equity shares for firms incorporated in the US, this includes:  
(a) common shares of closed end funds, real estate investment trusts, and companies incorporated 
outside the United States  
(b) ADR’s and shares of beneficial interest.   
Excluding the types of securities listed in (a) and (b) has virtually no effect on the results below. 
368
 Some smaller firms are occasionally missing shares outstanding information.  Missing data is interpolated 
from the last valid shares outstanding information. This interpolation makes little difference since the aggregate 
market capitalization of these firms is relatively small. 
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where the market is the CRSP value weighted index.  We ran this model for each firm once a 
month with an estimation period looking backward roughly one trading year (250 obs).
369
  
Therefore in our figures, the idiosyncratic risk on, for example, March 28, 2001 represents the 
risk from March 31, 2000 to March 28, 2001 and each regression period will have an overlap of 
230 out of 250 observations with the previous one.  To illustrate with Abbott Laboratories:  
Table 2A- 1 
Example of Estimated Idiosyncratic Risk 
 
Our estimated σi, which is the standard deviation
370
 of our estimated regression errors εi, 
is interpreted as the idiosyncratic risk of firmi over the regression period.  Each firm’s estimated 
σ is combined to give a market-cap-weighted average. If a firm makes up 5% of the total market 
capitalization of the sample, its estimated risk will make up 5% of the average. 
  
                                                 
369
 At first glance it might appear that using the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) technique would 
deliver greater efficiency here.  However, because the right hand side variable (the market return) is the same across 
all the firms, OLS and SUR are equivalent.     
370
 In some figures in our main paper (e.g. Figure 5) we use the variance instead of standard deviation, this is 
simply σi
2
 or the standard deviation squared. 
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Figure 2A- 1 
Baseline Estimate 
Idiosyncratic Risk 1925-2010 
 
 
Comparison to Campbell et al. 
 We use a different estimation method than Campbell et al.
371
  In addition, unlike those 
authors, our baseline model does not include industry returns.  Regardless our results are very 
similar, particularly since our concern is primarily with the relative changes in idiosyncratic risk 
rather than with the absolute level:  
                                                 
371
 Campbell et al., supra note 366. 
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Figure 2A- 2 
Idiosyncratic Risk 1964-1997—Comparison to Campbell et a l 
  
Industry Returns 
 As noted in the body of the text, the most recent crisis hit some industries—financial 
services and construction—particularly hard. It is therefore conceivable that controlling for 
industry returns is particularly important during crises. As a robustness check we estimate:  
 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑑,𝑡 +   𝜀𝑖,𝑡                           𝑬𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝟐 
 
where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑑,𝑡 is the value-weighted return of firms in the same two-digit SIC code as firmi. 
Including industry returns explains only a small part of the spike in idiosyncratic volatility during 
the most recent crisis. 
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Figure 2A- 3 
The Effect of Controlling for Industry Returns 
 
 
Likewise, Table 2A-2 demonstrates that the increase in idiosyncratic risk was not confined to 
hard-hit industries like finance and construction.  Instead, 58 of the 60 sectors we studied saw 
their risk at least double. 
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Table 2A- 2: 
Idiosyncratic Risk and Co- move ment of Returns  with t he Broad Mar ket 
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Three Factor Model 
 
 Fama and French have shown that other than a proxy for the market return, two other 
factors consistently help predict the returns of individual stocks.
372
  Therefore we estimate their 
model: 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑡 +   𝜀𝑖,𝑡             𝑬𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝟑                     
 
                                                 
372
 See, e.g., Eugene Fama & Kenneth R. French, The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence, 18 J. 
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 25 (2004). 
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where 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑡  is the difference between the return on a diversified portfolio composed of 
small stocks minus that composed of large stocks; and  𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑡  is the return on a portfolio 
composed of stocks with a high book value to market value minus one composed of stocks with 
a low book value to market value.   The results are very similar to the baseline “one factor” 
model results: 
 
Figure 2A- 4 
The Comparison to Fama-Frenc h 3 Factor Model 
 
 
Testing the “Tide-Goes-Out” Hypothesis 
 Recall that this explanation supposes that the crisis revealed the management of some 
firms to be incompetent or fraudulent and produced substantial mark-downs in price at those 
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firms.  The remainder of firms would see a modest (relative) mark-up. To test this theory we 
looked at the portion of volatility explained by the largest net-of-market drops in price. We 
follow our baseline procedure, except we remove the largest 5 net-of-market drops of each year 
long regression period from the volatility calculation. If the tide going out was important, the 
portion explained by these large drops should go up.  As shown in the figure below, however, the 
adjusted volatility looks almost identical. The results are similar if we exclude the 10 largest net-
of market returns regardless of sign. 
Figure 2A- 5 














Share-Price-Drop-Induced Increased Leverage 
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1.  Controlling for Direct Increase in Risk Stemming from Increases in Leverage.  As 
shown below, equity value declined substantially during the 2008-2009 crisis increasing 
leverage: 
Table 2A- 3 
Leverage Increase 2007-2009 
Firms in the S&P 100 
 
 
“Net Debt” is short term borrowing plus long term borrowing 
minus cash and cash equivalents. E= Equity, D= Debt.  
 
Increases in leverage can increase firm-specific risk without a change in the volatility of 
the market’s implicit valuations of a firm’s future cash flows. This is because equity absorbs 
(nearly) all changes in the value of the firm’s future cash flows, but the change is concentrated 
on relatively fewer equity dollars when leverage increases.
373
  
                                                 
373
 To illustrate, imagine a firm that will exist for one more period and assume, for purposes of simple 
exposition, that the risk free rate of interest is zero, there is no systematic risk associated with the issuer, and there is 
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More formally, if we assume that debt is risk-free,
374
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𝑈𝑛𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 represents the volatility of stock prices adjusted for leverage. Two firms with 
identical assets, but different levels of leverage will thus have the same 𝜎𝑖
𝑈𝑛𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑even though 
their 𝜎𝑖
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 will be different. Our baseline model presents an estimate of 𝜎𝑖
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑but the figure 
below shows that even when we estimate 𝜎𝑖
𝑈𝑛𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 (using Compustat data on the debt of each 
firm in the S&P 100) the rise in idiosyncratic risk remains steep: 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
no possibility of news so bad that there is a threat of insolvency.  Now assume that the market determines that the 
expected value of the cash flow available at the end of the period is $10 and that the firm is capitalized with $5 in 
debt and so its equity is valued at $5.  Suppose, at the end of the period, the underlying cash flow turns out to be 
$10.50, i.e., 5% ($.50) above the expected value of $10.  Debt investors will receive $5 and equity investors would 
receive $5.50, representing a 10% return.  If instead severe bad news arrives at the beginning of the period and the 
market determines that the expected value of the firm’s cash flow at the end of the period will drop to $7.00, equity 
is now valued at $2.00 and debt, because there is still no risk of insolvency, at $5.00.  If the underlying cash flow 
turns out to be $7.35, i.e., also 5% above the expected value of $7.00, debt investors will receive $5 and equity 
investors will receive $2.35, representing a 17.5% return.  If the cash flow turned out to be 5% below its expected 
value, the size of equity’s negative return would be similarly magnified. Thus, a reduction in the value of equity can 
increase the idiosyncratic risk associated with an issuer’s equity even if the risk associated with the issuer’s 
underlying cash flow stays the same. 
374
 Here, this a conservative assumption because if, as in reality, debt absorbs some of the change in the firm’s 
assets value, then we will be “over-correcting” for leverage, thereby attributing too much of the increase in the 
volatility of shares to leverage.   
375
See also Stephen Figlewski & Xiaozu Wang , Is the "Leverage Effect" a Leverage Effect?, (Working Paper 
2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=256109. 
  210 
Figure 2A- 6 
The Effect of Controlling for Leverage 
 
2.  Controlling for ß Instability Resulting from Leverage Changes.  The equity-value-
drop-induced increase in leverage in times of crisis creates a second concern with our results, one 
related to our estimates of ß.   Our results are reported in terms of the amount of idiosyncratic 
volatility, as measured by standard deviation in an issuer’s daily net-of-market-returns over the 
preceding 12 months.  Our measure of volatility is thus dependent on “correctly” netting out the 
market influence.  If β is either over or under estimated relative to the “true” relationship 
between the firm and the market, this will result in an increase in our measure of idiosyncratic 
risk.  Recall that if the estimated β is too large then when the market goes up the model will 
predict too positive a return, and when the market goes down the model will predict too negative 
a return.  Similarly if the estimated β is too small then when the market goes up, the model will 
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not predict a large enough gain, and when the market drops the model will predict too small a 
loss.   
For the typical firm, our estimate of β covering the full preceding year will be less 
accurate during crisis times than in normal times, which biases upward our estimate of firm-
specific risk.   This is because the true β over the period of the year is likely to change as the 
firm’s leverage changes, and these changes happen more rapidly in crises.  In the same way that 
leverage directly magnifies the idiosyncratic risk associated with the issuer as illustrated above, 
leverage similarly directly magnifies the systematic riskiness of an issuer’s equity (represented 
by its β times the volatility of the market portfolio) relative to the systematic riskiness of the 
firm’s underlying cash flow.376 Thus this crisis-price-drop-induced change in the β of a firm’s 
equity will, over a twelve-month crisis period, lead to greater inaccuracy in the estimate of the β 
of its stock than in the case of a twelve-month period in normal times when share prices changes 
less.  This greater inaccuracy in β leads to an increase in our measure of its idiosyncratic risk 
even if the idiosyncratic risk associated with its underlying cash flow remains unchanged.  This 
raises the possibility that this second leverage related phenomenon can explain the remainder of 
increase in idiosyncratic risk that we observe in crisis times.   
There is some evidence that in fact β instability is correlated with increases in our 
measure of risk.  In Table 2A-4 we test whether there is a relationship between how fast β shifts 
and increases in our measure of risk.  As Table A-4 shows, rapid shifts in β are associated with 
                                                 
376
 In the market model, β is the measure of an asset’s sensitivity to systematic factors relative to the sensitivity 
of the market as a whole (tautologically the sensitivity of the market as a whole to systemic factors is 1).  Since the 
“market” is really a portfolio of firms, the βs of those firms must at all times average to 1.  Thus, all other factors 
being held constant, whatever happens to firm debt/equity ratios overall, firms whose equity values fall during a 
crisis more than average, and hence have debt/equity ratios that increase more than average, will have increasing βs 
during the period.  Firms in the opposite position will, ceteris paribus, have decreasing βs during the period.  
Because all the firms in both groups experience changing βs over the period, the single estimate of each such firm’s 
β covering the whole year will be less accurate than in non-crisis years, when their leverage, and hence their βs, stay 
relatively more stable. 
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bigger increases in our measure of risk.  However, the results are not consistent with β instability 
driving most of this outcome.  For example, firms where the average β changed moderately saw 
a larger increase in risk than those with large declines in β.  This is the opposite of what we 
would expect if β instability was driving our result.  
Table 2A- 4: 
Percentage Change in Risk a s a F unction of C hanges in β
 
 
Likewise, our indirect control strongly suggests that β instability does not explain much 
of the remaining increase in idiosyncratic risk that we observe in crisis times. We tested for the 
effect of this phenomenon by running regression periods using a shorter one-month window, 
instead of a twelve-month one.  The logic is that because the overall price declines associated 
with the recent financial crisis occurred over a period of several months, leverage (and hence a 
firm’s β) would change in any one month much less than it would over the one-year period over 
Percentage Change in Risk as a Function of Changes in β 
Across Industries
Dependent Variable: %  Change in Idiosyncratic Risk between 2004-2005 & 2008-2009
Explanatory Variable Regression Coefficient T-Statistic
| % Change in β btw. 2004 and 2009 | 13.77 8.33
Large % Decrease
1
 in β btw 2004 & 2009 1.84 2.10
Moderate Change
2
 in β btw 2004 & 2009 2.38 4.99
Large % Increase
3
 in β btw 2004 & 2009 7.86 10.95
Here we use the data represented in Table A-2; that is we calculate risk and β for each firm in
CRSP and then take a market cap weighted average of this data across industrial sectors
using 2-Digit SIC codes to classify industries.  The regressions are then run on these 60
industries.
1 Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the industry's firms saw their β's decrease by more than
20% between 2004-2005 & 2008-2009
2 Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the industry's firms saw their β's change by less than 20%
(either up or down) 2004-2005 & 2008-2009
3 Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the industry's firms saw their β's increase by more than
20% between 2004-2005 & 2008-2009
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which we initially ran the regressions underlying the results that we have already reported.  This 
indirect control will not fully correct for ß instability because leverage changes can occur within 
a one month period too and these changes also will be larger during a crisis.  But if ß instability 
is driving the increase in idiosyncratic risk, we should see a substantial difference between the 
one-year regressions (where large changes in leverage over the year would make the linear 
model fit more poorly) and one-month regressions (where comparatively small changes in 
leverage would cause the linear model to fit much less poorly).  Figure 2A-7 below shows that 




                                                 
377
 The long regression periods represent the average standard deviation over the previous year of idiosyncratic 
returns. In order to make the one-month regression results comparable, we take an average, looking backward, of the 
results of the current one-month period and the previous 11 one-month periods.     
  214 
Figure 2A- 7 
The Effect of Controlling for Beta Instability Using Short Regression Windows 
 
As an additional way to deal with potential β instability, we also examined the prediction 
of idiosyncratic volatility imbedded in market traded options.  Option prices in part signal the 
market’s expectations about future volatility.  Using the Black-Scholes formula on options traded 
around the strike price, we can back out investors’ implicit prediction of the total volatility of a 
firm.  From that we can back out a measure of idiosyncratic volatility.  Taking the variance of 
both sides of equation 1: 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚−𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 =  𝛽𝑖
2 ∗ 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑀𝑘𝑡 +  𝑉𝑎𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚−𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 + 2𝛽 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚−𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 
Note the covariance term is 0 by definition, rearranging we have:   
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚−𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 =  𝑉𝑎𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚−𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 −  𝛽𝑖
2 ∗ 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑀𝑘𝑡 
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This measure still requires us to estimate β. However, in this case β instability is very likely to 
lead to a downward bias in our estimate of idiosyncratic risk.
378
  Nevertheless it still shows a 
huge spike in idiosyncratic risk even after making the direct leverage adjustment outlined above. 
Figure 2A- 8 
Using Implied Volatilities to Adjust for Beta Instability 
 
3. Summary.  When a firm’s debt/equity increases, its idiosyncratic volatility increases.  Crisis 
times are usually accompanied by a sharp drop in equity values.  This results in notable increases 
                                                 
378We can decompose β for any firm into two parts: our prediction of ?̂? and υ where v is an 
expectations error  (β= ?̂? + 𝑣 )  and E(υ) should equal 0 if our estimate is unbiased. This implies 
that in expectation our  𝑉𝑎𝑟𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚−𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐  will be too small since E (?̂?





).  The size of this gap, in expectation, will grow during crises as the variance of v 
increases (because β is more unstable during crisis).  So in expectation this measure of firm-
specific risk has a downward bias during crisis (provided that υ is independent of the size of the 
firm).   
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in most firms’ debt/equity ratios, as we saw in 2008-09.  However, the sharp drop in share prices 
in this period turns out to explain only about a quarter of the observed increase in idiosyncratic 
risk. 
An increase in a firm’s debt/equity ratio that occurs over time within a single observation 
period will shift the actual value of its β over this period of time. The market-model-derived 
estimate of the firm’s β for the period will be a less accurate estimate of the actual value of β 
than when actual β does not shift.  Such errors in the estimate of β show up as additional 
idiosyncratic risk.  Thus share-price-drop induced changes in leverage can contribute to our 
measure of idiosyncratic risk in this way as well.  Our indirect control for this problem suggests, 
however, that it probably does not explain more than an additional 5% of the increase that we 
witnessed in the 2008-09 period.  Moreover, our measure of idiosyncratic risk derived from 
market-traded options still shows, after adjustment for leverage, a sharp increase in idiosyncratic 
risk during the recent financial crisis, more than doubling in standard deviation terms, even 
though this estimate was likely to have been biased downward by β instability.  
Allowing for a more Complex Error Structure 
 Along with adding additional controls to the regression and adjusting for the impact of 
leverage, we also analyzed firm returns assuming the firm-specific volatility can be described 
within a Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) framework.  The 
advantage of GARCH is that we can pick up changes in volatility within the regression period.  
Under the GARCH(1,1) formulation, the idiosyncratic risk on a given day is assumed to be a 
function of the yesterday’s expected volatility and the size of yesterday’s idiosyncratic return.  
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Because GARCH is estimated via maximum likelihood, relatively long regression windows are 
needed to ensure convergence.
379
  
Again the results under GARCH look similar to those reached using a simple error.   
This makes sense intuitively because GARCH estimates of net-of-market returns for each firm 
will be very similar to the baseline and the difference is only in how to apportion the resulting 
volatility (our baseline model assumes that the distribution of the error function is constant 
through time, where GARCH allows it to vary.)   
Figure 2A- 9: 
OLS vs. GARCH 
 
  
                                                 
379
 Therefore GARCH is not particularly well suited to dealing with β instability.  The results presented below 
use 500 day windows for GARCH, but the results for shorter regression windows are very similar.  
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Appendix 3: Appendix to Does Capital Bear the Corporate Tax After All? 
Table 3A- 1: 
Comparing a 35% Tax on the Nor mal Rate of Retur n to Actual Cor porate Tax Reve nue 
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Table 3A- 2: 





Comparison of Hypothetical R-Base Tax to Actual Corporate Tax: Non-Financial1 Corporations
Billions of Nominal Dollars
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Expense Equipment and Structures
(1) Depreciation (+) 15.4   17.1  18.7  20.1  21.5  25.2  27.1  29.8  31.3  34.4  37.5  40.9   45.1  48.6  
(2) Net Investment Credits (converted to deduction equivalent) (+)2 -  -   -   -   -  1.6 2.1  2.7  3.7  4.3  4.4  4.7   3.5  1.6  
(3) Net Investment in Equipment and Structures Corporate Non-Financial Firms (BEA)3 33.4   28.7  30.8  33.4  32.9  35.5  37.3  42.2  50.9  59.2  60.0  65.4   72.9  74.6  
(4) Adjust (3) for portion attributable to S-corps4 33.4   28.7  30.8  33.4  32.9  35.5  37.3  42.2  50.9  59.2  60.0  65.4   72.9  74.6  
(5) Adjust (4) for coverage diff btw. IRS and NIPA 
= New Tangible Capital Investment (-)5
30.4   26.5  28.2  30.4  30.1  32.5  33.8  38.0  45.7  53.5  54.5  59.6   66.9  69.2  
(6) Net Change Expensing Equipment and Structures [(1)+(2)-(5)] (15.0)  (9.5)   (9.5)   (10.3)   (8.5)   (5.7)   (4.6)  (5.6)  (10.7)  (14.8)  (12.6)  (14.0)  (18.3)  (18.9)   
B. Expense Inventories -0.15373
(7) = Δinventoryt,t-1 (Book value) (-) 3.47   3.87  3.87  3.22  3.22  5.45  6.03 6.84  13.02  14.74  10.23  12.60   19.79  5.77  
(8) = Δinventoryt,t-1 (Tax Accounting) (-)
6
C. Expense Amortizable Capital
(9) Amortization (+) 2.4   2.0  1.5  1.2  0.9  0.7  0.5  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2   0.2  0.7  
D. Expense Depletable Capital
(10) Depletion (+) 3.2   3.1  3.1  3.2  3.4  3.5  3.8  4.2  4.3  4.6  5.1  5.5   5.7  5.4  
(11) Change in Base in Shifting to Expensing of Productive Capital 
(6)-(7)+(9)+(10)
(12.9)  (8.2)   (8.7)   (9.0)   (7.5)   (7.0)   (6.3)  (7.9)  (19.2)  (24.8)  (17.5)  (21.0)  (32.2)  (18.6)   
E. Remove Net Financial Income
(12) Interest Paid (+) 4.5   5.1  5.6  6.1  6.6  7.4  8.1  10.9  9.8  11.8  13.8  16.6   22.0  27.5  
(13) Taxable Interest Received (-) 1.3   1.5  1.7  1.8  1.9  2.1  2.5  4.9  2.9  3.5  3.8  4.9   6.6  7.9  
(14) Domestic Dividends (-) (adjusted for dividend received deduction)7 0.2   0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.4   0.4  0.4  
(15) Net Capital Gains (Adjusted for preferential long term capital gains treatment before TRA '86) (-)8 0.6   0.7  0.7  0.8  1.0  0.9  0.9  1.1  1.1  1.4  1.5  1.6   1.8  1.6  
(16) Non-Capital Net Gains (-) (0.1)  (0.1)   (0.1)   (0.2)   (0.3)   (0.2)   0.0  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.5  0.5   0.7  0.5  
(17) Foreign Dividends 0.7   0.8  1.0  1.2  1.4  1.4  1.8  2.4  2.9  2.9  3.1  3.0   3.9  5.0  
(18) Net Financial Income (13)+(14)+(15)+(16)+(17)-(12) (1.8)  (2.8)   (3.0)   (3.4)   (3.8)   (4.2)   (4.3)  (4.3)  (5.1)  (6.2)  (7.7)  (9.2)  (12.5)  (17.1)   
F. Tax Base
(19) Taxable Income Before Credits 36.9   38.8  40.7  39.9  39.1  42.6  47.3  53.0  63.1  69.2  65.8  71.9   71.5  62.2  
G. Composition of Productive Capital
(20) Structures and Equipment9 372   379  393  401  409  422  434  457  488  530  574  630   694  763  
(21) Estimated Value of Intangible Capital10 70   73  78  81  85  90  95  103  113  125  139  156   176  198  
H. Calculations of % of Tax Raised from Normal Return:
Baseline: Cost of Expensing Productive Capital / Tax Base Net of Fin. Inc.
(11)/[(19)-(18)] %
-33.2 -19.7 -20.0 -20.8 -17.4 -14.9 -12.3 -13.8 -28.2 -32.8 -23.8 -25.9 -38.4 -23.4
Leave Depletion and Amortization in Place: [(6)-(7)] / [(19)-(18)] % -47.7 -32.0 -30.6 -31.1 -27.4 -23.7 -20.6 -21.6 -34.8 -39.2 -31.0 -32.9 -45.4 -31.1
GKS Summary Figure: Net Change in Revenue Switching to R-Base/ Current Base
[(11)-[(18)-(17)]]/(19) %
-29.9 -14.0 -14.0 -14.1 -9.4 -6.6 -4.3 -6.8 -22.4 -26.8 -14.9 -16.4 -27.6 -2.3
GKS Summary Figure, Leave Amortization and Depletion in Place
[(6)-(7)-[(18)-(17)]]/ (19)%
-45.1 -27.2 -25.4 -25.3 -20.4 -16.3 -13.3 -15.2 -29.5 -33.7 -22.9 -24.3 -35.9 -12.1
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Table 3A-3
Comparison of Hypothetical R-Base Tax to Actual Corporate Tax: Non-Financial1 Corporations
Billions of Nominal Dollars
Expense Equipment and Structures
(1) Depreciation (+)
(2) Net Investment Credits (converted to deduction equivalent) (+)2
(3) Net Investment in Equipment and Structures Corporate Non-Financial Firms (BEA)3
(4) Adjust (3) for portion attributable to S-corps4
(5) Adjust (4) for coverage diff btw. IRS and NIPA 
= New Tangible Capital Investment (-)5
(6) Net Change Expensing Equipment and Structures [(1)+(2)-(5)]
B. Expense Inventories
(7) = Δinventoryt,t-1 (Book value) (-)
(8) = Δinventoryt,t-1 (Tax Accounting) (-)
6
C. Expense Amortizable Capital
(9) Amortization (+)
D. Expense Depletable Capital
(10) Depletion (+)
(11) Change in Base in Shifting to Expensing of Productive Capital 
(6)-(7)+(9)+(10)
E. Remove Net Financial Income
(12) Interest Paid (+)
(13) Taxable Interest Received (-)
(14) Domestic Dividends (-) (adjusted for dividend received deduction)7
(15) Net Capital Gains (Adjusted for preferential long term capital gains treatment before TRA '86) (-)8
(16) Non-Capital Net Gains (-)
(17) Foreign Dividends
(18) Net Financial Income (13)+(14)+(15)+(16)+(17)-(12)
F. Tax Base
(19) Taxable Income Before Credits
G. Composition of Productive Capital
(20) Structures and Equipment9
(21) Estimated Value of Intangible Capital10
H. Calculations of % of Tax Raised from Normal Return: 
Baseline: Cost of Expensing Productive Capital / Tax Base Net of Fin. Inc.
(11)/[(19)-(18)] %
Leave Depletion and Amortization in Place: [(6)-(7)] / [(19)-(18)] %
GKS Summary Figure: Net Change in Revenue Switching to R-Base/ Current Base
[(11)-[(18)-(17)]]/(19) %
GKS Summary Figure, Leave Amortization and Depletion in Place
[(6)-(7)-[(18)-(17)]]/ (19)%
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
52.6  58.5  64.5  72.2  79.4   86.5  98.9  112.0  127.8  145.9  172.7  197.3  221.8  242.6  
3.2  6.1  7.6  8.4  12.2   19.4  22.2  25.9  30.4  31.7  39.6  36.1  32.8  35.5  
76.7  87.6  104.0  117.8  119.2   132.5  159.4  195.3  230.5  249.5  283.0  281.1  271.7  318.7  
76.7  87.6  104.0  117.8  119.2   132.5  159.4  195.3  230.5  249.5  283.0  281.1  271.7  318.7  
71.6  82.3  98.8  112.2  113.7   126.0  152.2  185.4  219.0  236.2  271.2  265.5  256.5  302.0  
(15.8)  (17.8)  (26.7)  (31.6)  (22.1)  (20.1)  (31.0)   (47.6)   (60.7)   (58.5)   (58.9)   (32.1)   (1.9)   (23.8)   
8.51  23.94  37.91  48.86  5.86   32.38  43.97  45.92  60.91  29.61  48.42  (6.27)   18.26  62.23  
0.7  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.6   0.8  0.8  1.0  1.2  1.2  4.1  3.3  3.5  4.3  
6.0  6.7  9.2  18.8  5.3   5.5  5.6  6.2  7.7  8.7  7.7  6.8  7.4  7.8  
(17.5)  (34.1)  (54.6)  (60.9)  (22.1)  (46.2)  (68.6)   (86.2)   (112.7)    (78.2)   (95.5)   (15.7)   (9.3)   (74.0)   
28.1  30.4  39.1  50.9  51.6   52.6  59.5  73.6  97.0  125.4  162.8  174.1  164.7  188.7  
7.9  8.7  12.5  16.7  16.3   17.9  20.6  26.7  38.5  51.7  72.3  73.4  71.9  84.0  
0.4  0.6  1.1  1.9  0.8   1.4  1.6  1.4  1.8  2.2  2.2  2.4  2.5  2.7  
1.8  2.3  2.8  3.0  2.7   3.2  4.0  5.2  7.5  8.6  10.1  9.2  9.3  12.1  
0.5  0.5  1.5  1.6  2.1   1.8  3.1  3.9  4.8  3.7  4.3  6.5  7.5  11.3  
5.9  6.3  8.3  10.8  8.6   13.1  15.4  17.4  24.4  29.4  27.9  26.3  27.4  31.4  
(17.5)  (18.3)  (21.3)  (27.8)  (29.8)  (28.3)  (30.3)   (36.4)   (44.4)   (59.2)   (74.0)   (82.5)   (73.6)   (78.5)   
70.7  81.3  101.7  131.4  133.4   166.9  191.2  212.7  251.1  222.3  219.6  185.2  196.2  231.8  
835  904  1,019  1,251  1,388   1,524  1,694  1,922  2,213  2,538  2,867  3,034  3,101  3,266  
222  240  278  350  398   448  510  593  700  821  950  1,028  1,075  1,158  
-19.9 -34.3 -44.4 -38.3 -13.5 -23.6 -31.0 -34.6 -38.1 -27.8 -32.5 -5.9 -3.4 -23.8
-27.5 -41.9 -52.6 -50.5 -17.1 -26.9 -33.9 -37.5 -41.1 -31.3 -36.5 -9.6 -7.5 -27.7
0.0 -19.5 -32.8 -25.2 5.8 -10.7 -20.1 -23.4 -27.2 -8.5 -9.8 36.1 32.8 2.0
-9.6 -28.8 -42.6 -40.1 1.4 -14.5 -23.4 -26.8 -30.8 -13.0 -15.1 30.6 27.2 -3.3
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Table 3A-3
Comparison of Hypothetical R-Base Tax to Actual Corporate Tax: Non-Financial1 Corporations
Billions of Nominal Dollars
Expense Equipment and Structures
(1) Depreciation (+)
(2) Net Investment Credits (converted to deduction equivalent) (+)2
(3) Net Investment in Equipment and Structures Corporate Non-Financial Firms (BEA)3
(4) Adjust (3) for portion attributable to S-corps4
(5) Adjust (4) for coverage diff btw. IRS and NIPA 
= New Tangible Capital Investment (-)5
(6) Net Change Expensing Equipment and Structures [(1)+(2)-(5)]
B. Expense Inventories
(7) = Δinventoryt,t-1 (Book value) (-)
(8) = Δinventoryt,t-1 (Tax Accounting) (-)
6
C. Expense Amortizable Capital
(9) Amortization (+)
D. Expense Depletable Capital
(10) Depletion (+)
(11) Change in Base in Shifting to Expensing of Productive Capital 
(6)-(7)+(9)+(10)
E. Remove Net Financial Income
(12) Interest Paid (+)
(13) Taxable Interest Received (-)
(14) Domestic Dividends (-) (adjusted for dividend received deduction)7
(15) Net Capital Gains (Adjusted for preferential long term capital gains treatment before TRA '86) (-)8
(16) Non-Capital Net Gains (-)
(17) Foreign Dividends
(18) Net Financial Income (13)+(14)+(15)+(16)+(17)-(12)
F. Tax Base
(19) Taxable Income Before Credits
G. Composition of Productive Capital
(20) Structures and Equipment9
(21) Estimated Value of Intangible Capital10
H. Calculations of % of Tax Raised from Normal Return: 
Baseline: Cost of Expensing Productive Capital / Tax Base Net of Fin. Inc.
(11)/[(19)-(18)] %
Leave Depletion and Amortization in Place: [(6)-(7)] / [(19)-(18)] %
GKS Summary Figure: Net Change in Revenue Switching to R-Base/ Current Base
[(11)-[(18)-(17)]]/(19) %
GKS Summary Figure, Leave Amortization and Depletion in Place
[(6)-(7)-[(18)-(17)]]/ (19)%
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
277.5     271.8     265.3     268.3     274.4     269.9     270.9     281.9     294.6     325.7     350.5      380.3     407.1       
39.7       19.1       6.8         (1.5)        (1.0)        (0.3)        (0.2)        (0.1)        (0.1)        -         -          -         -          
337.3     319.9     316.6     337.2     361.6     389.4     374.4     385.8     422.9     465.9     529.7      570.1     613.1       
337.3     300.4     292.5     307.3     326.1     348.6     334.6     343.5     375.5     414.3     468.9      504.6     541.8       
319.2     282.8     275.5     289.6     306.9     327.7     314.7     324.4     355.3     395.2     450.4      486.8     523.7       
(2.0)        8.1         (3.4)        (22.8)      (33.4)      (58.1)      (44.1)      (42.5)      (60.8)      (69.5)      (99.9)       (106.5)    (116.6)     
39.94     (24.22)    12.87     21.25     18.57     5.45       (7.30)      26.00     26.51     49.31     19.72      26.61     18.10       
49.44 26.29 48.77
5.1         10.6       12.7       15.1       19.5       23.9       27.5       27.5       27.2       28.7       33.7        38.3       45.0         
7.5         8.7         8.1         8.3         8.8         9.2         8.1         8.5         8.0         9.0         9.6          9.7         9.6           
(29.4)      51.6       4.5         (20.7)      (23.7)      (30.5)      (1.2)        (32.6)      (52.1)      (81.1)      (76.3)       (85.1)      (80.1)       
205.6     214.3     214.3     241.6     289.5     296.8     287.7     252.2     235.2     250.4     286.4      305.9     337.5       
94.3       92.3       87.9       99.5       119.2     146.8     148.1     135.7     127.5     134.2     155.3      176.4     195.4       
1.8         1.4         1.2         1.3         1.2         1.3         1.3         1.3         1.4         1.2         3.0          1.3         1.4           
14.7       22.6       36.3       38.3       44.8       30.1       27.1       23.8       27.3       34.7       37.7        41.7       63.0         
12.9       11.1       11.0       20.9       16.5       9.8         11.3       9.6         10.7       14.9       18.3        24.7       27.4         
39.3       37.8       40.8       65.8       58.2       64.4       56.0       50.5       54.0       59.5       69.5        86.0       96.2         
(81.8)      (86.9)      (77.9)      (81.6)      (107.9)    (108.9)    (100.0)    (81.8)      (68.3)      (65.6)      (72.1)       (61.8)      (50.4)       
231.3     225.5     260.7     323.3     305.9     297.8     269.0     276.2     312.2     379.0     417.7      472.8     502.4       
3,422     3,547     3,705     3,921     4,129     4,344     4,427     4,566     4,780     5,035     5,327      5,590     5,891       
1,241     1,315     1,404     1,518     1,633     1,755     1,826     1,923     2,055     2,210     2,393      2,571     2,772       
-9.4 16.5 1.3 -5.1 -5.7 -7.5 -0.3 -9.1 -13.7 -18.2 -15.6 -15.9 -14.5
-13.4 10.3 -4.8 -10.9 -12.6 -15.6 -10.0 -19.1 -22.9 -26.7 -24.4 -24.9 -24.4
22.7 61.4 31.6 18.9 27.5 26.3 36.7 17.8 5.2 -4.1 -1.0 -4.9 -5.9
17.2 52.8 23.6 11.6 18.3 15.2 23.5 4.8 -6.1 -14.0 -11.4 -15.1 -16.8
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Table 3A-3
Comparison of Hypothetical R-Base Tax to Actual Corporate Tax: Non-Financial1 Corporations
Billions of Nominal Dollars
Expense Equipment and Structures
(1) Depreciation (+)
(2) Net Investment Credits (converted to deduction equivalent) (+)2
(3) Net Investment in Equipment and Structures Corporate Non-Financial Firms (BEA)3
(4) Adjust (3) for portion attributable to S-corps4
(5) Adjust (4) for coverage diff btw. IRS and NIPA 
= New Tangible Capital Investment (-)5
(6) Net Change Expensing Equipment and Structures [(1)+(2)-(5)]
B. Expense Inventories
(7) = Δinventoryt,t-1 (Book value) (-)
(8) = Δinventoryt,t-1 (Tax Accounting) (-)
6
C. Expense Amortizable Capital
(9) Amortization (+)
D. Expense Depletable Capital
(10) Depletion (+)
(11) Change in Base in Shifting to Expensing of Productive Capital 
(6)-(7)+(9)+(10)
E. Remove Net Financial Income
(12) Interest Paid (+)
(13) Taxable Interest Received (-)
(14) Domestic Dividends (-) (adjusted for dividend received deduction)7
(15) Net Capital Gains (Adjusted for preferential long term capital gains treatment before TRA '86) (-)8
(16) Non-Capital Net Gains (-)
(17) Foreign Dividends
(18) Net Financial Income (13)+(14)+(15)+(16)+(17)-(12)
F. Tax Base
(19) Taxable Income Before Credits
G. Composition of Productive Capital
(20) Structures and Equipment9
(21) Estimated Value of Intangible Capital10
H. Calculations of % of Tax Raised from Normal Return: 
Baseline: Cost of Expensing Productive Capital / Tax Base Net of Fin. Inc.
(11)/[(19)-(18)] %
Leave Depletion and Amortization in Place: [(6)-(7)] / [(19)-(18)] %
GKS Summary Figure: Net Change in Revenue Switching to R-Base/ Current Base
[(11)-[(18)-(17)]]/(19) %
GKS Summary Figure, Leave Amortization and Depletion in Place
[(6)-(7)-[(18)-(17)]]/ (19)%
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
426.0       452.4       473.6       497.0     541.7     524.7     523.2     402.9     420.9       446.9     567.7     543.4     558.0     
-          -          -          -         -         -         -         -         -          -         -         -         -         
648.7       689.5       753.4       713.5     617.2     621.8     664.2     758.1     860.6       929.8     938.0     722.1     748.0     
572.8       605.6       658.9       620.6     531.4     528.4     559.4     637.8     711.1       765.5     771.4     607.6     633.1     
555.2       587.3       639.5       602.1     515.9     512.4     540.9     608.9     677.4       727.0     735.9     574.9     596.9     
(129.2)     (134.8)     (165.9)     (105.2)    25.8       12.4       (17.7)      (206.0)    (256.4)     (280.2)    (168.2)    (31.5)      (38.9)      
24.62       38.74       52.69       (59.36)    (13.66)    30.29     77.16     82.90     67.73       33.41     (29.36)    (79.05)    49.28     
39.60 54.51 100.57 -38.02 17.10 38.12 88.32 72.65 84.55 39.13 -23.43 -116.64 74.19
54.9         63.2         72.2         81.3       85.9       88.6       98.4       109.8     112.5       124.2     138.4     146.3     145.5     
9.0           9.0           9.4           9.2         8.9         9.6         11.3       14.7       14.3         18.2       20.5       20.7       21.7       
(89.9)       (101.4)     (136.9)     44.7       134.2     80.3       14.8       (164.3)    (197.4)     (171.2)    20.0       214.5     79.0       
356.3       388.0       457.0       443.8     396.2     373.3     374.3     428.1     495.1       573.0     525.1     442.3     416.2     
194.0       207.0       248.5       233.6     209.5     197.5     207.5     248.2     303.2       332.6     259.4     179.4     145.5     
1.3           1.4           1.5           1.2         1.0         1.2         1.3         1.6         2.3           2.2         2.6         1.9         3.2         
69.2         104.1       121.5       80.0       52.0       56.6       63.0       80.7       92.3         105.4     68.7       41.1       56.4       
31.8         26.8         27.2         2.0         (5.0)        (1.9)        10.0       15.8       37.9         32.8       (6.2)        (2.4)        13.4       
92.2         107.3       110.0       98.4       93.3       107.6     122.2     437.8     145.2       167.8     221.9     239.1     242.6     
(60.0)       (48.7)       (58.2)       (127.0)    (138.8)    (119.9)    (92.5)      (81.7)      (59.4)       (99.9)      (200.6)    (222.3)    (197.7)    
485.7       515.6       553.8       438.0     390.2     452.0     574.7     854.0     909.3       909.7     783.6     704.5     805.4     
6,178       6,489       6,917       7,262     7,499     7,720     8,390     9,178     9,940       10,467   11,141   10,691   10,974   
2,975       3,196       3,484       3,741     3,950     4,157     4,618     5,163     5,713       6,147     6,709     6,246     6,449     
-16.5 -18.0 -22.4 7.9 25.4 14.0 2.2 -17.6 -20.4 -17.0 2.0 23.1 7.9
-28.2 -30.8 -35.7 -8.1 7.5 -3.1 -14.2 -30.9 -33.5 -31.1 -14.1 5.1 -8.8
-6.2 -10.2 -14.2 39.2 70.0 44.3 18.7 -9.7 -15.2 -7.8 28.2 62.0 34.4
-19.3 -24.2 -29.0 18.5 45.7 22.6 -0.4 -24.3 -29.1 -23.5 7.9 38.3 13.6
223
Table 3A-3
Comparison of Hypothetical R-Base Tax to Actual Corporate Tax: Non-Financial1 Corporations
Billions of Nominal Dollars
Expense Equipment and Structures
(1) Depreciation (+)
(2) Net Investment Credits (converted to deduction equivalent) (+)2
(3) Net Investment in Equipment and Structures Corporate Non-Financial Firms (BEA)3
(4) Adjust (3) for portion attributable to S-corps4
(5) Adjust (4) for coverage diff btw. IRS and NIPA 
= New Tangible Capital Investment (-)5
(6) Net Change Expensing Equipment and Structures [(1)+(2)-(5)]
B. Expense Inventories
(7) = Δinventoryt,t-1 (Book value) (-)
(8) = Δinventoryt,t-1 (Tax Accounting) (-)
6
C. Expense Amortizable Capital
(9) Amortization (+)
D. Expense Depletable Capital
(10) Depletion (+)
(11) Change in Base in Shifting to Expensing of Productive Capital 
(6)-(7)+(9)+(10)
E. Remove Net Financial Income
(12) Interest Paid (+)
(13) Taxable Interest Received (-)
(14) Domestic Dividends (-) (adjusted for dividend received deduction)7
(15) Net Capital Gains (Adjusted for preferential long term capital gains treatment before TRA '86) (-)8
(16) Non-Capital Net Gains (-)
(17) Foreign Dividends
(18) Net Financial Income (13)+(14)+(15)+(16)+(17)-(12)
F. Tax Base
(19) Taxable Income Before Credits
G. Composition of Productive Capital
(20) Structures and Equipment9
(21) Estimated Value of Intangible Capital10
H. Calculations of % of Tax Raised from Normal Return: 
Baseline: Cost of Expensing Productive Capital / Tax Base Net of Fin. Inc.
(11)/[(19)-(18)] %
Leave Depletion and Amortization in Place: [(6)-(7)] / [(19)-(18)] %
GKS Summary Figure: Net Change in Revenue Switching to R-Base/ Current Base
[(11)-[(18)-(17)]]/(19) %
GKS Summary Figure, Leave Amortization and Depletion in Place
[(6)-(7)-[(18)-(17)]]/ (19)%
2011 2012 2013
675.5  555.0  560.1  
-   -   -   
852.2  961.4  996.7  
719.2  824.2  844.6  
680.5  764.5  778.4  
(5.0)   (209.5)   (218.3)   
84.63  69.17  56.09  
91.06 71.60 56.60
149.9  153.4  160.6  
25.0  26.1  25.4  
85.4  (99.2)   (88.4)   
413.4  415.2  401.6  
146.9  133.6  121.5  
1.6  1.5  1.7  
60.2  76.5  68.0  
20.5  31.7  19.6  
192.5  201.0  210.6  
(184.2)   (171.9)   (190.8)   
768.2  879.2  922.5  
11,430  11,814  12,218  







The data come from the yearly IRS Statistics of Income Complete Corporation Report and Corporation Sourcebook, unless otherwise noted.
Prior to 1986, to ease the burden of hand collecting the data, the figures include S-corporations.  In the period from the introduction of the S-Corp in 1958 to 1986, the inclusion or exclusion
 of S-Corps makes a negligible difference because S-Corps made up an economically small portion of total corporate capital etc. (e.g., less than 4% of depreciable capital in 1986 and less in
previous years).  The data for 1958 and 1960 are interpolated due to difficulties in collecting it. 
Grey highlighting indicates that the year contains the trough of an NBER designated recession
1 In 1998 the IRS switched to reporting industry figures by NAICS code, rather than SIC code.  I use the SIC based definition of "Finance, insurance, and real estate" throughout the
analysis.  To convert the NAICS definition to be equivalent to the SIC based definition of finance, I use the following industries: "Finance and insurance," "Real estate and rental and
leasing" net of the sub-major-industry "Rental and leasing services," and "Management of Holding Companies."  This follows the definition used by Cronin et al. (2013). 
2 Investment credits net of recapture are grossed up into a "deduction" equivalent using the effective tax rate on taxable income for that year (generally about the statutory rate).
3 Obtained from BEA Table 4.7: "Investment in Private Nonresidential Fixed Assets by Industry Group and Legal Form of Organization." Note the BEA considers S-Corps to be
corporate organizations.  The BEA figure also represents "net investment."  Investment in new  structures and equipment by non-financial corporations is larger than the figure displayed above
because the net investment figure represents the investment in new structures and equipment reduced by net sales of used equipment and structures by those corporations to
individuals and government. Those net sales of used equipment and structures are positive in every year.  Under a cash flow tax these sales of used capital goods from corporations
to individuals would be fully included by the corporation with no accompanying basis deduction.  This effect can be mimicked by using the BEA net investment figure and eliminating all
capital gains and non-capital gains.  If the figure for new capital goods is employed and all capital gains are eliminated, then the corporate cash flow base will be understated by the
amount of the net sales of used equipment and structures to the non-corporate sector.
4 As explained above, there is no adjustment for S-Corps' investment prior to 1986 because the relevant tax data presented above also includes S-corps.  Starting in 1986
S-Corp investment is apportioned based on that year's ratio of S-Corp non-financial depreciation to C-Corp non-financial depreciation.
5 Uses data from BEA Table 7.13: "Relation of Consumption of Fixed Capital in the National Income and Product Accounts to Depreciation and Amortization as Published by the
Internal Revenue Service."  The BEA data covers a somewhat different universe than the IRS data. For example, the IRS data includes foreign
branches, but BEA does not. Likewise the tax code allows for the immediate deduction of some items the BEA considers to be capital expenditures, like many expenditures on
mines or well exploration.  The BEA figure is therefore adjusted for coverage differences by scaling the BEA figure by the ratio of IRS:BEA depreciation of physical capital. 
6 After 1986, tax inventory charges will likely systematically exceed book inventory charges because the TRA '86 required capitalization of some expenses not traditionally capitalized into
inventory in book accounting.  The size of this difference is fairly small though (~$10 B a year from 1995 to 2013).  The public IRS data is not sufficient to calculate the tax inventory
charges prior to 1995.
7 The fact that most domestic dividends are already excluded from corporate taxation via the various domestic dividend deductions is adjusted for by taking 20% of the raw domestic
dividends as subject to full taxation, following GKS. From 2000-2013 this adjustment was almost exactly correct based on the additional data provided in those years dividends are
exempted from taxation. 
8 The preferential rate given to long term capital gains under tax law prior to 1986 (and hence partial exclusion of such gains from the tax base in the pre 1986 period) is adjusted for
by reducing long-term capital gains by 20%/the effective tax rate on taxable income for that year. 
9 Data obtained from BEA Table 4.1.
10 Data correspond to estimates of Corrado and Hulten (2010) made using perpetual inventory method.  For 2007 to 2013, I tack on the estimates using Peters and Taylor (2017),
who use a similar methodology for public companies.
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